THE NATVRE OF MAN. A learned and usefull Tract▪ written in Greek by Nemesius, surnamed the Philosopher; sometime Bishop of a City in Phoenicia, and one of the most ancient Fathers of the Church.

ENGLISHED, And divided into Sections, with briefs of their principall CONTENTS: BY GEO: WITHER.

LONDON: Printed by M. F. for Henry Taunton in St. Dunstans Churchyard in Fleetstreet. 1636.



I Am not carefull to annexe your other Titles: for they are not so much honour to you, as they [Page] are honoured by you; and your bare Name sounds more honorably in my judg­ment, then that which the breath of others can adde unto it.

I have made bold there­fore (though without your knowledge) to send abroad with your Name prefixed, this ancient Greek Father, newly taught to speak En­glish; that hee may receive your approbation where hee well expresseth his meaning, and your cor­rection hereafter where hee proves defective; For, I presumed you might by this meanes be provoked to the perusall thereof, not­withstanding your many studies.

[Page] Your Candor, and sin­gular humanity, make mee confident in this attempt; For though my Author be a stranger to most moderne Students, you (from whom no such Worthie is obscu­red) are his familiar ac­quaintance; and in whose Name could I have more properly brought this Aun­cient among my Country­men (to be entertained with respect) then in yours, who are the truest lover of Antiquities; and hee, who hath best shewed the right use of them to this Age?

I think not you to be any whit honoured by this De­dication; but, [...]hat I have rather magnified my selfe [Page] in making it an occasion to signifie that I have so noble a Friend. Yet without all such respects, I have done this, meerely to content my self, in that which I thought could not justly discontent you; and, to say truth, having a long time loved your per­son, and honoured your worth, it is now an ease, and a delight to mee, to expresse it by this occa­sion.

And, you have not been pretious to mee without cause: For, I being one of those, who preposterously, be­gin to write before they learne, you might justly enough have reputed mee worthy of contempt onely, when I was first presented to [Page] your acquaintance. Never­thelesse, (perceiving, it may be that the affections of my heart were sound, though the fruits of my braine were defective) you vouchsafed mee a friendly, and a fre­quent familiarity: where­by I got opportunities both to rectifiemy Judgement, and encrease my Vn­derstanding in many things.

Were the same humble af­fability in those, (whom a lesse degree of knowledge hath vainly puffed up, to the corrupting of them into that, which is worse then Ignorance) they might have beene more beloved; and perhaps, more wise men [Page] then they are. To amend them & to encourage others to the like Vertue, I have testified this of you, and in that, shall perchance, adde somewhat to your ho­nour.

I have lately confined my selfe to my rustick habita­tion, in that part of this Kingdome, which is famous for the best of those meats, wherewith the Poet Martial invited his friend: Pallens Faba, cum rubenti Lardo: yet it hath not made mee so meer a Corydon, but that I relish the delicates of the MVSES; and retaine some ambition to be continu­ed in your esteem. And, SIR, wheresoever I am, you shall [Page] ever be remembred, and be­loved of

Your unfained friend, and true Honourer, GEO: WITHER.

A PREFACE to the Reader, con­cerning the Author of this Book; touching the Contents thereof, and the Translation of the same, &c.

COnsidering how many professe Knowledge, few have attained the right way of it: and, those few are so much employed in labouring to keep the Truth from being [Page] smothered among the heaps of impertinent Volumes; and compelled to spend so much time in weeding out Heresies, and in discovering the falla­cies of Error, that they cannot so improve themselves and others, as else they might.

Upon the Foundations laid by the Prophets, and Apostles, many sacred Buildings, were with comely uniformity ere­cted by the Primitive Doctors of the Church; and, in every future Generation somewhat was, now and then, added (by the Worthies of their times) according to the first Patterns; and upon such occasions or necessities, as required the same, to the continuing and enlarging of Divine know­ledge.

But, wee in this last Age have blinded the same with confused Opinions; and heaped [Page] upon them so many tedious Commentaries, so many false Glosses, and needlesse Treati­ses; that Students half outrun their course, before they can passe through that Rubbish, which obscures from them the directest Paths, and fairest monuments of Truth. Yea, some of our later Paper-works are so plaistered, glazed, pain­ted, and sophisticated, accor­ding to the vanity of our new­fangled-humours: and, other­some, are so durtily slubbered over, sutably to the homeli­nesse of our moderne-fancies: that the first insinuates a false beleefe, or a superstitious faith, to the disadvantage and dishonour of ancient simplici­ty: the later, a prophane neg­lect of all Piety & good order.

A good meanes (as I con­ceive) to prevent such incon­veniences, is to bring into [Page] more frequent view, the Wri­tings of these Ancients who lived so neer to the Apostles, that they cannot be justly sus­pected, as favourers, or parties to the factions of these later Ages. For, many of them, are (if not altogether unknown) very rarely perused, by rea­son of the numberlesse No­velties, which have wearied the Presses, and filled the Li­braries of Europe.

Or, if an Ancient Peece, be accidentally discovered in this Wildernesse of Inventions, (by our Students of the later Editions) they seldome bring it, honestly, to light: But, ei­ther mangle it, as they please; or steale as much of it, as is ge­nerally plausible to trim, and stuffe out those Volumes, by which they purchase an un­due opinion of being learned. The rest, they endevour to [Page] rake up againe in obscurity; that their Theft may be hid­den: Or, (which is worse) that those Truths which they un­derstand not, (or favour not) may be weakned.

For this cause, it well be­came us to revive, now and then, those Ancients, whose wisedome is usefull to mode­rate our controversies. Some, have already laboured happi­ly in this way. And, I (who may well enough be reputed among such as have increased those Treatises, which keep more profitable Books from being frequently perused) doe now desire to make some sa­tisfaction for the same: and, to that end, have published in English this Tract of Neme­sius. who was one of the Champions of the Christian faith, whose Labours have been famously profitable in [Page] former times.

Though few are, now a­dayes, acquainted with him, you shall find him among the most ancient Greek Fathers: And, this Tract of his (which is pertinent to every member of man-kinde capable of Book-knowledge) was heretofore so wel esteemed, as to have been twice interpreted, out of Greek into Latine, (viz.) by Georgius Valla Placentinus, and Nacasius Ellebodius, of whose interpretations I have made use.

This Author was as honou­rable in his generation, as those that are more volumi­nous, and more frequently named: for, he was not onely so eminent for his Naturall Philosophy, as to be called (by way of excellency) NEME­SIUS the Philosopher; but, so good a Moralist also, and [Page] so expert in the Lawes of the Romane Empire, that, the most Reverend, learned and de­vout Father GREGORIE Nazian: (among whose Po­ems are Verses written to this NEMESIUS) hath highly magnified him, both for his Learning, and uprightnesse: and left it witnessed, likewise, that he was dignified with a Pre­sidentship in Cappadocia.

When those Verses were first written to our Author, he had not embraced the Chri­stian Faith. For, hee was by them invited thereunto: And their invitation seemed to have taken so good effect, that he became a happy Belee­ver; an eminent Champion in the Christian Warfare; a Bi­shop of a City in Phoenicia, a­bout the times of the Empe­rours VALENS and THE­ODOSIUS.

[Page] Some have doubted whe­ther he were the same Neme­sius mentioned by GREGO­RIE; onely, because he was a Lawyer & a Temporall Ma­gistrate: But questionlesse hee that was once an Infidell, and afterward a Beleever, might aswell have been, also, a Di­vine, and a Bishop, after he had exercised the Functions of a Lawyer and a Iudge; seeing it is no new matter, that they should execute a double-cal­ling, who have received a double portion of the Spirit.

For, in all Ages, (since Princes became Nursing-Fa­thers of the Church) it hath been usuall for Emperours, Kings, and other Free States, to make use of their Gifts, in Temporall Iudicatures, and in other publike Affaires, of whose Wisedome, and Faith­fulnesse, they had experience [Page] in Ecclesiasticall Govern­ments: yea, and it was no strange thing for men of say professions, to be called from common Affaires, to assume sacred Orders.

And (though some are un­discreetly offended thereat) it is not onely both conveni­ent and comely, that Ecclesi­asticall persons (who neither desire, nor ambitiously affect such Employments) should be, sometime, invited and au­thorized by their Soveraigns, to joyne unto their spirituall charge, an industrious care of the temporall welfare. But it so happeneth otherwhile, al­so, that this double Authority, (though it double the im­ployment) proveth so farre from being over-burthen­some, or a hinderance to the due execution of the first sin­gle calling, that hee upon whō [Page] it is conferred, is thereby the better enabled to mannage both for the generall advan­tage: And we finde this dou­ble calling, to have been so of­ten, so commendably, and so successefully practised in the most flourishing times, both of Iewish, and Christian Com­monweales; that it may be still warrantably imitated, so often as Soveraign power shall be pleased therewithall.

Our Nemesius (whose ma­nifold employments, and gifts of the Spirit, have perhaps, occasioned this digression, to some good purpose) embra­ced the Christian Faith, and received his Episcopall digni­ty (as it seemes by circumstan­ces) long after his President­ship: For, as by the words of GREGORIE may be col­lected, he had given faire te­stimonies both of his Pru­dence [Page] and Vprightnesse in that Office, before his Conversion: and his faithfulnes in the em­ploiment of that single talent; first vouchsafed, by the Com­mon grace, was rewarded with a large encrease, through the speciall favour of GOD, as the sequele hath declared.

The Authors whom he na­meth (none of them having li­ved since the Emperours afore­mentioned) are a probable ar­gument of his Antiquitie; and so likewise, is the scope of this Treatise, and his manner of handling the same: For, ac­cording to this command, When thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren; the learned Converts of the Pri­mitive Church, endevoured to fortifie their Profession (a­gainst the many heathen Phi­losophers who did then oppose it) by turning the weapons [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] of those enemies of Christia­nity against themselves; even by fooling their carnall wise­dome, in their owne logicall reasonings; and by the Princi­ples of their own Philosophie. And in this performance, our Author was both faithfull and painefull; as will appeare by the following Tract, wor­thy to be preserved and peru­sed in all generations.

For in what age, will the knowledge of the humane na­ture bee impertinent, or to what person of that kinde? nay, what knowledge, save the knowledge of GOD is more pertinent? Or, how can GOD be well knowne, by him, that knoweth not himselfe? It is that knowledge which this Booke teacheth; and in my o­pinion the ignorance of right­ly knowing our owne nature is one maine cause of the ma­ny [Page] absurdities, and unreasona­ble controversies which di­stract these times, yea, the ig­norance thereof is a principall cause that so many wickedly blaspheme GOD, & unthank­fully accuse him (without cause) of being niggardly to­wards them in the Talents of nature; and in requiring that of them, which hee hath not given them ability to per­forme.

Hence ariseth it also, that some consequently, and some directly make our good GOD the Author of all sinne; and MAN, not properly an a­gent, but a patient only in com­mitting evill. From this Igno­rance, likewise it proceedeth, that wee neither husband the gifts of nature (which is Gods common grace) nor endevour as we ought to doe, according to that ability which we have [Page] received: whereas, if wee knew what were given into our power, and what not; I think we should not so often, (as many of us doe) foolishly denie our essentiall propertie; but beleeve and worke, accor­ding to Sanctified reason.

Though our originall Na­ture were so depraved by our first parents fall, that wee lost our Well-beeing; yet wee lost not our Naturall-beeing, nor those Faculties, which made us capable of being renewed by speciall grace, when it should be ten­dred unto us. Though we fell very low, & were in a Down­fall, in which we should never have left sinking; and from which wee could never have raised our selves, by any pow­er remaining in our selves; yet we were not at the lowest by our Grand-fathers offence. [Page] For, the mercy of GOD, even IESVS CHRIST, stayed us from falling so low, as we had else tumbled; and from loosing absolutely our Ratio­nality, or any thing essentiall thereunto, by that Transgressi­on.

Yea, though the Will, and every other Powre of the SOUL were so maimed and bruized by the first Adam, that, like a broken Watch, their motions would have been still worse and worse, till they had utterly perished; and should never have mo­ved rightly of themselves, (nor by any other meanes) unless the second Adam, had, at least, benefited us without our owne righteous­nesse, as much as the first A­dam harmed us, without our personall sinne: yet, no man lost by the first Transgression, so [Page] much, as hee may lose by his own fault.

By the first sinne, wee lost, indeed, our light, but not our eyes. And therefore, when GOD sent the light of MAN­KIND into the World, hee reprobated those, onely, who rejected it. And why? not be­cause they saw it not; but be­cause they loved it not. For, that they saw it, is manifest by that place, which said, It enlightens every one which commeth into the world. Yea, the reprobate Jews could not deny but that they saw it; for, our Saviour told them, that, if they could have truely de­nyed to have seene this Light, they should not have had their sins imputed unto them: which, (under correction) I take to be the meaning of his words.

Now, if they saw it, wee [Page] may truely inferre that they received of his fulnesse, that common grace, and the preser­vation of every naturall facul­ty, so far forth, as might have enabled them, to become the sons of GOD; whereas, by the neglect of that single Talent, they became losers of more then Adam lost them; even to lose the right use of their naturall faculties, and to be of a Reprobate sense; having eyes, that see not: eares, that heare not: and hearts as void of un­derstanding, as the beast that perisheth. And, all this comes to passe through want of con­sidering, what is taught in this Book, even for want of know­ing what power wee have gi­ven us, and how wee are to exercise that power.

Let no man, therefore, de­spise this meanes of Instructi­on, nor prejudicately conceive [Page] (because it may have some expressions unsutable to their opinions) that NATURE is here magnified above GRACE, or in any measure equalled thereunto: or, that any power is thereto ascri­bed, derogating from the free mercy of GOD. Far is it from our Authors intention: and for ever, far be it from me, to be­come an instrument of pub­lishing such Doctrines. There is not (in my judgement) one syllable in this Tract, which tendeth not to the glorifying of GOD's Grace to Man­kinde. For, whatsoever is as­cribed to man, as being pri­marily in him by nature, is ac­knowledged to be the graci­ous gift of GOD: That which is affirmed to be left in him, since the fall, is confessed to have been justly forfeited, and yet preserved in him, by the [Page] free Grace of the same GOD: The good effects of all those Faculties, which are affirmed in mans power, were not (in my understanding) so much as thought, by this Author, (nor are they so conceived by me) to be wrought at any time without the conti­nuall assistance of the holy Spirit: neither is the naturall power of man, or the excellen­cy of his nature, here set forth for mans owne glory, or that he should arrogate anything to himselfe: But, that GOD's first and second GRACE vouchsafed unto us, might the more manifestly appeare. And that it might not be one­ly said, but made evident, also, that the sinne and unhappinesse of every man, is of himselfe, and not of GOD: all which is implyed (though not directly expressed) by the scope of this Booke.

[Page] They affirme in effect, this blasphemy, that every sinne is GOD's, (though in word they professe never so vio­lently against it) who will not allow that MAN (as this Treatise declareth) hath some things naturally in his owne power. For, unlesse that be granted, hee should have as little sinne, as righteousnesse of his owne: and beasts or blocks might as well be reputed righteous, or sinfull, & as justly be termed Reasonable-crea­tures, as men: yea, and many other absurdities are belee­ved and occasioned, by the ignorance of that, which is here taught.

Besides that, which is the maine scope of this Booke, divers brief testimonies of ancient Truths (lately suspe­cted of novelty) are here and there, occasionally inserted; [Page] yea, and to some in these dayes, that which was the prime intention of this Dis­course is, yet, as pertinent as when it was first written: For, there are not only as ma­ny still ignorant of their own Nature as heretofore; but, the same Stoicall Divinity, here opposed, and confuted, is, in some branches, so largely sprouted up againe, that, they are supposed to be ancient & orthodoxe principles of Chri­stianity; and so are they cryed up by a multitude of modern voices, that few beleeve, An­tiquity ever mentioned ought in contradiction to what they fancie to be the Truth.

To make it appeare other­wise, this Father of the Church speakes now in En­glish, what he spake in Greek much above a thousand yeares past: And therefore, though it [Page] were true (which as yet, I be­leeve not) that some of the later times have as learnedly handled the same subject; yet, because the noblenes of Truth, is other while suspected, when her Pedigree is obscured, I thought it not in vaine, to help to discover her Antiqui­tie, by the publication of this Author.

You have him (if I am not much deceived) according to his Genuine sense, though not every where grammatically interpreted; for that were but to play the part of a Pedant. And because a shew of tedi­ousnes, might make the same lesse profitable, I have not on­ly caused him to speak as brief­ly and as plainly to the mea­nest capacities, as I possibly could, (which is not easie in a Subject of this nature) but to prevent wearisomenes, and [Page] render it the more usefull, I have divided the longest Chapters, into equall Sections; & before every Chapter and Section, summed up the prin­cipall Contents of the same. Which will bee easefull unto those who have not leasure to read out long continued Dis­courses; especially when they have some speedy occasion to collect the Testimonies of Antiquitie.

Now that I may every way (as much as in me lieth) keep my Nemesius from being ei­ther misconceived, or misre­puted; I beseech my common Readers, to bee very heedfull in the perusall of him, least through want of understan­ding in themselves, they cen­sure him to be an Author not Intelligible, (as it hath pleased them to censure a learned writer now living) for such [Page] halfe witted people, as are nei­ther capable of the mysteries of Nature, nor of such tearms, as may properly expresse them, should learne to know, before they presume to cen­sure: which will never bee attained, without humility & some diligence.

Let them please to be heed­full also, when this Author speaks in his own person, and when in the person of others: for, sometime he bringeth in Arguments, and continued disputes, out of Ethnick Phi­losophers, (with all their cir­cumstances, to confute their fellowes; and if it be not well observed when hee so doth, some heathenish proposition, (interlaced therewith) may be wrongfully taken for his opi­nion: And, perhaps also a well meaning expression may bee misunderstood, contrary to [Page] the minde of the Authour, by a little obscurity in the Text, or by want of heeding, how his intention may be discove­red in other passages of the same Booke.

Nemesius hath heretofore suffred in this kinde, even by no worse men, then his two Latine Interpreters; and one of them hath charged him with being of their opinion, who beleeved the Transmigration of Soules, whereof hee was no way guilty, as may be made probable, not only by sundry expressions in this Tract; but by those words al­so, from whence this miscon­ceit arose; they being inter­preted, as I understand them.

They are to be found about the beginning of the seaventh Section of the second Chap­ter, and speake to this effect. Iamblicus (saith he) hath af­firmed [Page] in his Booke called MONOBIBLON, that the changing of Soules never hapneth from men to unrea­sonable creatures, nor from unreasonable creatures to men: but from Beasts, to Beasts, and from men, to men▪ and in so saying, hee hath not only conjectured very well of Platoes opini­on, but of the Truth it selfe.’

By these last words, Ne­mesius hath seemed to justifie the opinion, both of Iambli­cus, & Plato, touching Trans­migration of Soules. Now this clause I have understood as if it said thus, rather: And in so saying, hee hath not only well guessed, but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Pla­toes opinion. Let the learned judge, whether the Greek words will not well enough beare this Version (though not [Page] in a strict Grammaticall sense) especially since the context proves his opinion concerning the Soule to be the same which is generally belee­ved among Christians, for my part, till I see more cause to suspect the contrary, I shall alway so conceive of it.

That which is mentioned by another concerning his opi­nion touching the Soules preexistence before the Bodie, is not a matter of faith, or so precisely decided, as that he or we are (for ought I know) ob­liged, to be peremptorily for it, or against it; and therefore I my self have not yet so much thought upon it as to resolve which way to encline: or what to answer for him. If any man can assure me whether part is without errour, that will I embrace; and I am per­swaded so would Nemesius [Page] have done, if any man could have proved unto him that his opinion was erroneous, in that point; which if others beleeve of him, (as they have no just cause to the contrary) no more needes to be spoken of this matter.

If any be offended that hee argues philosophically, rather then by proofs of Scripture, and citeth Moses not as a Di­vine Prophet, but a Wiseman; Let them consider, that hee had such to contest withall, as neither beleeved the Scrip­tures, nor ascribed more unto Moses, or any other, then the Reasonablenesse of their affe­ctions seemed to deserve; The alledging of Scripture, there­fore, to such men, had been to cast pearles to swine, and more to the derision, then to the honour of his cause. This course was practiced by the [Page] Apostles themselves; To the Iewes and beleeving Gen­tiles, they brought the testi­mony of the Prophets: but to Unbeleevers, they cited their owne Poets, or convinced them by Reason.

Had our Author argued with Christians, the holy Scriptures onely, should have been Judges of their Contro­versies: For he himselfe saith, Cap. 2. Sect. 7. To us the Do­ctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient, &c. but against those who embrace not the Scriptures (as wee Christians doe) we must prove by Demon­stration, &c.

In these times, there be ma­ny, who though they deny not the letter of the Scrip­tures, yet they doe as bad (or worse rather) for they deny the true sense of them, and make interpretations accor­ding [Page] to their owne lusts and fancies. To these also, the holy Scriptures are impertinent proofs, till by some reasonable Demonstrations we can make them understand and confesse their true meaning: And some of these have so long, and so violently professed against Reason, as unusefull in the consideration of the Divine mysteries, that there is little hope either to work upon them by a rationall dispute, or to convince them by divine Authority, till GOD shall for­give their deniall and abuse of his common graces, upon true repentance for the same; and restore the Vnderstanding which is worthily darkned by that sinne: and for enlight­ning whereof, this Treatise, may perhaps become help­full.

Other things might bee [Page] here declared, to prevent pre­judice, and to shew forth the use and profitablenesse of this Booke: but lest they make this Preface over-large, I wil here conclude, and commit all to Gods blessing.

Geo: Wither.

PErcurri Librum bunc Denaturâ hominis, in quo ni­hil reperio sanae fidei, aut bo­nis moribus contrarium.

THO: WEEKES, R. P. Episc. Lond. Cap. domest.

[Page 1]NEMESIVS of the Nature of MAN.

CAP. 1.

SECT. 1.

I. The Definition of MAN: A quaere touching the Under­standing; and the opinions of Plotinus, Apollinarius, Ari­stotle & Plato concerning the SOVL & BODY of MAN. II. MAN partaking in some­what with every Creature, is a medium knitting together the whole Creation, & a ma­nifestation of the Unity of the CREATOR of all things. III. The Agreement, and comely order of GOD'S Works, of all which MAN is the true Epitome.

GOod men, (and of those not a few) have defined Man to consist of an Vn­derstanding [Page 2] Soul and a Body; and so true is this Definiti­on, that it may seeme he could not otherwise be, well, defined. Yet, when wee terme him an Vnder­standing soul, it may ap­peare doubtfull to some, whether the Vnderstan­ding comming to the soul (as one distinct thing comes to another) did be­get Vnderstanding in the Soul; Or, whether the Soul doth naturally contain in it self this understanding, as the most excellent part thereof; and, as being the same to the Soul, which the Eie is to the Body.

There be some, (and of this opinion is Plotinus) who thinking the Soul to [Page 3] be one thing, and the Body another, doe therfore af­firme, that MAN is com­posed of these three, a Soul, a Body, and Vnderstan­ding. Of this mind also was Apollinarius Bishop of La­odicea: For, having laid this, as the Foundation of his own opinion, he made the rest of his Building agreeable to the same Groundwork.

Others there are who divide not the Vnderstan­ding from the Soul in this manner; but suppose ra­ther, that the Vnderstan­ding is a principall of the Soules essence. Aristotle conjectures that a cer­tain potentiall understan­ding was made together [Page 4] with MAN, which might become actuall in time; and that the understan­ding which commeth to us from without, (and whereby we acquire an actuall knowledge) per­tains not to the naturall Essence of the Soul; but, assisteth in the knowledge and speculation of things: By which means it comes to passe, that very few, or none, but men addicted to the study of wisdome, are thought capable of this Actuall understanding.

PLATO seems to affirm that MAN consists not of a double essence; that is to say, joyntly of a Soul and a Body: but rather, that he is a soul, using (as it were [Page 5] Instrumentally) such a Bo­dy: and perhaps by fixing the mind upon that only, which is the most excel­lent part of Man, he seeks to draw us to such a seri­ous consideration of our selves (and of the divine nature) as might win us, the better, to pursue ver­tue, godlinesse, and such good things as are in the Soul: or else by perswading that we are (essentially) no­thing else but soul, hee would, peradventure, al­lure us to renounce the desires of the Body, as things not primarily per­tinent to MAN as MAN; but, chiefely belonging to him, as he is a living creature; and so, by conse­quence [Page 6] appertaining to him as he is a Man, in re­gard Man is a living-crea­ture.

And it is indeed con­fessed (not much other­wise) of all men, that the soul is far more to be e­steemed then the body: and that the body is but as it were an Instrument moved by the soul, as is evident in death. For if thereby the soul be divided from the body it is immediately as much without motion, as a Workmans Tools when hee hath cast them aside.

II This is manifest, that MAN in some things par­ticipates with creatures void of life; and that he is [Page 7] partaker also of life, as those living-creatures be, which are unreasonable: and that he is indowed likewise with understan­ding, as are Creatures reaso­nable. With inanimate creatures Man partakes in this, that he hath a Body, and in his mixture of the foure Elements. He agrees with Plants, not onely in that which is afore-men­tioned, but in having also both a nourishing and a feeding-power. His cohe­rence with unreasonable Creatures (over and above all the former particulars) is, in having a certaine voluntary motion, appetite, anger, and a power enabling him to feele and breathe: [Page 8] for all these are common both to Men and unreaso­nable creatures. Further­more, he communicates with Intelligent incorpore­all Natures, in reasoning, understanding, judging, and in pursuing vertue and a good life, which is the chief end of all vertues.

These things consider­ed, MAN standeth in such a Being as comprehends the sensible and intelligible Nature. In respect of his Bodily powers, and of his Bodily substance (which is subject unto sense) hee a­grees both with living-creatures, and with things void of life. In respect of his Reasonable part he com­municates with Substances [Page 9] which are bodilesse (or spi­rituall) as hath been said before: For, GOD the Creator of all things, hath seemed by little and little so to collect and knit toge­ther sundry differing natures, that all created things should become ONE And indeed, it will be a manifest proofe unto us, that there is but One Creator of all things, if we well consider how fitly he hath united the substance of in­dividuall things by their particular parts; and all the severall species (tho­rowout the world) by an excellent sympathie.

For, as in every living III creature hee hath joyned the parts insensible with [Page 10] such as have sense in them (as bones, fatt, haire, (and other insensible parts) to the flesh and sinewes (which are sensible) compoun­ding the Living-creature both of sensible and insensi­ble portions; and decla­ring that all these toge­ther make but one living-creature: Even so he hath joyned one to another, every particular species which was created, by or­dering and compounding that agreement and disa­greement which is in their natures; In so much that things inanimate doe not greatly differ from Plants which have in them a ve­gitative and nourishing life; neither are Plants wholy [Page 11] differing from sensible li­ving creatures void of rea­son; nor are those unreaso­nable creatures so aliena­ted in all things from crea­tures indowed with reason, as that they have no natu­rall allyance or similitude, whereby they may be linked one to another.

For even in stones (which are inanimate crea­tures, not having in them, for the most part, so much as a vegitative life) there is otherwise a certaine power, making them to differ from each other e­ven in their stony properties: but the Loadstone seemeth very far to exceed the na­ture and vertue of other stones, in that it both at­tracts [Page 12] Iron thereunto, and also detaineth it (being so attracted) as if it would be nourished thereby. Neither doth it exercise this vertue upō one peece of Iron alone; but, by that one peece, linketh fast a­nother, and imparteth his owne power to all other peeces which are contigu­ous thereunto: yea Iron draweth Iron, when it is touched by the Loadstone.

Moreover, when the CREATOR passed from Plants to living-creatures, he rushed not (as we may say) all at once, into things whose nature is to remove from place to place; and, to such as are indo­wed with sense: but, he [Page 13] proceeded, rather, by de­grees, and by a naturall and most comely progres­sion. For, the Shell-fishes called Pinnae, and Vrticae, are so made as if they were certain Plants, ha­ving sense in them For, he fastned them in the Sea with roots, and covered them also with shells as with bark. And, as therein he made them to partici­pate with Plants; so, he gave them likewise (in some measure) the feeling­sense, which is common to living-creatures. They a­gree with Plants in being rooted and fixed, and they communicate with living-creatures in their feeling In like manner the Sponge [Page 14] (though it be rooted in the Rocks) is of it self, ope­ned and contracted, accor­ding as the passenger ap­procheth toward it, or de­parteth frō it. And there­fore, Wise men have anci­ently termed such things [...], in English, Life-plants, if by a new word I may so name that which is partly a living-creature, and partly a Plant.

After the Fishes called Pinnae, he proceeded unto those, which (being una­ble to passe far from their station) doe move onely to and fro within some certaine space, such as are the most part of those, which have shells, and are called the bowels of the [Page 15] earth. He went further, and added (in the like ma­ner,) something to eve­ry thing in particular (as to some things more sen­ses; and to some o­ther, more ability to re­move themselves from place to place;) and, came next to those unreasonable-creatures which are more-perfect. Those, I call more-perfect-creatures, which have obtained all the sen­ses, and, can also remove themselves to places far distant.

And when GOD pas­sed from unreasonable-crea­tures to MAN (a Creature indowed with Reason) he did not perfect him in himself, (and, as it were, [Page 16] all at once;) but, first, in­graffed into some other li­ving-creatures, certain na­turall wiles, sleights, and de­vises for the saving of themselves, which, make them seeme to be almost reasonable-creatures: And, having done all this, he, then, brought forth MAN, which is, indeed, the true Reasonable-Creature.

The same Order (if it bee well considered) will appeare in the Voice, which from the noise of Horses & Oxen is brought, by little and little, from one plaine simple sound, unto the voices of Crowes and Nightingales, (whose voices consisting of many notes, can imitate what [Page 17] they are taught) and, so, by degrees it is termina­ted in the Articulate voice of MAN, which is di­stinct and perfect.

Furthermore hee made the various expressions of the Tongue to depend up­on the Minde, and upon Reason; ordaining the speech to publish forth the motions of the Minde: And, in this wise, by a sweet Musicall proporti­on, hee (collecting all things together) incorpo­rated all into ONE; aswell, things Intelligible, as things visible, and, made MAN as a meanes thereunto.

SECT. 2.

I. Why MAN was first made, and why he hath in him somewhat of the Nature of all Creatures. II. MAN is the Bounder between visible and In­tellectuall things, and becomes either an Earth­ly or Spirituall MAN, according as he is incli­ned to Good or Evill. A distinction between the Goods of the Mind and Body; and betweene the life of MAN as he is Man, and as he is meerly a living creature. III. The opinion of the He­brews touching the mor­tality and immortality of MAN.

[Page 19] THese things conside­red, Moses in expres­sing the Creation of the World, did very properly affirme that MAN was last made. Not only, because all things being made for MAN, it was most con­venient, that all such things ought first to bee provided, which were ne­cessarily pertinent to his use; and that he who was to have the use of them, should afterward be crea­ted: But, in respect both intellectuall and visible sub­stances, were created, it seemed also convenient that One should be made, by whom those two Na­tures should be so united together, that the whole [Page 20] World might become ONE; and be in it owne selfe so agreeable, that the same might not bee at va­riance, or estranged from it selfe. Even to this end, was MAN made such a li­ving-creature, as might joyne together both Na­tures, and (to summe up all in a word) therein was manifested the admirable wisdome of the universall CREATOR.

II Now MAN being pla­ced (as it were) in the Bounds betweene the Rea­sonable-nature, and that which is Irrationall; if he incline to the Bodie, setling the maine part of his affe­ctiō upon corporal things; he chuseth and embraceth [Page 21] the life of unreasonable-creatures; and, for that cause, shall be numbred among them, and be cal­led (as Saint Paul terms him) An earthly MAN, to whom it shall be thus said, Earth thou art, and to Earth thou shalt returne: yea by this meanes he be­comes (as the Psalmist af­firms) like the Beast which hath no understanding. But, if he incline rather to the Reasonable part, and con­temning Bodily lusts and pleasures, shall make choice to follow that bles­sed and divine life which is most agreeable unto MAN, he shall, then, be ac­counted a Heavenly MAN, according to that saying; [Page 22] Such as the earth is, such are they that are earthly; such as the heavenly are, such are they that are heavenly: and indeed that which principally pertaineth unto the Reasonable-Na­ture, is to avoid and op­pose Evill, and love and follow that which is Good.

Of Good things some are common both to the Soul and to the Body (of which sort the Vertues are) and these have a relation unto the Soul, in respect of the use which it maketh of the Body, being joyned there­unto.

Some good things per­taine to the soul only, by it self, (so that it should not need the help of the body) [Page 23] as godlinesse, and the Con­templation of the nature of things: and therefore so many as are desirous to live the life of MAN as he is a MAN, (and not onely in that he is a living creature) do apply them­selves to Vertue and Piety. But we will anon shew distinctly what things pertain to Vertue, and what to Piety, when we come to discourse of the Soul and of the Body: For, seeing wee doe not yet know what our Soul is in respect of the substance thereof, it is not yet con­venient for us to treat here, of those things that are wrought by it.

The Hebrewes affirme III [Page 24] that MAN was made from the beginning, neither al­together mortall, neither wholly immortall, but, as it were, in a state betweene both those natures, to the end that if he did follow the affections of the body, he should be liable to such alterations as belong to the bodie; But if he did prefer such good things as pertaine to the soul, he should then be honoured with Immortalitie For, if GOD had made MAN ab­solutely mortall from the beginning, he would not have condemned him to die after he had offended; because it had beene a thing needlesse to make him mortall by condemna­tion, [Page 25] who was mortall be­fore. And on the other side, if he had made Man absolutely immortall, hee would not have caused him to stand in need of nourishment; for, nothing that is immortall needeth bodily nourishment.

Moreover, it is not to be beleeved, that God would so hastily have re­pented himself, and made Him to be forthwith mor­tall, who was created ab­solutely immortall: For it is evident that he did not so in the Angels that sin­ned, but (according to the nature which they obtai­ned from the beginning) they remained immortall, undergoing for their of­fences [Page 26] not the penalty of Death, but of some other punishment. It is better therefore, either to be of the first mentioned opi­nion touching this mat­ter; or, else, thus to think, that MAN was indeed created mortall, but, yet, in such wise that if hee were perfected by a ver­tuous and pious progressi­on, he might become im­mortall: that is to say, he was made such a One, as had in him a potentiall a­bilitie to become immor­tall.

SECT. 3.

I. Our Author sheweth why the Tree of Knowledge of good and evill was forbidden; &, that it was, at first, expedient for MAN to be ignorant of his owne Nature. II. MAN by the Trans­gression, attained that knowledge of himselfe, which diverted him from the way of perfection and Immortalitie. III. The Elementarie c [...]mpo­sition and nourishment of Mans bodie: The reasons also why it needed fee­ding, clothing, curing &c. and why MAN was made a Creature sensible, and capable of Arts and Sciences, &c.

[Page 28] IT being inexpedient, rather then any way helpful, for MAN to know his own nature, before he came to his perfection, GOD forbad him to taste the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evill: For there were, and doubtlesse as yet there are very great vertues in Plants; but at the first, (in respect it was in the beginning of the worlds Creation) their vertues being (before the curse) pure and void of all mixture, had in them a strong operation; and it is not therefore strange that there should be (by Gods [Page 29] providence) the taste of a certain Tree, that should have a power given to ingender in our first pa­rents, the knowledge of their own nature.

The cause why God would not have MAN to know his owne nature, be­fore hee had attained to perfection, was this: lest he knowing himself to stand in need of many things, should (as by the sequell we find it manifest) labour on­ly to supply the wants of his Body, and utterly cast away the care of his Soul; and for this cause did God forbid him to tast of the fruit of knowledge of good and evill.

By disobeying this Com­mandement, II [Page 30] MAN attai­ned to the knowledge of Himself, but thereby fell from the state of growing to perfection, and busied himself in taking care for such things as the body needed: For (according to the words of Moses) as soone as he had eaten, He knew that he was naked, and immediately sought about to get a covering for his nakednesse: whereas, till then, God kept him as it were in a Traunce, and in such case that hee knew not himself.

When hee fell away from the state of growing to perfection, hee fell also from his immortalitie, which by the mercy of his [Page 31] Creator he shall recover a­gaine at the last. In the meane time it was gran­ted him that hee should eat flesh (whereas before his fall, God willed him to bee content with such things only as grew out of the earth, all which hee had provided for him in Paradise) yea the first meanes of growing to perfection being become desperate, it was permit­ted him to feed as hee would.

Now, seeing Man con­sisteth III of a Bodie (as of one of his parts) and seeing e­very (inferiour compound) bodie is composed of the foure Elements, it is ne­cessary that such things [Page 32] should happen unto him, as the Elements are subject unto; That is to say, Cut­ting, mutation and flowing. By mutation I mean muta­tion in Qualitie; and I terme it Flowing when he is emptied or purged of such things as are in him. For a living creature hath alway his evacuati­ons, both by such pores as are manifestly seene, and by such also as we see not; whereof I shall speake hereafter.

It is necessary there­fore, that so much should be taken in again, as was e­vacuated; seeing else, the living creature would pe­rish through defect of what should re-enter to [Page 33] supply the want: And (if the things evacuated be ei­ther dry, or moist, or spi­rits) it is as necessary that the living creature should have a continuall supply of dry and moist nourishments, and of spi­rits.

The meats and drinks which wee receive, are made of those Elements, whereof we also are com­posed: for every thing is nourished with what is agreeable and like unto it, and (in diseases) we are cured with what is con­trary (to the disease.)

There he some of the Elements which we some­time receive into our Bo­dies immediately of thē ­selves; [Page 34] and sometime use means unto the receiving of them; as for example, we somtime receive water of it self; sometime wee use Wine and Oyle, and all those that are called moist fruits, as means to the receiving of water. For wine is nothing else but a certain water comming from the Vine, and so or so qualified. In like manner we partake of Fire some­time immediately, as when we are warmed by it; sometime also by the means of such things as we eate and drink: for all things containe in them some portion of Fire, more or lesse. We are in like case partakers of Aire: [Page 35] either immediately when we breathe it, and have it spread round about us, or draw it in by our eating and drinking; or else by meanes of such other things as we receive into us.

But as for the Earth, we seldome or never re­ceive it immediately, but by certain meanes. For, we eate the corn which com­meth of the earth. Larks, Doves, and Partridges feed oftentimes upon the earth; but Man usually feedeth on the earth by the means of feeds, fruits, berries, and by the flesh which proceedeth from things nourished by the Earth.

[Page 36] And forasmuch as God respecting not onely a de­cencie, but also the fur­nishing of us with a very quick sense of feeling, (in which man exceedeth all other living creatures) he hath clothed us neither with a tough skin as Oxen and other beasts, that have a thicke hide; neither with large thicke set haire, as goats, hares, and sheepe; neither with scales, as fishes and ser­pents; neither with hard shells, as Tortoises and Oysters; neither with a more fleshie bark, as Lob­sters; neither with fea­thers, as birds; and there­fore (wanting these cove­rings) it is necessary wee [Page 37] should have Raiment, to supply that in us, which nature hath bestowed on other living creatures.

These are the causes why wee stand in need of nourishment and clothing: And not onely for the same ends are our houses become necessary; but al­so that wee may escape the violence of wilde beasts, which is none of their least commodities.

Moreover (by reason of the distemperature of qualities in the humane bo­dy) Physitians and their art are likewise needfull, that thereby (as often as occasion requires) those things which are rent a­sunder, may be fastned a­gaine [Page 38] together for the preservation of health. And whereas the alterati­on consisteth in the quali­ty, it is necessary that wee bring the state of the bo­dy to a just temperature by the contrary Quality: For, it is not the Physitians pur­pose (as some think) to coole the Bodie which hath beene in a heat, but to change it into a tempe­rate estate; seeing if they should coole it, the di­sease turneth (not to health, but) to the contrary sick­nesse.

Now in regard of Arts and Sciences, (and by the necessarie use which we have of such things as they accomplish) it so [Page 39] commeth to passe that we need the mutuall assi­stance one of another, and by that need which wee have each of other, many of us assembling to­gether in common, doe thereby the more conve­niently bargaine and con­tract for such things as may serve to supply the necessities of life.

This meeting and dwel­ling together, was anci­ently termed by the name of a Citie; by the neere neighbourhood whereof, men received aid and profit by each o­thers arts & labours, with­out the discommodities of long and far Travaile. For, Man was naturally [Page 38] [...] [Page 39] [...] [Page 38] [...] [Page 39] [...] [Page 40] made to be such a living creature, as should be soci­able, & delighted in neigh­bourhood. And forasmuch as men could not other­wise be so conveniently provided of useful things; it is evident that the stu­dy of Arts, and the necessi­ty of traffick were the first occasions of erecting Cities.

SECT. 4.

I. Of the two Priviledges which MAN hath ob­tained above all other Creatures, (viz.) to be capable of the Forgive­nes of sinnes, and Im­mortalitie: the Justice and Mercy of GOD in vouchsafing the pardon of sinne of MAN, and de­nying the same to An­gels. II Man only is a creature capable of lear­ning Arts and Sciences: A Definition of Man, and Reasons justifying every branch of that De­finition. III. The World was not made for the Angels, nor for any other, but MAN onely. To him was committed the government of the Vniverse, with a limita­tion to use, not abuse the Creatures.

[Page 42] THere are also two Priviledges which Man hath specially gotten a­bove all other. One is, to obtaine pardon by Repen­tance; the other is that his body being mortall should be brought to im­mortalitie. This (privi­ledge) of the body, he get­teth by meanes of the soul; and the priviledge of the soul, by reason of the bodie: Yea, among Rea­sonable creatures, Man only hath obtained this Peculi­ar, that God vouchsafeth [Page 43] him the pardon of sin up­on repentance; For nei­ther the Devils nor the Angels are vouchsafed pardon, though they doe repent.

Hereby the most ex­act Iustice, and admirable mercy, of GOD is both fully proved and evident­ly declared: For, good cause is there why pardon should not bee granted to Angels, though they doe repent; because there is nothing in them, which naturally allures or draws them to sin; and in regard also that they (of their own nature) are free from all passions, wants, and pleasures of the body.

But MAN, though hee [Page 44] be indowed with Reason, yet hee is also a bodily li­ving creature, and there­fore his wants (in that hee is such a living creature) together with his passions, do often blinde and captivate his reason. And therefore (when he returnes againe by repen­tance, and applies himselfe unto vertue) he obtaineth mercy and forgivenesse: For as it is proper to the Essence of MAN to have the ability of laughing (because it agreeth to man only, to all men, and ever to man) so (in respect of those things, which pro­ceed from the grace of God) it is proper unto Man above all Creatures indued [Page 45] with Reason, to bee deli­vered, by Repentance, from the accusation and guil­tinesse of all those things wherein he hath formerly transgressed. Yea, this Grace is given to MAN onely; to all men; and ever to man, during the conti­nuance of his life in this world, and no longer: for after Death there is no more Forgivenesse.

Some there bee who give a reason why the Angels could no more ob­taine pardon by repentance after they had fallen; and it is this that followes. The Fall of Angels, was (as they affirme) a kind of Death unto them; and God vouchsafed them the [Page 46] tender of a pardon before their utter falling away, when like account was to bee made of them, as is made of Men during this life: But because they ac­cepted not the grace offe­red, they received after­ward (as a just reward) punishment everlasting without pardon. And hereby it plainly appeares that such as refuse Repen­tance, doe reject that which is a speciall good gift of God, and peculiar to MAN.

This also is one of the things proper and peculi­ar unto MAN, that of all other living creatures on­ly the body of MAN should arise againe after Death, [Page 47] and aspire to Immortalitie. This priviledge the body gaineth in respect of the immortalitie of the soule; as likewise the soule obtai­neth the other (that is to say, pardon after Repen­tance) in respect that the Body, is weake and trou­bled with many passions.

It is a thing proper al­so,II to MAN only, to learn Arts and Sciences, and to worke according unto such Arts: For which cause they who define him, say thus; MAN is a li­ving Creature, induced with Reason, mortall, capable of Consideration and Science.

He is tearmed a living-creature, in that he is a sub­stance having life indued [Page 48] with sense: for, that is the definition of a living-crea­ture.

He is said to be indued with Reason, that hee may be distinguished from un­reasonable-creatures.

He is called mortall, to make a difference betwixt him and the Reasonable-creatures, that are immor­tall.

And, this clause [capable of Consideration & Science] is added thereunto, be­cause wee come to Arts and Sciences by learning of them; having in us na­turally a certaine potenti­all ability to receive both understanding and Arts; but, not actually attaining them save by study and practise.

[Page 49] There be some, who say that this last clause was lately added to the Definition; and, that it had beene good enough with­out the same, were it not, that some bring in their Nymphes, and other petty Deities of those kinds, who are said to live long, and yet not to be immortall; And to distin­guish MAN from those, these words, Capable of consideration and science were judged needfull; be­cause, none of that sort are thought to learne any thing; but, to know natu­rally, whatsoever they are said to know.

The Iewes are of opini­on III on that the whole World [Page 50] was made for MAN (even immediately for his sake) as Oxen with other beasts for tillage, or to bear bur­thens; and, as grasse was made for the Beasts. For some things were made for their owne sakes; and some for the sakes of o­thers. All reasonable-crea­tures were made for their owne sakes: Vnreasonable-creatures and things with­out life, were ordained for others, not for themselves.

Now, if such things were made in respect of others, let us consider for whom they were, indeed, created. Shall wee think they were made for the Angels? Doubtlesse, no wise man will say that [Page 51] they were made for their sakes; because, the things made for the respect or sake of another, must con­cern either the making, or the continuance, or the re­creation of those things for which they were made: For, they are made ei­ther in respect of the pro­pagation and succession of their kinde; or of their nourishment; or to cover them; or to cure them, or for their better welfare and rest.

Now the Angels need no such things; for, they neither have any succession of their kind, neither want clothing, bodily nourishment, nor any thing else: And, if Angels have no need of [Page 52] such things, it is then evi­dent that no other nature having place above the Angels; can have need of them; because by how much higher the place of it is, so much the lesse need hath it of supply or assi­stance from another.

This being so, we must seek out a Nature which is indued with Reason, and yet needeth such things as are aforementioned; and what other nature can be found of that sort, if MAN be passed over? Surely none: And if no other can be discovered, it follow­eth by good reason that both things void of life, and unreasonable-creatures, were made for the sake [Page 53] of MAN; and if they were ordained for him (as it is evident they were) then, that was likewise the cause why he was consti­tuted the Governor also of those creatures.

Now, it is the duty of a Governour, to use those things which are put un­der his government, in such manner and measure as need and conveniencie shall require; and not to abuse them untemperate­ly, or to serve voluptuously his owne delicate Appe­tite. Neither ought he to bear himself tyrannously or ungently towards those whom he governes. For, they that so doe (yea and they that use not merci­fully, [Page 54] their unreasonable-cattell) are therein great Offenders; neither per­forming the part of a Go­vernour, nor of a just man, according to that which is written, The just man hath compassion upon the life of his Beast.

SECT. 5.

I. It is here proved, that nei­ther things without-life, nor the unreasonable. creatures, were made for themselves; First, by ar­guments taken from the consideratiō of the nature and use of things with­out life. II. It is proved also by considering those creatures, which are void of reason, and which are (for the most part) very serviceable to MAN. III. And lastly, it is proved by considering those things which seeme to be rather harmfull then profitable to Mankind.

BUt some perhaps will say, that nothing was [Page 56] made inrespect of another but every thing in respect of it selfe. Therefore, di­stinguishing first between things inanimate and those that have life, let us ob­serve whether things void of life are likely to have beene created onely for their owne sake.

For if those things were made in respect of them­selves, how, or upon what should living-creatures feed? wee see that Na­ture out of the earth pro­duceth food both of fruits, and of plants, to every living-creature, some few excepted, whose fee­ding is upon flesh; yea, and those creatures which are nourished by eating [Page 75] flesh, doe feed on such beasts as are sustained by eating the fruits of the earth: For, Lions and Wolves, feed on Lambes, Goats, Harts, and Swine. Aegles also, and all sorts of Hawkes, devoure Partrid­ges, Doves, Hares, and such like; which are fed with what springeth out of the ground.

Moreover, the nature of those Fishes which de­voure one another, doth not so extend it self to all fishes, that they do gene­rally devoure the flesh of one another; but it brea­keth off in such as eate weeds and such other things as grow in the wa­ter. For, if all sorts of fishes [Page 58] had been inclined to eate the flesh of one another, so that no kindes of them could feed on any thing else, but on the flesh of themselves, verily they could not have long con­tinued (no not for a small time) but would have beene utterly destroyed, some of them each by o­ther, and the rest for lacke of meat.

To the intent then, that it might not so happen, certaine Fishes were so made, that they might ab­staine from the flesh of the rest, and feed (if I may so tearme it) on the grasse of the Sea, that, by them, the other sorts of fishes might be preserved. These [Page 59] fishes feed upon weedes; other fishes feed upon them; Those, againe, are food for other greater fi­shes. So, by the feeding on such fishes as last of all doe eate the weeds of the Sea, (which come of the slimie waters) the sub­stance of the rest of the fi­shes is successively conti­nued.

Having reasonably de­monstrated, that the Plants were not created in respect of themselves, but in regard of the non­rishment and nature both of Men & of other living-creatures, it will be there­by manifest that such things also, were made in respect of Man and other [Page 58] [...] [Page 59] [...] [Page 60] living-creatures, which are meanes and causes of the encrease and preservation of those interiour things: And if that be so, it will be as apparant that the motions of the starres, the firmament, the seasons of the yeare, the showers, and all such like things, were made in respect of those things without life afore-mentioned, and to the end that nourishment being continually admi­nistred unto them, the nature of such fruits might be perpetuated, and that Men and living-creatures also (for whom those were ordained) might bee pre­served, by them.

II It resteth not to consider [Page 61] whether the nature of unreasonable creatures, was made in respect of it selfe, or for MAN's cause: and sure, it cannot but be very absurd, to affirme that things incapable of un­derstanding, and living on­ly by an instinct of Nature (yea, things groveling to­ward the earth, and by their very shape declaring their bondage) should be brought into the world for their owne sake. Much might be spoken to prove the contrary, even so much as would spin out this one point to the length of a Treatise, if I should handle the same at large, and therefore I will briefly mention in this [Page 62] place, those things onely which are of greatest weight.

By seriously conside­ring (as it were in a glasse or image) those things which are without us by such things as are within us, we should make a plain demonstration hereof; yea, and by considering the very substance of the things themselves, which are in question. For, if wee ponder in our minde that part of our selves, which is irrationall, and the parts thereof (I mean appetite and anger, which are ordained to serve the Reasonable-part) wee shall there see, that Reason ru­leth, and that the unreaso­nable-parts, [Page 63] are ruled; that Reason commandeth, and that the other are com­manded, and serviceable to such uses, as Reason will have them to bee subject unto; if MAN preserve that cōdition which doth naturally appertaine unto him.

Now then, if our part which is reasonable doth beare rule over our unrea­sonable-parts, which are within us; seemeth it not much more probable, that our reasonable-part should have dominion over such unreasonable-things as are without us? and that such things were ordained to serve our necessities? e­specially seeing it is accor­ding [Page 64] to the law of Nature that the unreasonable shold be subject to the reasona­ble, as hath beene declared by those things which are in our selves?

This may bee further manifested, by conside­ring that divers creatures are made even fit for the necessary services of MAN. For, Oxen and all bearing cattell are natu­rally fitted for the tillage of the earth, and for bea­ring of burthens. Sundry other beasts of the field also, and many fishes and soules, for dainty feeding, yea, and singing-birds for our delight and recreati­on.

III And al-beit all things [Page 65] doe not alwayes serve to such pleasing uses, but that there are some which may seeme rather to harm and destroy man; it is to be considered that when those things were created, the speciall end of whose creation was at first for man's service; all other things which might be o­therwise usefull were then created also, that in the Creation there might bee no defect, or want of such things whereof there might bee afterward any use.

Neither were such things as are now accoun­ted harmfull, exempted utterly from the profita­ble fruition of man; but, [Page 66] he by reason, doth, or may, fruitfully employ to his advantage, even the most venomous things. For, hee useth poisonous creatures to the curing of such harmes as come by those, and other veno­mous beasts, and to the curing of many infirmi­ties other wayes occasio­ned. Such are the confecti­ons called [...] (whereof our Triacle is one sort) which reason hath inven­ted, that by their owne power those things might be made to cōquer them­selves, and procure health and safety (as it were) from conquered enemies.

Man hath also many other things of great ver­tue [Page 67] given unto him by his Creator, which being contrary to those mis­chievous things, have in them a power to with­stand or qualifie their vi­rulent operations; to re­medy their hurts; and to defend him from their se­cret assaults. One thing serveth to one use, other things to other uses, and God hath so provided that all things should bee helpfull for the benefit and preservation of Man, yea and some things there be which are serviceable no way else.

SECT. 6.

I. He sheweth why the crea­tures are now harmfull to MAN, seeing all things were at first created for his benefit: Exemplary demonstrations intima­ting how this mischiefe might be remedied. II. A briefe Elogium in praise of the excellent nature and prerogatives of MAN. III. This chap­ter is concluded, with a short exhortation, that a thankfull use be made of the high favours vouch­safed unto MAN.

THat which hath beene formerly said touching [Page 69] the harme which MAN receiveth somtimes from the unreasonable-creatures, hath respect onely to the present condition of Man­kinde in this life; for, if we looke back to the first time which was long ago, wee shall finde that none of the irratinall-creatures durst to be offensive unto MAN; but, that all of them were subject unto him, faithfully serving and obeying him, so long as he did master his owne passions, and subjected his unreasonable-parts to the part-reasonable. And when hee gave the reines to his owne affections, not sub­duing them to reason, but suffered himselfe to be o­ver-mastered [Page 70] by the brute desires which were within him; it was very just, that (as it hath since hapned) he should be over-awed by the wilde-beasts, and by such other harmefull things as are without him.

For, after MAN had sinned, then began those beasts to be hurtfull unto him, which had else been serviceable; as may yet appeare true by those who have lived a superemi­nent life, and thereby pre­vented the mischievous assaults of such creatures. Of this, Daniel and Paul are exemplary witnesses: for, neither could the Li­ons finde power to seife the one; nor the Viper to [Page 71] fasten upon the other.

These things conside­red,II who is able to com­mend sufficiently the no­bility of this living-crea­ture? Behold, he bindeth together in himself things mortall and immortall; and knitteth up in One, things reasonable and unreasonable. In his owne nature, hee beareth the image of all creatures, and from thence is rightly called A little world. He is a creature, of whom God hath vouchsa­fed to take so much re­gard, that all created-things both present and to come, were for him created. He is that creature also, for whose sake GOD became MAN, and who shaking [Page 72] off his corruption, finisheth it in a never-ending im­mortality.

Yea, he is that creature, who being made after the image and likenesse of GOD, raigneth above the heavens, living and be­comming cōversant with CHRIST the sonne of GOD, who sitteth above all power and authority; and no eloquence may wor­thily publish forth the manifold preheminences, and advantages which are bestowed on this creature.

He passeth over the vast Seas; he rangeth about the wide heavens, by his con­templation, and conceives the motions and the magni­tudes of the stars. He en­joyes [Page 73] the commodities both of sea and land: He contemns the furie of wild-beasts, & the strength of the greatest fishes. He is learned in every science, and skilfull in Artificiall, workings. Hee communi­cates by writing, with whomsoever he pleaseth, though they be far distant; and is nothing hindred therein by the absence of his Bodie. He foretelleth things to come: he ruleth all, subdueth all, and en­joyeth all things.

He talketh with Angels, yea, and with GOD him­self. He hath all the Crea­tures within his Domini­on; and keeps the Devils in subjectiō. He searcheth [Page 74] out the nature of every thing, and is diligently studious in the know­ledge of GOD. He was borne to be the house and Temple of the Holy-ghost; and he acquires the frui­tion of all these priviledges by Vertue and Piety.

But lest it may be thought, of some, that we proceed unskilfully, in setting forth so largely the praises of Man; (whereas wee should rather have contented our selves to proceed with a Discourse touching the nature of MAN, according to our first purpose) wee will break off our speech, in this place; though we are not ignorant, that by set­ting [Page 75] forth his preheminence and priviledges, we have not improperly prosecu­ted our intention to de­clare the Nature of MAN.

And, now, seeing it is III manifested unto us, of how great nobility we are partakers, and that we are a heavenly plant; let us not deface or shame our Na­ture, neither let it be true­ly said that we are unwor­thy of such gifts: nor let us foolishly deprive our selves of so great Power and Glory and Blessednes, by casting away the frui­tion of Ioyes that shall be everlasting, for the see­ming possession of imper­fect pleasures, which will endure but a while: But, [Page 76] let us preserve, rather, this nobility of ours, by doing good, by abstaining from evill works, and by a good-zeal, intent or purpose; For to such endeavours, (if we seek it by prayer) God al­waies lendeth his assisting hand.

Thus much concerning these matters: And now seeing it is the received opinion, that MAN con­sisteth of Body and Soul we will follow the same Division; treating first of the Soul, and therein passe by those questions which being over subtile, and difficultly understood, can­not be intelligibly ex­pressed to many capaci­ties.

CAP. 2.

SECT. 1.

I. The severall and different Opinions of the An­cients concerning the SOVL, as whether it be a Substance; whether cor­poreall, or incorporeall, whether mortall or im­mortall, &c. II. The con­futation of those who af­firme in generall that the SOVL is a corporeall-substance. III. Confuta­tions of their particular Arguments, who affirme that the SOVL is Bloud, Water, or Aire.

EXceeding great va­riance is discovered among the old Phi­losophers in their discourses [Page 78] of the SOUL; insomuch that almost all of them differ one from another in that matter. Democritus and Epicurus, and the whole sect of the Stoicks doe peremptorily affirme that the SOVL is a Bodie; and those very men who affirme the SOVL to be a Bodie, dissent one from a­nother in declaring the Essence of it.

The Stoicks affirm, that it is a certain Blast, hot and fiery. Critias holds, that it is bloud. Hippon the Philo­sopher, will have it to be water, Democritus thinks it is fire; and his opinion is, that the round Formes of indivisible-bodies or Atomes being incorporated, by [Page 79] ayre and fire, do make up the Soul. Heraclitus con­ceives that the Soul of the whole frame of the World is a certaine breathing out of the vapours, from moist things; and, that the Soul which is in living-crea­tures, doth proceed both from exhalations without themselves, and from exha­lations, also, within them; and being of the same kind, of which they them­selves are.

Againe (on the contra­ry part) there are almost innumerable disagree­ments among them who say that the SOUL is not a Body, or Bodily-substance. Some of them affirm that the SOUL is a substance [Page 80] and immortall; Some, that it is without a Bodie, and neither a substance nor im­mortall.

Thales, who was the first of that opinion, held that the SOUL was alwaies in motion, and had that motion from it selfe. Pythagoras thought that it was a NUMBER moving it selfe. Plato affirmed that it was a substance (to be conceived in mind) that received mo­tion from it self, according to NUMBER and HAR­MONY. Aristotle taught that it was the first continu­all-motion of a BODIE-NATURALL, having in it those Instrumentall parts, wherein was possibility of life. Dinarchus took it to [Page 81] be an Harmony of the foure Elements; not a Harmony made of sounds, but as it were a tunable tempera­ture and agreement, of hot & cold, moist & dry things, in the Bodie. But, it is without doubt that all the best of these doe agree in this, that the SOUL is a substance; Aristotle and Di­narchus excepted, who af­firme that it is no substance at all.

Besides all these, some were of opiniō that there was but one and the same SOUL belonging to all things; which was by smal portions distributed to all particular things; and, then gathered into it self againe: of which opinion [Page 82] were the Manichees and certain others. Some like­wise imagined the Soules were many, and of differing sorts; Some affirmed that there was both one uni­versall, and many particu­lar SOULS; and there­fore it cannot be, but that my Discourse must be drawne to a great length, seeing I am to disprove so many opinions.

II Therefore, to confute in generall all those toge­ther, who affirme that the Soul is a corporeall essence, it shall be sufficient to al­ledge that which hath been heretofore delive­red to that purpose by Numinius the Pythagorist, and by Amonius the Ma­ster [Page 83] of Plotinus, who thus affirme:

All Bodies, being by their proper nature muta­ble, and such as may be ut­terly dispersed and divi­ded into innumerable parts (and having nothing remaining in them which may not be changed and dispersed) have need of something to close them in, to bring them toge­ther; to knit them into one; and (as it were) to hold them fast united: And, this we say is done by the SOUL.

Now if the SOUL be corporeall, (let it be what Body you please) yea, though it be a body con­sisting of the most thin [Page 84] and subtile parts, what will you say holds that to­gether, as that knitteth the Bodie in One? For, as we declared before, every Bodily thing hath need of some other thing to fasten the parts of it together; yea the Bodie of this SOUL, that knits together our visi­ble BODIE, (if we should grant the same to be a corpo­reall SOUL) and the next to that also, infinitely, it would still have need of some other thing to knit and fasten its own parts together, untill an incorporeall-essence were found out.

If they answer, as the Stoicks doe, that, there is a certaine motion pertaining unto Bodies, extending [Page 85] both to the inward and outward parts of the Body: That the motion tending outward, effects the quanti­ty and the qualities of the Body; and, that the motion tending inward, is cause both of uniting the body and of the essence thereof; wee will then aske them (seeing every motion doth proceed from some power) what kinde of power it is, which that motion hath? in what consisteth it? and what gives essence there­unto?

If this power bee a cer­taine matter (which the Greekes call Hylen) wee will use the same reasons against them, which wee objected before. If they [Page 86] say it is not matter, but a materiall thing, (for matter and materiall things thus differ; That which hath matter in it, is called a mate­riall thing) wee then aske them, whether that which hath matter in it, be like­wise matter, or void of mat­ter? If they say it is matter, we demand how it can be both materiall and matter? If they answer, that it is not matter, then they must grant it to be void of mat­ter, and if it be void of mat­ter, wee will easily prove it to be no Body; because, every body hath matter in it.

If they alleage that Bo­dies have the three Di­mensions in them, and that [Page 87] the SOUL extending it selfe through the whole Body, hath in it also the three Dimensions, and therefore must necessarily be a Body; wee will then thus answer them; It is true, that all BODIE'S have in them the three Di­mensions, but every thing ha­ving the three Dimensions is not a BODY. For place, and Quality which in themselves have no Body, have accidentally, a Quan­tity if they bee in such things as have magnitude.

In like maner the SOUL in respect of it selfe, is ut­terly void of the Dimensi­ons; but, accidentally it hath Dimensions; because the Body (in which it is) [Page 86] [...] [Page 87] [...] [Page 88] having in it the three Di­mensions, wee so conceive it, together with the Bo­dy, as though the Soule also had in it the three Dimensions.

We argue further, and say thus: Every Body hath his motion either from without it selfe, or from within. If the motion bee from without it selfe, it must then be void of life: if it be from within it selfe, it must be indued with life: now, it is absurd to say that the SOUL is either indued with life, or without life (one of which must necessarily be affirmed, if the Soule bee a corporeall substance) therefore the soule cannot be a corpore­al Essence.

[Page 89] Againe, the SOUL, if it be nourished, it is nouri­shed by that which is void of Body (for, knowledge is the nourishment thereof) but, no corporeal essence is norished by things bodiless, therefore, the SOUL can­not be a Body. Xenocrates thus concluded this argu­ment: If (said hee) the SOUL be not nourished, it cannot be a corporeal-sub­stance; because, the Body of every living-creature must be nourished.

Thus much in generall,III in confutation of all those who generally affirm, that the SOUL is a bodily thing. Now, we will treate par­ticularly against them who are of opinion that [Page 90] the SOUL is either Blood, or Breath; because, when either Blood or Breath is taken away, the living-creature dyeth.

Wee will not say (as some well accounted of have written) that, part of the SOUL falleth away when any part of the blood faileth, if the SOUL be the Blood: for, that were but a slender answer. In those things which have every part of like na­ture with the whole, the part remaining is the same with the whole: Whether the water bee much or lit­tle, it is every way perfect water. In like maner, gold, silver, and every other thing, whose parts do not [Page 91] essentially differ from each other, are still the same, as is afore said: And even so, that part of blood which remaineth (of what quan­tity soever) may be called the SOUL (aswell as the whole quantity) if the blood be the SOUL.

We, therfore, will rather answer them thus: If that be rightly accounted the SOUL, upon whose taking away, the death of the li­ving creature ensues; then, should it needs bee, that flegme, and the two chol­lers must be also the SOUL, seeing, if any one of these faileth, it brings the li­ving-creature to his death. The like falleth out in the Liver, in the Braine, in the [Page 92] Heart, in the Stomach, the Reines, the Entrails, and in many other parts, where­of if you bereave a living-creature, it will immediat­ly perish.

Moreover, there are many things without blood, which have life in them, neverthelesse; as some smooth and gristly fishes; some also of a softer kind, to wit, Sepiae, Teuthides, and Smyli (as the Greekes call them) and Lobsters, Crabs, Oysters, and all shel-fish, whether they have hard or soft shells. Now if these things have a living-Soule in them (as we know they have) and yet are void of blood, then it plainely followes that [Page 93] blood cannot bee the SOUL.

Against those who say that water is the Soule, ma­ny things may bee said to disprove their opinion, though water helps to quicken and nourish all things; and though it bee (as they say) impossible to live without water.

Wee cannot live with­out nourishment, and there­fore if their assertion bee true, wee may aswell af­firme that all nourishment in generall, and every par­ticular nourishment is the SOUL. And whereas they have said that no living-creature can live without water, wee finde the con­trary to bee probable; for [Page 94] it is written of some Ae­gles, and of Partridges, that they live without drinke.

And why should water be the SOUL rather then ayre? Seeing it is possible to abstaine from water ve­ry long, whereas wee can hardly live a moment without breathing the Aire.

And yet, neither is Aire the SOUL: For, there are many creatures which live without breathing the Aire; as all Insectae (ri­veted creatures) such as Bees, Wasps, and Ants; as al­so all bloodlesse creatures, all those which live in the waters, and such as have no Lungs. For, none of [Page 95] those things that are with­out Lungs can breath Aire. The proposition is true al­so, if it be converted, There is no creature having Lungs, which doth not breath aire.

SECT. 2.

I. The arguments of Clean­thes the Stoick (affir­ming the SOUL to bee corporeall) are here con­futed logically and by demonstration. II. Chrysippus (intending to maintaine the like opi­nion) is here, likewise an­swered, and his Fallacies discovered. III. A con­futation of their Tenet also, who affirme that the SOUL is an Harmony.

SEeing certaine reasons of some account, are divulged by Cleanthes the Stoick, and by Chrysippus (to prove the SOUL a corpo­reall. [Page 97] substance) wee will here deliver somewhat in answer of them; and it shall be the same which the Platonists have there­unto replyed heretofore.

Cleanthes composeth a syllogisme in this manner;

There is (saith hee) a likenesse betweene us and our parents, not in respect of the Body onely, but in regard also, of the SOVL, as in Passions, Manners, and Affections: now it pertai­neth to a body to have in it likenesse and unlikenesse; and likenesse and unlikenesse cannot belong to things void of Bodie; Therefore the Soul is a bodily-thing.

It is here to be obser­ved, first, that he proveth [Page 98] things universall by things particular (which is not al­lowable by the Rules of Lo­gick.) Next, whereas he saith that likenesse and un­likenesse cannot pertaine to any thing void of bodie, it is false. For wee know that Numbers, which have their side-numbers answe­ring in proportion, are like one to another, as the side-numbers to sixe and to foure and twentie. The side-numbers to sixe are two, and three: The side numbers to foure and twenty are foure, and sixe. Now, there is like proportion of two in re­spect of four; and of three in respect of sixe: For they have a double proportion, each in respect of other; [Page 99] foure being twice as much as two, and sixe twice as much as three. Thus it ap­pears that Nūbers are like unto Nūbers, & yet Num­bers are no bodily thing.

Likewise, Figures (in Geometrie) are like unto Figures, so many of them as have both their corners equall, & their sides which inclose their equall-corners, answering one another in proportion: and even the Platonists themselves will confesse, that such Figures are no Bodily-things.

Moreover, as it is a pro­priety in the predicament of Quantity, that a thing should be equall, or une­quall; So, also, it is a pro­priety in the predicament [Page 100] of Quality, that things should be like, or unlike. Now the predicament of Quality is an Incorporeall thing; Therefore, a thing incorporeall may be like unto another thing, that is incorporeall.

Cleanthes, thus frameth another Argument: No Incorporeall thing (saith he) can suffer together with a thing corporeall; neither can a bodily-thing, suffer with such a thing as hath no body; but, things corporeall, only, may suffer one with another. Now it is evident, that if the body be diseased, and wounded, the SOVL suffereth grief with it; The Bodie suffereth also with the SOVL; for, [Page 101] when the mind is afflicted by shame, the Bodie blush­eth, and when the minde feareth, the body looketh pale. Therefore the SOVL is a corporeall thing.

One of his Assumptions is false; and he taketh un­to himself that which no man granteth. For where­as he saith, that no Incor­poreal thing can suffer with a thing having a bodie; what if this be true onely in the SOVL? This is as if we should argue thus; No living-creature moves the upper jaw; But a Crocodile moves the upper jaw; There­fore, a Crocodile is no li­ving-creature. The major of this proposition is false; because, in saying, No li­ving-creature [Page 102] moves the upper-jaw, hee taketh as granted that which is de­nied: for, behold the Cro­codile both moveth his upper-jaw, and is also a living-creature. The like arguing useth he, who saith, that Nothing, void of body, suffereth together with a bodily-thing; for, he taketh unto himself, in his negation, that which lieth in question.

But, if we should grant (for argument sake) that no Incorporeall-thing, doth suffer together with a thing-corporeall; yet, that which is inferred there­upon, is not fully confes­sed, (to wit) that the Soul suffereth with the Body, if [Page 103] it be sick, or wounded: For, it is yet in controver­sie whether it be the Body onely that suffereth pain; which having taken sense from the Soul, leaves the same insensible of suffe­rings; or whether the Soul be grieved together with the Bodie. The former o­pinion hath hitherto been most generally received among learned men; and therefore, Cleanthes ought not to have made his pro­positions of things in que­stion; but, of such onely as are quite out of doubt: for in doing otherwise he in vaine laboureth to de­monstrate that, for which he contendeth.

And yet (to make the [Page 104] fashood of his Assumption more evident) it might be proved, that some things void of body, doe suffer to­gether with such things as have body: For, Quali­ties being things-incorpo­reall, doe suffer with corpo­reall-things when they are altered: yea, both in the corruption of the body, and in the Generation of the same, the Quality thereof suffers change and altera­tion therewith.

II Chrysippus thus argueth. Death is a separation of the Soul from the Bodie: Now, nothing void of bo­dy is separated from a bo­dy; because, a thing incor­poreall cannot be touched (or laid even along) by a [Page 105] corporeall-thing: But the Soul toucheth, and is e­qually touched by the bo­dy: and is also separated from the same: Therefore the Soul is a corporeall-essence.

Among these propositi­ons, this is true, that death is a separation of the soul from the body: But, this, that a thing void of body cannot touch a body, is false, if it be generally spo­ken; and true, if it be affir­med of the soul. It is false; because, a Line which is an incorporeall-thing doth e­venly touch a corporeall-essence, and is also separa­ted from the same; as also whitenesse. Yet, in the Soul it is true; by reason the [Page 106] Soul doth not (so) touch the Bodie. For, if the Soul should (so) touch the bo­dy, it must needs follow that it must be laid (as it were) along by it. And if that be so, then it lieth a­long by the whole bodie (that is, by every part of the same) which is impos­sible. For, how can a whole­body, lie along by every part of another body?

Or, if it should be that the Soul so touched the Bodie; then, the whole Creature should not have life: For, if it (so) touched the same, it would indeed consequently follow, that the Soul were a corporeall-essence; but, then, the thing made alive, should not [Page 107] have life in it, throughout every part of the same. And, contrariwise, if the whole living-creature hath life in it, then the Soul nei­ther touches the Bodie, neither is it a bodily-thing. But, the whole living-creature hath life in it; therefore, neither doth the Soul touch it; neither is the Soul a bodily-thing; and, being a thing void of body; is, neverthelesse, se­parated from the bodie, (contrary to the proposi­tion of Chrysippus.)

It is manifest, by what III hath been hitherto said, that the Soul is no corpre­all-substance: it now re­maines that we prove the same to be a substance. [Page 108] And, because Dinarchus defines the Soul to be an Harmonie; And Simmias, contradicting Socrates, af­firmes the same; compa­ring the Soul to an harmo­nie, and the body to a Harp; we will here set downe the same confutations of them, which we finde in Plato's Dialogue called Phaedon.

One of them is taken from what Plato had pro­ved by things granted: For, he had demonstrated that when we doe learne, we doe but call to minde things that were ingraffed formerly in us: And there­fore, taking this unto him (as a thing granted) hee thereupon confirmes his [Page 109] Argument in this maner;

If (saith hee) the lear­ning of things be nothing else, but the recalling of them to minde; then, our soule had a being, before it was in the forme of MAN: Now, if it were a Harmo­ny, it was not before the body, but came after it, when the body was harmoniously joyned together. Such of necessity must the composition bee, as the things are whereof the composition is made: For, composition is a certaine common joyning toge­ther of those things, which are compounded, having a harmony in the same: and, it cannot bee other­wise, in reason, but that [Page 110] the Harmony must follow, and not precede those things whereof it is com­pounded.

These matters conside­red, this saying, That the SOUL is an Harmony, is contrary to this other say­ing, That, the learning of things is the recordation of things: But the opinion concerning recordation (as is aforesaid) is true; even in their judgement who af­firme the SOUL to bee an HARMONIE; therefore the SOUL is not a Harmo­ny, according to their owne Principle.

Againe, the SOUL is a part repugnant to the bo­dy; and is in stead of a Ru­ler, exercising a govern­ment [Page 111] over the same. But Harmony neither exerci­seth any government o­ver the Body, neither is a­ny way repugnant there­unto; therefore, the SOUL is not an Harmony.

Moreover, one Harmo­ny may bee more or lesse Harmony then another, ac­cording as it is slackned or stretched forth, (wee meane not to bee under­stood as if we spoke of the very nature of Harmony; seeing it is impossible there should be intension and remission, in the very nature thereof,) but wee meane Harmony as it con­sisteth in joyning toge­ther of the notes: For, if a shrill and a base-sound, be­ing [Page 112] matched together, shall afterward bee made more slack, there will bee a diversitie in the Harmo­ny, by reason of joyning together of the notes, more or lesse reached forth, though they retain the same nature in the greatnesse of the sounds: But one SOUL is not more or lesse SOUL then ano­ther; therefore, the SOUL cannot be a Harmony.

Futhermore, the SOUL in that it receives contra­ries succeeding one ano­ther, is a substance and a subject: But, Harmony is a Quality, and in the subject Now the predicament of substance is one thing, and the predicament of Qua­lity [Page 113] is another; therefore, the SOUL and Harmony are two distinct things. It is indeed, no absurdity, to say that the SOUL hath Harmony in it; howsoever, it followeth not that the SOUL is therefore an Har­mony: Because, though the SOUL hath vertues in the same, it cannot bee thereupon inferred that the SOUL is vertue.

SECT. 3.

I. It is here declared, that the SOUL is not (as Galen implicitly affirmeth) a Temperature in gene­rall. II. It is here proved also, that the SOUL is no particular temperature or quality. III. And it is likewise demonstrated, that the SOUL is rather governesse of the tem­peratures of the Body, both ordering them, and subduing the Vices, which arise from the bo­dily-tempers.

GAlen, hath determi­ned nothing peremp­torily of the SOUL; yea, [Page 115] hee himselfe affirmeth plainly, in his writings of demonstration, that hee hath delivered nothing precisely of the same: But, it may bee collected by some of his expressions, that he could be best plea­sed to affirme that the SOUL is a temperature.

For, he saith, that the diversitie of manners fol­lowes the temperature of the Body, and confirmeth his opinion by certaine collections out of Hippo­crates: Wherein, if hee delivered that which hee truly thinketh, then, doubtlesse, hee beleeveth also, that the SOUL is mortall: not the whole SOUL, but that onely [Page 116] which is irrationall; for, hee maketh a doubt con­cerning the reasonable soul, as his words declare.

Now, that the tempera­ture of the Body cannot be the SOUL, it may be made evident by these reasons: First, every body, aswell that which hath life in it, as that which is void of life, is made of the temperature of the foure Elements (for, the temperature of these Elements make all Bodies) And if the SOUL bee the temperature of the body, there can be no body with out life: For, if the Soul be the temperature, then, every body hath life in it, because every body hath his tempe­ratures. And if every Bo­dy [Page 117] hath life in it, then there is no body void of life: So, consequently, neither stone, nor timber, nor iron, nor any other thing can be without life.

But he did not meane,II perhaps, to affirme in ge­nerall, that every tempera­ture of the body was the SOUL; but rather, that some such, or such a tem­perature. Wee, then, de­mand what temperature it is which maketh a living-creature, and standeth in­stead of the SOUL? For, let him name what tempe­rature soever hee can de­vise, we will finde him out the like in things without life.

There are (as hee him­selfe [Page 118] hath declared in his Booke intituled OF THE TEMPERAMENTS) nine temperatures; eight distempered; and one in good temper; by which (as he likewise affirmeth) eve­ry man is tempered, whose temperature kee­peth a meane. But by the other distemperatures other living-creatures are com­posed (every one accor­ding to the severall kinde thereof) with a certaine intension and remission, to the more and to the lesse. Yea, and all the nine tem­peratures are found also more or lesse in things void of life; as he himselfe hath taught, in his booke of simple-medicaments.

[Page 119] Moreover, if the SOUL be a temperature, then is the SOUL subject to alte­ration; for, the temperatures are altered according to the diversitie of Ages, Sea­sons, and Dyets: And, if the SOUL be altered, then wee have not at all times the same SOUL; but, a Soule varied according to our temperatures; some­time the soule of a Lion, sometime of a Sheepe, and sometime of other creatures, which were ab­surdly affirmed.

Againe, our temperature doth not oppose it selfe a­gainst any lusts of our bo­dies, but rather helps to provoke them, or effect them, for, it is that which [Page 120] stirreth up the desires: But, the SOUL bendeth it selfe against those desires; therefore our temperature is not the SOUL.

Furthermore, the tem­perature is a quality; and a qualitie may be in the sub­ject, or absent from it without the destruction of the same subject: Now, if our temperature bee our soule, it will then follow (by the reason afore-men­tioned) that the soule may be separated from the bo­dy (which is the subject thereof) without the de­struction of the same. But, this is universally knowne to be false; therefore, the SOUL can be neither tem­perature nor qualitie.

[Page 121] None will imagine it more possible to change that which is of the es­sence of a living-creature, into the contrary thereof, and yet preserve the li­ving-creature, then, in fire to change the nature of heat into coldnesse, and yet still continue the fire. But it appeareth plainly that our temperature doth alter into the contrary; (& that such as Galen was are they, who change our tem­peratures, by their art of Physick. Therefore the soule (which is the essence of a living-creature) can­not be the temperature.

Neither is the Soule a quality of the body: For, the qualities of every body [Page 122] are subject to sense; But the soule is not subject to sense, but to understanding onely, and therefore it is not a Quality.

Wee know that this good temper of blood and spirits, accompanied with flesh and sinewes, and such other things, is strength. And, that the good tem­perature of hot and cold, dry and moist things, is health. And that the measurable proportion of the members, with a fresh colour, is cause of the beauty which is in the Body. Now, if the soul be a certaine harmony, of health, and strength, and beauty; It must needs fol­low that Man as long as he hath a Soule in him, can [Page 123] neither be sick, nor weake, nor deformed.

But, wee see by often experience, that even while the living-soule con­tinueth in them, many men are deprived, not on­ly of one, but of all these good temperatures; inso­much, that the very same man is deformed, and weak, and sick all at once. There­fore, the soule is not the good temperature of the Bo­die.

Some will aske, per­haps,III how it comes to passe, (if the soule be not the temperature of the body) that men are vitious or vertuous, according to their naturall constitutions and complexions▪ and they [Page 124] may demand also, whe­ther these things proceed not frō the tēperature. We answer, that they doe in­deed proceed from the bo­dily temperature: For, as there bee some naturally healthfull, or sickly, by rea­son of their constitution; So, othersome, naturally a­bounding in bitter choller, are froward; and some o­ther cowardly, or leacherous, (more or lesse according to their complexions.)

But, there bee some, who overcome these na­turall inclinations, and by getting the victory over them, doe evidently ma­nifest, that these tempera­tures may bee suppressed. Now, that which over­commeth [Page 125] is one thing, and that which is overcome is another thing: Therefore, the temperature is also one thing, and the soule (which is the vanquisher and or­derer of inclinations pro­ceeding from the tempera­ture) is another thing, and not the same.

The body being an in­strument which the soule useth, if it bee well fitted for the same, is a helper unto the soule; and she the better useth it to her own contentment. But, if it be not every way framed and tempered for the soule's use, it becommeth her hinderance, and much adoe hath she to strive a­gainst the unfitnesse of her [Page 126] instrument. Yea, so much, that if shee bee not very wary and diligent in re­ctifying the same, she her selfe is perverted aswell as the instrument; even as a musitian misseth of true musick, when his harp is out of tune.

The soule therefore must be carefull of the bo­dy, and make it a fit instru­ment for her selfe: which may be done by ordering it according to Reason, and by accustoming the same to good manners; as in Harmony, otherwhile slackning, and sometime winding up, according as necessity requires: By the neglect whereof, shee her selfe, may else [Page 127] (as it often happeneth) become as faultie, and as perverse as her Instru­ment.

SECT. 4.

I. The SOVL is not a per­petuall motion as Ari­stotle affirmes: Hee shewes what [...] is, and the defects of Ari­stoles judgement concer­ning the SOVL. II. The Body hath not in it selfe a possibility to live, be­fore the SOVL commeth unto it, as Aristole hath also affirmed. III. The SOVL is neither unmo­vable of it selfe, nor ac­cidentally moved, nor bred in the Body; as the fore said Philosopher hath delivered.

ARistotle affirming that the Soule is [...] a [Page 129] perpetuall motion, is never­thelesse to bee accounted among them, who say that the SOUL is a quality. But, first, let me make it appeare what Aristotle meaneth by [...], (which is to say) a perpetu­all motion.

He divideth a substance into three parts: The first is matter (which is as it were the subject) and this matter is in it selfe no­thing, but a generating power, out of which ano­ther thing may bee for­med.

The second part of the Essence, is forme, (or speci­all kinde) by which the matter is brought unto a certaine forme.

[Page 130] The third part, consi­steth both of matter and forme united together, and endued with life: The mat­ter being a thing in possibi­lity only, and the forme an actuall thing considerable two wayes. That is to say, either as you consider of a science, or of a contemplati­on according to the science; as a habit; or, as working by that habit.

It is considerable as a science; because, in the very substance of the Soule there is a kinde (as wee may call it) both of sleepe and of waking. This wa­king is analogically answe­rable unto contemplation; and sleepe represents the having of this habit, with­out any working thereby.

[Page 131] The Science, is, before working according to that science; and Aristotle calls the forme it selfe [...], that is, the first continued motion: The working according to this forme, he names [...] the second continu­ed motion. As for example:

The eye consisteth of a materiall subject, and of a certaine forme. This ma­teriall subject, is in the eye it selfe; even that which containeth the sight (I meane the matter of the eye) and this matter is equi­vocally called the eye. But the forme and continuall motion of the eye is the o­peration wherby it seeth: A whelp before he can see [Page 132] though he hath neither of the two motions afore­mentioned, hath yet, an aptnesse to receive such a motion: Even in such ma­ner we must conceive of it in the SOUL. When sight commeth to the welp it perfects the eye; and when the SOUL commeth unto the Body, it perfects the living-crea­ture.

So then, in a perfect li­ving-creature, neither can the SOUL bee at any time without the Bodie, neither the Body without the Soul: For, the SOUL is not the Body it selfe; but, it is the SOUL of the BODY: and therefore, it is in the Bo­dy, yea, and in such a kinde [Page 133] of body: for, it hath not an existence by it self.

Aristotle first calls the possible (inferiour) part of the soul, by the Name of the soul, severing the Rea­sonable-part from it, wher­as hee should have taken the whole soul of Man to­gether, and not have gi­ven his judgement of the whole, by a part, much lesse by the weakest part there of.

Aristotle hath affirmed II also, that the body hath an aptnesse to live, even be­fore the soul commeth un­to it: For he saith, that the body hath in it selfe a possi­bility to live.

Now, the body which hath in it self a possibility [Page 134] to live, must first be actu­ally a body, before it re­ceives that form: For, such a body is a matter void of all qualities. Therefore it is impossible that the thing which is not actual­ly it self, should have in it an aptnesse whereby ano­ther thing may be made of it.

If it be a bodie, and hath in it self, no other being, but in possibility only; how can that which is a bodie but in possibility, have a possibility of life in it self? Though in other things, it is possible, that a man should have somewhat which he never useth; yet in the soul it is impossible: For, the soul doth not [Page 135] cease to worke, even in them that are asleep; but, a man, even in sleeping, is nourished, & groweth. and seeth visions, and breathes, which is the chiefest symptome of life.

It is hereby very plain that a Thing cannot have the possibility to live, but, it must needs have life actually in it: For, indeed, it is nothing else but life which doth principally form the Soul, (it is plan­ted together with the Soul) and it is in the bodie by participation.

If therefore any man shall affirme, that Health answereth proportiona­bly to Life; we will reply that in saying so, he tal [Page 136] keth not of the life of the SOUL but of the body, and so useth a sophisticall rea­soning: For, the corporeall-substance doth receive con­traries one after ano­ther; but, in the substance, which is the forme, that cannot be possible; Be­cause, if the difference, which is the Form, should be altered, the living crea­ture would be altered also.

It is not therefore, the substantiall forme, which receiveth contraries; but the substance which is the subject; that is to say, the bodily-substance: And there­fore also the Soul cannot be, by any means, the con­tinued motion of the bodie; [Page 137] but must be a substance all perfect within it selfe, and incorporeall; for that it re­ceiveth contraries one af­ter another, (as vice and vertue) whereof the very Forme, by it self, is not ca­pable.

Furthermore, Aristotle III saith, that the Soul being a continued-motion, un­moveable of it self, is mo­ved accidentally; and, that it is not unlikely wee should be moved by an immoveable thing; be­cause we see by common experience, that beautie being a thing unmoveable doth neverthelesse move us.

But, though Beautie, which is unmoveable in it [Page 138] self, may move us, (as hee saith) yet, the Beautie so moving us, is a thing by nature, apt enough to be moved, & not such a thing as is altogether unmovea­ble. Therefore, if the body had any selfe-motion, it had not been any absurdi­ty to say it should be mo­ved of that which was im­moveable: But, it is im­possible that a thing of it self immoveable, should be moved of that which is also immoveable How then should the body attain un­to motion, except it re­ceive it from the soul? see­ing it cannot have any motion from it self?

It appeares, therefore, that when Aristotle went [Page 139] about to declare the first breeding of Motion, hee shewed us not the first, but the second. For, if he had moved that which of it self is not moved, he had then made the first-motion. But, if (otherwise) he move that which is moved of it self, hee dis­courseth how the second-motion commeth.

From whence then is the first motion procured to the bodie? If he say the Elements are moved of themselvess; in regard some of them are natu­rally light, & some heavy; It is not so: For, if levity & weightinesse were kinds of motion; then, light and heavy things would never [Page 140] leave moving. But, they cease from moving when they have attained their proper place. Therefore, lightnesse and heavinesse are not causes of the first-motion, but qualities of the Elements.

If it were granted (that lightnesse and heavinesse were causes of the first-motion) how can the Qua­lities of Reasoning, of Judging, and of holding Opinion, be wrought by heavinesse and lightnesse? If they be not effects of these; neither are they effects of the Elements; and if not of the Elements, then also not of the Bo­dies.

Beside, if the soul be [Page 141] moved accidentally, and the bodie of it self; then should the bodie be mo­ved of it self, although it had no soul; and if that were possible, then it might be a living-crea­ture without a soul. But, these things are absurd; and absurd therefore is the former opinion.

Moreover, it is likewise untruely affirmed, that e­very thing which is mo­ved naturally, is moved also violently; and that whatsoever is moved vio­lently, is moved by nature. For, the World being mo­ved naturally, is not mo­ved violently. Neither is it true, that such things as are moved naturally, doe [Page 142] rest naturally also: For, the World, and the Sunne, and the Moone, are naturally moved, and yet cannot rest naturally: In like manner being naturally inclined to a perpetuall motion, they cannot rest naturally: For Rest is the destruction of the Soul, & of every thing which is given to perpetu­all-motion.

It is herewith conside­rable also, that there is as yet no solution made un­to that which was obje­cted in the beginning of this Chapter, (viz.) how the bodie (whose nature is to be easily dispersed) can be knit together, (if it be not by an Incorporeall-sub­stance).

SECT. 5.

I. The SOUL is not a Num­ber according to the opi­nion of Pythagoras; nor as Xenocrates under­stands it. II. The error of Eunomius in adding to his definition of the Soul, these words, created (or ingendred) in the Bo­die; and the absurdity thereupon insuing. III. The difference betweene the Workes of Creation, & Providence, &c. and the error of Apollinarius touching the generation of Soules.

PYthagoras, whose cu­stome it was, by a cer­taine kind of Comparison [Page 144] to liken God, and all other things to NUMBERS, defined the soul, also, to be a number moving it self. Him, Xenocrates imi­tated; not as though the soul were number; but, for that it is in things numbred; and in such as are multi­plyed; and, for that it is the soul which discernes things; and, because, like­wise it putteth (as it were) upon every thing, cer­taine formes, and distin­ctions.

(For, it is the SOVLE that separates one form from another, and shewes how they differ; both by the diversity of their Formes, and by the mul­titude of their number; [Page 145] thereby causing things to be contained in num­ber: And, therefore, betweene the soul and numbers, there is some affinity.)’

He himselfe hath born witnesse of the soule that it is moved of it selfe: And, that it is not a number, wee may thus prove; Number, is in the predicament of quantity; But, the soul is not in the predicament of quantity, but in the predi­cament of substance; Ther­fore, the soul is not a num­ber. Yea though they would never so faine, that number should bee a sub­stance accounted among things comprehended in understanding, it will bee [Page 146] proved otherwise, as it shall hereafter bee decla­red.

Againe, the SOUL hath all his parts continued one to another; but, so hath not number; Therefore the SOUL is not a Number. Againe, a number is increa­sed by putting more and more unto it, but, the Soul taketh no such increase. Againe, a number is either even or odd; but the SOUL can neither bee termed even nor odd. Againe, the SOUL hath motion of it selfe; but a number is un­doubtedly unmoveable. Againe, a number remai­ning one and the same in nature, is able to alter no quality that belongeth un­to [Page 147] numbers: But, the Soul remaining one and the same in substance, doth change his qualities, alte­ring from ignorance to knowledge, and from vice to vertue; therefore (all these particulars conside­red) the SOVL is not a number.

These were the anci­ent II Philosophers opinions concerning the SOUL. But Eunomius defined it to be a SVBSTANCE void of body, and created in the bo­dy, agreeing therein both with Plato and Aristotle. For, he took these words, a substance void of body, out of Plato; and these, crea­ted in the body, from Ari­stotle: not considering [Page 148] (though hee was other­wise very quick witted) that he endeavours to knit those things into One which can by no meanes be united together.

For, every thing that is engendred both bodily and in time, is corruptible and mortall. To this the doctrine and judgement of Moses is agreeable. For, in describing the Creati­on of things subject unto sense, hee did not therein deliver in expresse words, that the nature of things intelligible were then made. But, some (though othersome are not of their opinion) insisting upon conjectures, are of that minde.

[Page 149] Now if any man sup­pose that the SOUL was made after the body; be­cause it was put into the body, after the same was fashioned, he erreth wide from the truth. For, nei­ther doth Moses say, that the SOUL was at the same time created when it was brought into the body, nei­ther doth any reason per­swade thereunto.

Eunomius therefore, might aswell have said that the Soul is mortall, as doth Aristotle, and the Stoicks, as affirme it is en­gendred in the body. For, if he will say the soul is an incorporeall Essence; hee should have refused to say that, it was created in the [Page 150] body; lest hee give men oc­casion to thinke the soule mortall, and utterly void of Reason.

Beside, it seemes by his opinion, that the World is not yet repleni­shed; but, is at this present (as it were) no more then halfe perfected, and stands every day in want of some additions. For, there are every day added unto it, at the least five times ten thousand intelligible sub­stances. And (which is most unreasonable) hee seemeth to beleeve, that when the number of soules is finished, then the whole world shall bee dissolved, and the last not come to light before the day of [Page 151] the generall resurrection.

What can be more con­trary to reason, then to imagine that the world shall be destroyed, assoone as it is fully furnished? It were like the play-games of little children so to do. For when they have made any workes or de­vises upon the sands, they usually tread them out a­gaine as soone as they have done them.

Now if any shall here­unto III reply, that the soules are now made by Provi­dence and not by Creation; and that there is no new substance brought into the world (whensoever any body is replenished with a soule) nor any other Es­sence, [Page 152] but the same multi­plyed, by Providence, which was before; doubt­lesse, they know not the difference between Crea­tion and Providence.

For it is the speciall worke of Providence to preserve the substance of corruptible living crea­tures, by breeding them one of another. I meane, here, all such corruptible living-creatures as are bred by generation, and excepting those which are generated by some rotten-matter; for, the suc­cession of such, is preser­ved, (by the same provi­dence) by generating them of some other putri­faction.

[Page 153] But the chiefe operati­on of Creation is, to make things of nothing. If, ther­fore, the SOULS bee made one of another: It will also follow, that they are corruptible, like those other creatures, which are made successively one of another, according to their kindes. If contrari­wise, the SOULS be made of nothing; then their ma­king commeth by Creati­on; and in so affirming, we deny that place of Moses: God ceased from all his workes. But both of these opinions are absurd; Therefore, the Soules are not now made. For, that saving of the Scripture; My Father worketh, &c. by [Page 154] the judgement even of Eunomius himselfe, is to be understood not of the workes of Creation, but of Providence.

Apollinarius held opi­nion that Soules were en­gendred one of another, as Bodies are; and that the SOUL proceeds by suc­cession from the first Man, unto all men descending from him, according to the bodily succession; therein dissenting both from those who conceive them to have beene from the beginning (as it were) stored up; and from those also who thinke they are daily created. For, in con­tradiction to these tenets, they affirme, that by them [Page 155] God is set on work with Adulterers when they be­get children. And they further say that these words of Moses, God cea­sed from all his works, &c. should be untrue, if God continueth to create Souls.

In answer hereunto, we have already shewed, that all things are mortall which have a successive generation one of ano­ther: For, therefore onely they generate and are ge­nerated, that the race of corruptible things might be preserved. And there­fore, Apollinarius, must ei­ther deny the successive generation of Souls; or by holding such a generati­on, he must (consequently [Page 156] at least) necessarily affirme that the Soul is mortall. Whereas hee mentions children borne in Adul­tery; let us leave that unto the Divine Providence, whereof we are ignorant. But, if we may presume to conjecture ought of the Divine Providence, it may be conceived that God ve­ry well knowing a child so begotten may be some way profitable, permit­teth such a bodie also to be furnished with a Soul, as hath been testified unto us by the child which was begotten of David on the wife of Vrias.

SECT. 6.

I. The opinion of the Mani­chees concerning the SOUL, and the absurdity and contradictions there­of. II. The judgement of Plato touching one gene­rall SOUL, and many par­ticular SOULS; The office of the SOUL; and the dif­ference betweene things that live, and Living-creatures, is here also de­clared. III. Of the Trans­migration of SOULS ac­cording to the various fancies of the Grecian Philosophers.

NOw, it followes that we examine the opi­nion of the Manichees [Page 158] concerning the SOUL. For, they say truely, that the SOUL is a substance, both immortall and incorporeall: But, they adde also, that there is but one onely Soul for all things; and that it is parted, and (as it were) peecemeal distributed un­to all particular bodies, as well to bodies inanimate, as to those which are indued with life.

They affirme likewise that some bodies receive the same in more ample sort, and some in a lesse measure. Things indued with life in a larger pro­portion; Things void of life, in the lesse; And, hea­venly things in the most abundant manner; and [Page 159] that the particular soules, are portions of that soul which is universall.

Now, if they had affir­med the soul to have been so divided, as that it had not been divided into parts, but after some such sort as one voice is divi­ded to the eares of many hearers, the error had been the more tolerable. But, their opinion is, that the very substance of the soul is divided into parts; and (which is most harsh) they will have it to be ac­counted properly among the Elements, and to be distributed together with the Elements, in the ma­king up of bodily-things; and for the collecting of [Page 160] them againe into one, when they are dissolved, as water is divided into certain portions, and then mingled again all toge­ther.

They are of opinion, likewise, that (after the dissolution of their bo­dies) the pure soules, being light, doe ascend unto the light, and that souls which have been defiled by the materiall substance (in which they resided) doe passe into the Elements, and from the Elements de­part againe into Plants, and living-creatures. And though they do thus man­gle the substance of the soul, by their fancies ma­king it in effect both cor­poreall [Page 161] and subject to per­turbations, they say ne­verthelesse, that it is im­mortall.

But, in these things they contradict themselves: For, first, they say that the souls which have been de­filed, doe returne back to the Elements, and are min­gled and tempered one with another; and con­trariwise, in the passing of soules from body to body, they say that punishments are inflicted on them ac­cording to their offences, joyning and separating again the nature of them, (as occasion serves.)

They hold likewise, that when it is light, sha­dowes are dispersed; and [Page 162] when all is covered with clouds, that the shadowes are gathered together; which cannot possibly come to passe in an intelli­gible Nature. For, if a Man should grant that shadowes are dispersed and gathe­red againe; we must then count shadowes among things subject unto sense.

II Plato is of opinion that there is both one generall soul, and many particular soules. One soule for the whole world altogether, and other soules for parti­cular things: In such man­ner, that the whole world is indued with a proper soul of its owne, even with that soul which belongeth unto the whole world; and [Page 163] so also, that particular things are indued with their proper soules, even with the soul, which is peculiar unto every one of them.

The soul (saith hee) which pertaineth to the Vniverse is stretched forth from the center of the Earth to the uttermost li­mits of the Heavens, (not as though he conceived such a stretching forth as is inclosed in Place, but such an extension rather as is conceived in our un­derstanding.) And hee saith, that this is the SOUL which turneth about the whole Globe, and which holdeth in, and bindeth together all such things as [Page 164] have bodily shape. For (as hath been already decla­red all corporeall substances have need of somewhat to hold them together; and that is done by the SOUL, which giveth un­to every thing the forme.

For, every thing that liveth, hath a proper life of his owne, and every thing that is corrupted hath his proper corrupti­on, (say the Platonists.) So long as it is held, and knit together, they terme it a Bodie; and, when it is dis­solved, they say it is cor­rupted or destroyed.

They affirme, also, that all things live; but, say not that all things are living-creatures. For, they distin­guish [Page 165] Plants from things inanimate, for that they in­crease and are nourished by a nourishing and vegita­tive power. They distin­guish the living-creatures, void of reason, from plants, by sense; And the rationall from the irrationall, by reason.

Thus, though they af­firme generally, that all things live; yet they di­stinguish the nature of e­very living-thing. Such things as are utterly void of a sensible life, doe live (say they) an habituall life, and are held together by the generall Soul of the World, which keeps them in their proper Being, and undissolved. This, they [Page 166] hold also to be the Soul which governs the world; and, that, it sends into eve­ry particular thing such particular Souls, as were before, made for them by the CREATOR. Yea, and they say to, that the Crea­tor gave unto it certaine Lawes, whereby it should order this whole world, (which Lawes they call DESTINIE) and that the same Creator vouchsafed thereunto a sufficient po­wer to supply such things as are necessary for Man: whereof wee shall treat more at large in our dis­course of Destinie.

III All the Greek Philoso­phers who affirme the Soul to be immortall, are of opinion [Page 167] that the SOUL pas­seth from bodie to bodie: But they differ in setting down of what sort of souls they meane it.

Some understand it of one sort onely; that is to say, of the Reasonable-soul; affirming that it passeth into Plants, and into the bodies of irrationall-crea­tures: Some of these think this transmigration was but at certaine appointed Re­volutions of Time; and some of them imagined the time to be casuall and uncertaine. Some other understand it, not of one sort of souls onely; but of the Irrationall, as well as of the Rationall: and some a­gain, understand it of ma­ny [Page 168] sorts of soules, even of so many, as there are di­vers kinds of living-crea­tures.

The Schollers of Plato have been somewhat sin­gular in this opinion. For, considering Plato said, that the soules of such as were furious, and angry, and gi­ven to rapine, were clo­thed with the bodies of Wolves and Lions; and that their souls who spent their lives in wantonnesse, tooke upon them the bo­dies of Asses and such like beasts: Some understand him as though hee had meant Lions and Wolves & Asses as the bare words doe signifie. Some percei­ved that he spake figura­tively, [Page 169] and by the names of those beasts, under­stood the conditions or qualities of those crea­tures. For Cronius in his booke intituled Of the re­newed generation (for so he termes the transmigration of SOULS from Bodie to Body) will have it un­derstood of none but rea­sonable-Soules: Yea and Theodorus (one professing the doctrines of Plato) in his book which affirmeth, that one SOUL comprehends all the species, is likewise of the same minde; And so is Porphyrie.

SECT. 7.

I. The singular opinion of Iamblicus, touching the Trāsmigration of Souls. II. Every BODIE hath a SOUL convenient for the same. III. The brute creatures doe nothing ac­cording to Reason, but by-naturall instinct▪ IV. The judgement of Galen concerning diversitie of Soules, and a recapitula­tion of the severall things proved and disproved in this Chapter, concluding the Soule to be both im­mortall, and incorpo­reall.

BUt, Iamblicus running a contrary race to [Page 171] these men, sayes that wee must understand, that the soul is of the same sort that the living-creature is; and that there be divers kinds of SOULS. He hath affir­med in his booke called MONOBIBLON; that the changing of SOULS never hapneth from Men to unreasonable-creatures, nei­ther from unreasonable-creatures to Men, but from beasts to beasts; and from Men to Men. And in so say­ing he hath not only well guessed, but in my judge­ment expressed the very truth of Plato's opinion: As by many other of his Arguments may be shew­ed; but, especially by these that follow.

[Page 172] No one of the motions of reason (saith he) mani­fests it selfe in unreasonable creatures: For, neither Arts, nor Learning, nor Consultations, nor Vertues, nor any other thing be­longing to an intelligible nature, can bee found in them. And, therefore it is plaine that they have no part of the reasonable-Soul. Though in Infants, which are very young, there is al­together an unreasonable-motion; yet wee say they have a Reasonable-Soule; because, when they come to yeares, they shew forth the workes of reason. But, in the unreasonable-crea­ture, which, at no age, gi­veth any token of Reason, [Page 173] the Reasonable-soule would bee superfluous; because, the force of Reason would bee altogether, and at all times, uselesse unto him.

All men have agreed unanimously, that God made no superfluous crea­ture; which being true, it cannot be that a Reason­able-soule should be so su­perfluously bestowed, as to be placed in cattle, and wilde beasts, which can­not exercise the same; lest it might bee objected as a fault in the Creator, to give an unfit SOUL to the Body: For, it is not the part of a good worke­man (or of one who knowes the order and method of working) so to doe.

[Page 174] Now, if any shall ob­ject, that there is in beasts, a certaine hidden habit of reason, whereby they are moved; and that their shape makes them unca­pable of artificiall workes, as the want of a mans fin­gers, depriveth him of meanes to practise many Arts, wherein he is expe­rienced, it makes nothing to the matter: For, the same absurdity still re­maines; implying that God applyeth SOULS un­to some BODIES, which are so unfit, and superflu­ous, that they are hinde­red, throughout all the ages, of those creatures, from their operations.

Beside, they confirme [Page 175] their propositions, by things unknowne, and such as are not confessed: For, who allowes this fancy, that, beasts have in them a motion, according to an hid­den habit of Reason?

It is therefore better to II hold, that a SOUL conve­nient for every Body, is fit­ly applyed thereunto: That beasts also have no­thing more, according to any hidden habit of reason, then doth outwardly ap­peare in their naturall and simple actions; That every sort of unreasonable-creatures is moved likwise according to a proper in­stinct of their owne, to such uses, and to such workes as they were or­dained [Page 176] unto, from the be­ginning: and, that the shapes of their Bodies are likewise very fitly accom­modated for such purposes

Moreover, the CREA­TOR, because hee would not leave them utterly void of help in their ne­cessities, hath placed in e­very one of them such an understanding as is naturall, though not reasonable. In some he hath placed a wi­linesse representing Art, and having a shadow of Reason; partly for their better avoiding of snares and dangers, which may betide them, and partly to make all creatures to be the more naturally knit one to another; as hath [Page 177] beene said before.

Now, that the brute-crea­tures III have not the use of reasō in doing these things is evident in this, that e­very living-creature of one kinde, doth the same things, and all of them in one, and the same man­ner. Their practices dif­fer not in multitude, but in this onely, that some use them, perhaps more, and some lesse; for all the whole kinde of them, pra­ctise the same wiles.

Every Hare doth use the same subtleties, every Foxe is alike crafty, and every Ape imitates alike. But, it is not so with Man; For, his actions are infi­nitely various, because, [Page 178] Reason being a certaine thing which is free; and men having also many things in their power, their workings are not one and the same, as it is in every kinde of irratio­nall creature. For beasts have their motion onely by nature; and such things as are in a creature natu­rally, are in all of the same kinde. But, the actions proceeding from Reason, are after one sort in one man, after another sort in another, and not necessa­rily the same in all men.

But, if they should say that mans SOVL is dri­ven into the Bodies of beasts, for a punishment of those faults which i [...] [Page 179] had committed, when it was formerly in man while he lived: This demon­stration of theirs (contra­ry to the rules of Logick) proveth former things, by such as come after: For, why should reasonable SOULS bee cast into the Bodies of beasts which were made before man? can you say they had of­fended in the Body of man before they had entred at all into mans body?

Galen, that admirable Physitian seemeth to bee of the former opinion, & to suppose that in every severall kinde of living-creature there is a sundry kind of soul: For, in the beginning of the first [Page 180] booke of that Tract which he wrote Of the use of the parts; hee sayes thus. ‘Though there be many parts of a living-crea­ture, some greater, some lesse, (and some that can­not be divided into any other kinde) every one of them is usefull some way to the SOUL: For, the Body, is the instru­ment of the soul, and the parts of living-creatures, differ much from one a­nother, because there is difference in their SOULS.’

Againe, somewhat af­ter that in the same book, he addes these words, speaking of an Ape. ‘Oh, thou that art so witty [Page 181] in finding faults I Na­ture can tell thee that it was convenient a ridi­culous shape of Body should be given to that beast whose SOUL was ridiculous. By this it may sufficiently be decla­red, that Galen thought a diversitie of SOULS was planted in those creatures which were of divers kindes. Thus much of these matters.

Seeing wee have IV now proved (even by their owne arguments who have held the con­trary) that the SOUL is neither a corporeall essence, nor a harmony, nor a Tem­perature, nor any other quality; it will necessarily [Page 182] follow, that it is a substance incorporeall. All confesse there is a SOUL; and if it be neither a Body, nor an accident, it is mannest that it is a substance without a body; and no such thing as cannot stand by it selfe without a subject: For such things may without the destruction of the sub­ject be either in the same, or absent; but if the SOUL be separated from the bo­dy, that body must of ne­cessity be destroyed.

We may use the same reasons to prove the Soul immortall: For, if it bee neither a body, whose na­ture is subject to dissoluti­on and destruction, as is a­foresaid; nor a quality, nor [Page 183] a quantity, nor any thing subject to corruption; then it must needs bee immor­tall.

There bee many other demonstrations, both in Plato, and others, illustra­ting the immortality of the SOUL, but they are full of obseurity, and can hardly be understood, or borne away by those who have beene trained up in the same sciences.

To us the doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient, to prove the SOULS immortality; & beare a ful credit in them­selves, because they were inspired by God. But, a­gainst those who embrace not the Scriptures, as wee [Page 184] Christians doe, wee must prove by demonstration, that the SOUL is no such thing, as is subject to cor­ruption. If it bee no cor­ruptible thing, it must needs bee incorruptible; and consequently immor­tall. And therefore, to that purpose let this be suffici­ent.

CAP. 3.

SECT. 1.

I. Of the uniting of the SOUL and BODY, and whether their Natures be altered, or confounded by their union. II. The mystery of the SOUL and BODIE'S union il­lustrated by considering things conceivable in un­derstanding, and by a si­militude taken from the Sun. III. Of the admi­rable proprieties of the SOUL; and how it is properly or improperly said to be in the BODY, or in Place, &c.

OUr purpose is now to enquire, how between [Page 186] the SOUL and a lifelesse-body there may bee a per­fect union: For, the pos­sibility of this thing ap­peareth somewhat doubt­full; and, it is much the more doubtfull, it Man consist not of these two parts onely, but of under­standing also (as a distinct thing) which is the opini­on of some. But, the grea­test doubt of all, ariseth in this respect, that all those things which concurre un­to the making of one es­sence, are joyned all toge­ther in the making of that one; seeing all such things as are united to the ma­king up of another thing, are (usually) so altered that they remaine not the [Page 187] same they were before, as it shall plainly be decla­red in our Treatie of the four Elements.

How then can the BO­DIE being united unto the SOUL, remaine still a Bodie? or, how can the SOUL being incorporeall, and having a substance of his owne, be united with the BODIE, and become a part of the Living-crea­ture, preserving still his owne proper substance, without corruption and confusion?

It seemes to be no way else possible, but that the Soul and the Body must by their union one with other, either become al­tered one with the other, [Page 188] or corrupted with each other, as the Elements are; or else, (to avoid those ab­surdities) that they should not be truly united; but, be so joyned onely as Dauncers are in their daunce, or lie one by the other as Counters in a summe, or at best be so mixed, as wine and water.

But, we have already declared in my Treatise upon the SOUL, that the Soul cannot be laid (as it were) along by the Bodie; because, if it should be so, that part onely of the body should have life in it, which joyneth neare unto the soule; and that the part which the soule toucheth not, should be without life.

[Page 189] Moreover, wee cannot say, that two sundry things placed one beside the o­ther, (as two pieces of timber, two iron wedges, or such like) are one and the same thing. And as for such a mixture as is made of wine and water, wee know it corrupts both the one and the other; for there doth remaine nei­ther pure water, nor pure wine, after such a mixture.

Yet this mixture of wine and water, is but (as it were) a laying of them one beside another, though our senses be not able to apprehend the same, because they are hindred from perceiving it, by the thinnesse of the [Page 190] parts of those things which are mixed. For, the wine and water may be se­parated againe the one from the other, by a sponge dipped in oyle, or by pa­per, either of which will suck away the pare water from the wine. But, indeed, it is utterly impossible to separate sensibly one frō the other, those things which are exactly united.

If therefore, the parts of MAN be neither united, nor placed one beside the other, nor mixed toge­ther, as aforesaid; what reason should move us to say, that one Living crea­ture is made of these two parts, a Soul and a bodie?

It was the considera­tion [Page 191] hereof, which partly moved Plato to imagine that this living-creature did not consist of Soule and Body; but, that he was a Soule having the use of the Body, and to whom the Body served as a gar­ment. But, even in affir­ming that, he occasioned as much doubting; for, how can the Soul bee one with what is but his gar­ment, seeing a Coat, is not all one with him that wears it?

But Amonius, who was II master to Plotinus thus dis­solved this question: even by affirming that intelligi­ble things have such a na­ture as may both bee uni­ted unto such things as are [Page 192] capable of them (and after the manner of such things as are corrupted together in their uniting) and yet remaine as truly without confusion or corruption, when they bee united, as those things do, which are but laid along one by a­nother.

It is true that Bodily-things being perfectly u­nited together, must of necessity suffer alterati­ons by their union, and be changed in every one of those parts which con­curre thereunto; because, they are thereby changed into other Bodies, as are the Elements making com­pound bodies; or as nourish­ment, being changed into [Page 193] blood; or as the blood when it is converted into Flesh, and other parts of the Bo­die.

But things intelligible, may bee united, and yet no alteration of the sub­stance thereupon ensue. For, it is not agreeable to the nature of intelligible-things, to bee altered in substance; but, either it de­parteth away, or is brought to nothing, and so can admit no alteration.

The SOUL is immortall and therefore cannot bee corrupted, or brought to nothing; for, then it could not be immortall. It is also life it selfe; and therefore cannot be changed in the mixture: For, if it should [Page 194] be changed in the union, it should be altered from being life any more; and what should the SOUL profit the Body if it gave not life thereunto? All these arguments conside­red, it must be concluded that the soul is not altered by being united unto the Body.

Having thus proved that the substance of intel­ligible-things cannot be al­tered; it followes necessa­rily therupon, that as they are not corrupted by their union with other things; so likewise, the things whereunto they are uni­ted remaine uncorrupted; and that in the union of the SOVL and Body there [Page 195] is neither any corruption or confusion of the one or of the other.

That they are never­thelesse perfectly united, is manifested by this, that either of them partaketh of that which chanceth to the whole living-creature: For, the whole man grie­veth as one creature, if any cause of griefe happen to the one part or the other, (to the SOUL or to the Body.)

And, it is as plaine, that they remaine united without confusion, in that the soule being separated (after a sort) from the Bo­dy when wee bee asleepe (and leaving the body ly­ing in maner of a dead [Page 196] Corps, and only breathing into the same, as it were, certaine vapours of life, least it should utterly pe­rish) doth worke by it selfe, in dreames, whilest the Body sleepeth; fore­seeing things to come, and exercising it selfe meerely in things intelligi­ble.

The like hapneth when the minde is very seriously occupied in cōtēplation, & enters into the considera­tion of intellectuall-things. For, even then the soule endeavours by all possible meanes to bee separated from the body, and to bee alone by it selfe that it may thereby ascend to the knowledge of things.

[Page 197] For, being without bo­dy, it separates it self from the whole body, as things which are therewithall corrupted; and yet remai­neth uncorrupted as those things also doe wherein there is no confusion: And keeping it selfe one and alone, changeth that wherein it abideth, by the life which is contained in it selfe; and yet is not changed by the same.

For, as the Sun, so soon as it appeareth, changes the ayre into light; so ma­king it light some, and so diffusing it selfe with the ayre, that it is united with the same, and yet not confoūded therewith: E­ven so, the soul being uni­ted [Page 198] with the Body, re­maines without confusion therwith; differing in this onely, that the Sunne be­ing a Body, and circum­scribed within the com­passe of Place, is not him­selfe in every place where his light is, but (as fire in the wood, or as the flame in a candle) is confined to a certaine place.

III It is not so with the soul. For, being void of all Body, and not contai­ned within the limits of any place, it passeth all and whole, through it own whole light, and through the whole Body, wherein it is; neither is any part of it illuminated thereby, wherein it is not fully and [Page 199] wholly present. Neither is it in the body as in some bottle or other vessell, nor compassed in by the same; but the Body is rather in the soule, and is thereby held in and fastned toge­ther.

For, intelligible things (such as the soul is) are not hindred by bodily things; but, enter, and pierce, and passe through every corpo­reall thing, and cannot possibly bee contained within the circumference of a bodily-place. Things intellectuall, have their be­ing in places also intelligi­ble; yea they are either in themselves, or else in such intellectuall things, as are a­bove themselves.

[Page 200] The soul is otherwhile in it selfe; as, when it rea­soneth or considereth of things; and otherwhile in the understanding; as, when it conceiveth any thing: And when it is said to bee in the body, it is not said to be there, as in place; but, to be as it were in a certaine relation to the body; and to bee present with it in such a sense, as, God is said to be in us.

For, wee say that the soul is bound (as it were) by a certaine disposition and inclination, as the lo­ver is to his beloved: not bound in place, or as bo­dies are bound; but by the habituall bands of affecti­on. And indeed, seeing it [Page 201] hath neither magnitude, nor massinesse, nor parts, how can it be enclosed by a speciall place? Or with­in what place can that bee contained, which hath no parts? Where place is, there must needs bee a massinesse; because place is the Bound which compas­seth another thing; and hath it being in respect of that which it encloseth.

Now, if any man shall thereupon conclude, that his soule is in Alexandria, and in Rome, and in every place; let him know, that even in so saying, hee in­cludeth a Place. For, to be in Alexandria, or gene­rally to be here, or there, or any where, pertaineth un­to [Page 202] a place; whereas the soul is no where (no not in the body) as in a place; but habitually; because, (as is aforesaid) it cannot be contained within a place.

For this cause, when things intellectuall have a­ny habituall inclination to a place, or to such things as are in place; wee turne the word from his proper use, and say abusively, that such a thing is there, or there; by reason of the operation which it there hath; taking the name of place, for the inclination, or working in a place. And, whereas we should rather say, it there worketh, we say, There it is.

SECT. 2.

I. Of the union of the God­head with the Man-hood, how far forth it hath any similitude with the union of the Soule and Body; and wherein it is unlike thereunto. II. Arguments taken from Porphyrie, confu­ting himselfe, and others, who deny the possibility of an union betweene the Godhead and the Man-hood, and a disproofe of the opinion of the Euno­mians concerning that union. III. He proceeds to treat of the union of the soule and body; and shewes that as it was meerely, of Gods good pleasure, to unite the Godhead to the Man-hood; So it was also agreeable to the Nature of God, that this union should be without mixture or con­fusion.

[Page 204] THat which is last afore­said, agrees more plain­ly and in more speciall manner to that union, which is betweene GOD the WORD, and the Man-hood; by which union, the two Natures being u­nited, remained neverthelesse without confusion; and so, also, that the divinity was not comprehended by the Humanity: And, yet, this uniting is not al­together [Page 205] such, as is be­tweene the soul and the body: For, the soul being in the number of multipli­ed things, suffers (after a sort) with the Body, in such things as happen thereunto, and by reason of their mutuall necessi­ties, and conversation to­gether, both holds it in, and is also held in, by the same.

But, GOD the Word being himselfe nothing al­tered, by that union, which unites the divinity and hu­manity together (nor by that communion which the soule and body have with each other) imparts his God-head unto them, without participating of [Page 206] their frailties; and be­commeth one with them, still remaining in himselfe the same thing which hee was, before such an uni­ting.

This is a strange and mysterious temperature & uniting: For, Hee is tem­pered with them, and yet he himselfe continues ut­terly without mixion, without confusion, with­out corruption, and with­out change: Neither suf­fering any thing with them; but, only helping, and furthering them: nor being corrupted nor alte­red by them; but, greatly encreasing them, without any diminution in him­selfe; because, hee is alto­gether [Page 207] without mutation, without confusion, and without possibility of changing.

Hereof may Porphyrie II himselfe beare witnesse, who hath moved his tongue against CHRIST (for, the testimonies of our Adversaries are the most undeniable proofes which may be brought a­gainst themselves.) This Porphyrie in the second Booke of his mixt questi­ons uses these words.

It is not, then (saith he) to be judged a thing impos­sible, that some ESSENCE should be assumed to the per­fiting of another ES­SENCE, and be part of that ESSENCE, perfecting [Page 208] also the same, and yet re­maine still in it owne NA­TVRE, both being ONE with that other thing, and yet preserving the VNITY of it selfe: yea, and (which is more then this) changing those things wherein it is, by the presence thereof, and ma­king it so to worke as it selfe worketh, and yet nothing al­tered in it SELFE.

Now, Porphyrie spake these things of the uniting of the SOUL and body: and if his reason hold good, in the SOUL, in regard it is an incorporeall substance, it holds true much rather, in GOD the Word, who is verily without bodie, and also utterly void of compo­sition. And this doth ma­festly [Page 209] shut the mouthes of them who endeavour to contradict the uniting of the God-head and the Man-hood, as many of the Grecians have done; Jea­sting, and deriding at it, as impossible, improbable, and absurd, that the Di­vine-nature should be joy­ned in a temperature and an unity with our mortall-nature; for, it is here dis­covered, that they may be opposed in this argument, by the testimony of such as are in most esteeme a­mong themselves.

The opinion of some (especially of the Eunomi­ans) is this, that GOD the Word is united to the body not in substance, but by the [Page 210] powers of either (Nature:) For it is not (say these) their substances which are united and tempered to­gether; but the powers of the BODY are tempered with the Divine powers.

Now, they affirme (ac­cording to Aristotle) that the Senses are the powers of the body (meaning of all the body as it containes the instruments thereof) and therefore, in their judgement, the Divine powers being tempered with the Senses, is cause of that uniting: But, wee shall never be perswaded to grant unto them that the Senses are certaine powers of the body: For, wee have already mani­festly [Page 211] declared, what things belong properly to the Body, what things to the SOUL only; and what to the SOUL and body both together: And, we ther­upon concluded, that the Senses, which worke by the instruments of the Bo­dy, are to bee reckoned a­mong those things which are proper to the SOUL and bodie joyned in One.

These things confide­red,III it is most agreeable to reason, wee should af­firme (according to the nature of incorporeall-things) and as is aforesaid, that these Essences of the soule and Body are united without confusion; and in such maner, that the more [Page 212] Divine nature, is nothing impaired by the inferiour nature; but that onely the inferiour nature is profited by that which is Divine.

For a nature which is purely incorporeall, can passe without stop tho­row all things, whereas nothing hath passage tho­row that: By passing through all things, it is united; and in regard no­thing passes through the same, it remaines void of mixture, and without con­fusion.

It is not rightly affir­med therefore (though many excellent men be of this opinion) that no rea­son else can be given, why the union, whereof wee [Page 213] have treated, should bee after such a manner, but, onely, because it pleased God it should so be: For the very nature of the things is cause thereof.

We may justly say, that it came to passe meerely by GOD's good pleasure, and choise, that the SON should take a Bodie unto himselfe: But, it commeth not meerely of the good pleasure of GOD (though it be also his good pleasure it should be so) but of the pro­per nature of the Godhead, that when it is united, it should not bee confounded with the Man-hood.

Wee will speake no­thing of the degrees of soules, nor of their ascen­ding [Page 214] and descending, mentioned by Origen. For we finde in holy Scriptures nothing warranting the same; neither are they a­greeable to the doctrines commonly received a­mong Christians.

CAP. 4.

SECT. 1.

I. Of the Body, and of the mediate and immediate composition thereof. II. Of those parts of a living-creature, every portion wherof taketh the name of the whole; and of those parts which take not the name of the whole. III. MAN only hath every part belonging to the Body of a perfect LIVING-CREATVRE whereas all others are de­fective in some of the parts; and many in the Situation of them.

RIghtly may we af­firme that every corporeall Essence [Page 216] is a composition proceeding from the foure Elements, and made up of them. The bodies of living-crea­tures having blood in them, are cōpacted immediatly of the four humors, Blood, flegm, Choller, & Melancho­ly: But the Bodies of such as are without blood, are made of the other three humours, and of some­what in them answering proportionably unto blood

We call that immediate­ly, when any thing is made of the selfe-same things without any other thing comming between them: As the foure hu­mours are made of the foure Elements; and those things are compounded [Page 217] of the foure humours, which consist of like parts, and are parts also of the body (that is, things ha­ving such parts, every part of which parts, may bee called by the same name which is given unto the whole; as when every part of the flesh, is called flesh.)

Melancholy, is likned to Earth, Flegme to water; Blood to Ayre; Choller to Fire; and, every thing which is compounded of the Elements, is either a Masse, or Moisture, or Spi­rits.

Aristotle thought that the bodies of living-crea­tures were made immedi­ately of Blood onely; be­cause [Page 218] the seed is ingen­dred of blood, and all the parts of a living-creature nourished thereby.

But, because it seemed somewhat absurd to ima­gine that both hardest bones, and the tenderest flesh and fatnesse, should proceed all of one thing; It pleased Hippocrates to affirme that the bodies of living-creatures, were im­mediately compacted of the foure Elements; the thicke and sollid parts of the more earthly Elements, and the soft parts, of such Elements as are softest.

Oftentimes, all the foure humours are found in the blood; whereof wee have experience in Phle­botomy: [Page 219] For, sometime a certaine flegme like whey doth abound in it; other­while Melancholy, and sometime, againe, Choller. Whereupon, it commeth to passe that all men seem in some sort, to agree with one another.

Now, of the parts of li­ving-creatures; II some parts there be, every portion of which parts hath the same name which is given unto the whole part: Other­some there are, which cannot bee called by the same name whereby the whole is called. As for ex­ample; Every part of the Braine is called Braine; In like maner of the sinewes, of the marrow, of the [Page 220] bones, of the teeth, of the grissells, of the nayles, of the thin muscles that binde the Ioynts together, of all the skins (throughout the body) of the strings (which are in the bloody flesh) of the haires, of the flesh, of the veines, of the arteries, of the pores, of the fat, and of those foure which are in maner of Elemēts, yeel­ding matter out of which the things aforesaid are immediately made, pure Blood, Flegme, Melancho­ly, and Choller. Except from these, the Muscle, which is compounded of those thinner Muscles which knit our joynts to­gether, and of the strings which are of the nature of sinewes.

[Page 221] The parts of the body, consisting of portions, whereof every one taketh not the name of the whole; are these that follow; viz. the head, the breast, the hands, the feet, and such other members of Mans body. For, if you divide the head into severall parts, every part of it is not called a Head: but if you divide a sinew into se­verall portions, every por­tion of it shall have the denomination of a sinew; and so shall it be likewise, if you divide (or subdi­vide) a veine or flesh.

Every whole thing, whose severall parts have not the same name with the whole, is made of such things as [Page 222] impart the name of the whole to the parts, when they are compounded to­gether; as the head is made of sinewes, and flesh, and bone, and such like, which are called the instrumentall parts.

The definition there­fore of such things as the Greeks call [...], that is, things which consist of like parts, is thus made; They are things whose parts are like both to the whole, and to each other; (as flesh, braine, &c.) and by the word like, in this place, we meane the same with the whole; for a piece of a mans flesh, is as truly flesh as the whole masse.

III Now, every living-creature, [Page 223] hath not all the parts of a body; but, some of them are defective in one part, and some in o­thers; for, some lack feet, as fishes, and Serpents; Some have no head, as Crabs and Lobsters, and certaine other water-creatures; and because they want a head, the seat of their sense is in the breast.

Some living-creatures have no Lungs; namely, all such as breath no Ayre; some are without a blad­der, as birds, and all such as void not urine. And creatures which have thick shells, are destitute of so many members, that some of them, have but few ap­pearances of being living-creatures.

[Page 224] There bee also some li­ving-creatures, which al­though they have such things as are in our bodies, yet seeme to want them. As the Stag which seemes to have no choller, because hee hath it not in one place, but so dispersed a­broad in his entrailes, that it is no where appa­rant.

But, MAN hath all the parts of a living-creature; every part also, perfect; and all in so goodly or­der, that it could not pos­sibly have beene better composed.

Beside their want of some parts, there is like­wise among other living-creatures, much difference [Page 225] in the scituation of the parts. For, some have their dugs in the breast; some, on their bellies; and some under their thighes: Some againe, have two dugs; some foure; and some have more. Nature hath so provided (for the most part) that the num­ber of dugges is answera­ble to the number of young-ones which every creature brings forth at a time. But let him that would bee more exactly informed of these things, reade the hystory which Aristotle hath written of living-creatures.

For, it pertaineth not unto the discourse which I now purpose, to treate at [Page 226] large of such things; but, only to point at them, or, to speak briefly of them.

CAP. 5.

SECT. 1.

I. Of the foure Elements: of their simple and mixt Nature; of their foure qualities, Heat, Cold, Moisture, and Drinesse; of their contrarieties, and of the meanes of uni­ting them into one body. II. Of the Circular mo­tion, and changeable­nesse of the Elements one into another; and a reason why God made them of such a nature. III. The opinion of Aristotle, con­cerning the nature of the Ayre, &c.

GOe we now on, to the Elemēts, which are consequently [Page 228] to be next handled in this Treatise. An Element of the world, is a most small part in the composition of bodies. They are these foure; Earth, water, ayre, and fire, and if you begin at the lowest, and so passe to the highest body of them, they are placed in such order, as I have na­med them.

The bodies of these Ele­ments, are the first bodies, and simple bodies, in respect of other bodies: And e­very Element is of the same kinde, with those things, whose Element it is. For, principles (as mat­ter, forme, and privation) are not of the same kinde with the things which are [Page 229] made of them: But, an Element is necessarily of the same kinde.

Now, it is manifest that these foure, Earth, water, ayre, and fire are the Elements; and it is as evi­dent that the (foure first) qualities (that is to say) Hot, cold, moist, and dry, bee in those Elements, in the highest degree, both potentially and actually also. And, yet, there is not one of these Elements, which we can discerne by our senses, to bee altoge­ther void of temperature, and mixture with some other Element: For in­deed, all those which wee are sensible of, are in a sort somewhat counter­feit, [Page 230] and participate each of other, more or lesse; even when in their mix­ture, their severall na­tures continue most ap­parant.

Moreover, every one of these Elements, hath two coupled qualities, which constitute the spe­cies, or nature of it. For, EARTH is dry and cold; WATER is cold and moist; AIRE is hot and moist; and FIRE is hot and dry. Yet, these qualities, by them­selves, cannot be Elements: For, qualities are void of bodie; and of things incor­poreall, things corporeall cannot be made.

Neither is it possible, that other bodies should be [Page 231] actually Elements, wch have not actually each of these qualities in the highest degree: For, if those things which have these qualities, more or lesse, should bee Elements, there would be an infinite number of Ele­ments; and we should ne­ver bee able to discerne the Elements of each par­ticular thing: because e­very thing hath some qua­lity in it, more or lesse.

It followes therefore necessarily, that every Ele­ment is a BODIE and a simple-body; and such a one as hath actually in it, in the highest degree, these qualities, HEAT, COLD, MOISTURE, and DRI­NESSE: because, of all [Page 232] qualities, these onely and no other doe make a whole change in the whole substance. White­nesse comming neare unto a Body cannot make it white thorow and tho­row (as wee say) neither can such a change bee wrought by any other thing; whereas Heat or cold, can warme or coole a body, not onely superfi­cially, but quite through­out the same.

Those Elements are ac­counted contraries, which are directly contrary to one another, in both their qualities. Thus WATER is contrary to FIRE: For, water is cold and moist; and Fire is hot and dry. In like [Page 233] maner, EARTH is contra­ry to AIRE: For, Earth is cold and dry; and Aire is hot and moist.

And, forasmuch as things which are so repug­nant, could not bee fitly joyned one unto another, without a middle-band or­dained to knit them toge­ther: The wise Creator hath placed water as a meane between the Earth and the Aire (which are contraries) induing it with her two qualities, cold and moist, that being the medium betweene those, which extreamely differ, they might be uni­ted thereby: For, by reason of the cold, it agrees naturally with the earth; [Page 234] and by meanes of moisture, it is fitly joyned unto the aire.

Againe, in the middle betweene the water and the fire, (which are also contraries in themselves) hee hath placed the aire, which by his moist-quali­tie doth very well accord with water, and with fire, by the quality of heat.

Thus, God hath linked every one of them each to other (as in a chaine) by placing betweene things contrary, such other things as may both unite the said contraries to themselves, and to such things also, as are bound one to another by them: Yea, (which is an excellent kind of band) [Page 235] hee hath joyned together every one of the Elements, by the one of his qualities to that which went be­fore; and by the other to that which followed af­ter.

For example, the wa­ter, being cold and moist, is joyned unto the earth (which if you beginne at the lowest, and ascend, is next beneath it) by his coldnesse; and by his moi­sture, to the aire which is next above it. The aire likewise by the moistnes of it, is joyned to the water, which is next beneath it; and by heat, to the fire which is above it. The fire also by the heat there­of, is joyned to the aire [Page 236] which is beneath it; and by drynesse to the earth; to which, being the lowest, it declineth it selfe (as it were in a circular motion.) The earth by coldnesse, is united to the water; and by dry­nesse to the fire, which de­clineth towards it.

II For, that the Elements, should not have onely an inclination to ascend and descend directly upward and downeward; but in­cline also to a circular mo­tion: God bowed them (as it were) and made the two extreame Elements, fire and earth to turne one toward the other. For, the fire if it lose heat, is no longer fire; but becom­meth earth, as is manifest­ly [Page 237] proved by thunder-bolts, which being thrown downe and cooled, are converted into stones: For, every thunder-bolt consists of stone and brimstone, The stone is (as it were) the brimstone over­baked,) Brimstone is (as it were) fire cooled: and no more actually hot, but, having a neare possibility of heat; and being also, actually dry: For, the Ele­ments only, have the quali­ties actually; wheras, all o­ther things have them but in possibility, except they come near unto some Ele­ments.

But, to the end, that neither the Elements should faile, nor the Bodies [Page 238] which are to be compoun­ded of those Elements, the Creator did providently devise, that they should be convertible, both one into another; and also, in­to compound-bodies: and that the compound-bodies should be againe resolved into their Elements. By which meanes, it com­meth to passe, that they are continually engende­red one of another, and perpetually preserved from being wasted.

For, Earth being first dissolved into a mirie moistnesse, becommeth water. Water being thick­ned and congealed, be­commeth earth. Water also, being heated and re­solved [Page 239] into vapours, vani­sheth into aire. Aire be­ing collected and conden­sed, is turned into water. The same aire being dry­ed changeth into fire. Fire, if it be quenched, and wa­ter also if it be evaporated, become aire: For, aire is the quenchings of fire, and the moisture arising from water being heated; even by both of these is the aire generated: For, experi­ence doth shew us, that whensoever fire is quen­ched, or water heated, aire is encreased thereby: Therefore aire is natural­ly hot; and cooled by be­ing scituated so neare un­to the water, and the earth; which coole the lower [Page 240] parts thereof, as the fire heateth also the upper parts of the same. And this hapneth unto the aire by reason of the softnesse thereof; and the easinesse which it hath to receive impressions, makes it quickly depart from its proper nature, and very apt to be changed.

III But, Aristotle is of opi­nion that there bee two sorts of aire; one like unto vapours, and generated by the exhalations of waters: The other, smoakie, and bred out of the fire, when it is quenched. The aire which commeth of smoke, he conceiveth to bee hot; and that also which pro­ceedeth from vapours, [Page 241] when it is first bred; but, in continuance of time, that aire (as he saith) coo­leth, by little and little; untill it is converted into water.

This supposition of Aristotles, that the aire is of two sorts, was by him devised, that he might e­scape some absurdities which he knew not other­wise how to avoid; and that things which are somewhat high, and farre distant from the earth, might seeme hot, and that such as are very low might seeme colder.

SECT. 2.

I. Of the uniting of the Ele­ments into a naturall body; what maner of composition it is, and why those bodies are a­gaine resolved into Ele­ments. II. Plato's opi­nion concerning the Ele­ment of earth; as also, concerning the other three Elements. III. Of the division of the Elements according to the Stoicks: The opinion of Aristotle, touching a fifth body, out of which hee thinkes the heavens were made; and of the contrary opini­on of Plato.

NOw, all Bodies are made by the conjun­ction [Page 243] of these foure Ele­ments, both the Bodies of Plants, and of living-crea­tures also: to the compo­sition of which bodies, na­ture drawes together the purest parts of those Ele­ments. These are called by Aristotle, naturall bodies; being compounded, not by heaping of the Ele­ments one upon another; but by tempering all to­gether (throughout the whole) so much of every Element, as is in the Body, in the uniting therof; and by making of them one certaine BODIE, diffe­ring from what they were, before that compo­sition.

For, they are so united, [Page 244] that impossible it is to sever them, or to see Earth by it selfe, or Water alone, or Ayre, or Fire, di­stinctly from the rest; be­cause, one intire thing, and a thing differing from the Elements, is made by the tempering of all foure of them together; As a medicine, consisting of foure Ingredients, being once made up, is a thing differing from those In­gredients.

But, yet the compositi­on of a naturall body is not in all things like those ar­tificiall composures: For, the Elements do not make the bodies, by the scituati­on of the thinnest parts, one by another, as it fal­leth [Page 245] out in a medicine, compounded of foure ingredients; but, it is effected, rather, by altering them­selves, and by uniting of all into One.

All Bodies are again re­solved, also, into these Elements; by which means it commeth to passe, that all the Elements remaine continually unwasted, and are kept sufficient for the making of all things, in regard they neither are diminished, nor abound. And from hence arises this generall proposition, That, the generation of one thing is the corruption of another; And the corruption of one, the generation of ano­ther; not referring (this [Page 246] perpetuity) to the Soul, as is aforesaid, but to the Bodie onely.

II Plato is of opinion that the three other Elements are changed one into each other, and that the Earth remains altogether with­out mutation; as may ap­peare by his comparing of the firmnesse of figures, consisting of streight-lines, with every Element.

To the Earth he com­pares the figure called a Cube; because of all other figures that is least movea­ble. The figure Icosaedron, which is hardliest moved of all the rest, (and consi­sting of twenty bases) he likeneth unto water. The Pyramide, whose motion [Page 247] is easiest of all the rest, he resembleth to fire. And Octaedron, (the figure con­sisting of eight bases) hee compareth unto the Aire, whose motion is easier then that of the water, and more hard then fire.

By these figures, he en­devors to prove demon­stratively that the three other Elements are chan­ged one into another, but that no change hapneth to the Earth: For, (saith he) three of these figures, that is to say, the Pyra­mide, the Octaedron and the Icosaedron, are made of Tri­angles, whose sides are unequall, whereas the Cu­bicall figure is made of Tri­angles, whose sides are [Page 248] equall: now things which are made of Triangles whose sides are unequall, being dissolved and mee­ting together again, may be changed into another; but, the Cubicall-figure be­ing dissolved cannot be changed into any o­ther; because it is made of equall-sided-Triangles, whereof none of the o­ther three can be made.

In like manner none of the other figures can be changed into a Cube. And, for these reasons it is ne­cessary that the Bodies formed of these species, and the species whereof they are formed, should in respect of one another be such as they were.

[Page 249] And, yet, the Earth re­maineth not altogether impassible; but, is divided by bodies, having thinner parts then it selfe; being after a manner altered from Element to Element, and yet not changed into those things which doe divide it: For, when it is recollected againe unto it selfe, it recovereth the state which it formerly had, as appeares by it, in the water.

For, if you cast a little earth into the water, and stir it often up and down, that earth dissolves into water; but, if you leave stirring of the same, the water settles, and the earth sinks to a residence: [Page 250] The like is to be thought of the whole earth: and this is not a changing, but a dissevering of such things as were mingled together.

Plato affirmes that the earth is also severed by the sharpnesse of the fire, and being so dissolved is ele­vated and carryed away in the fire: So likewise in the masse of the Aire, when Aire dissolves it; and, in the water, when it is dissolved, in the water.

Moreover, Plato men­tioneth another division of the Elements, affirming every one of them to have three Qualities. The fire to have sharpnesse, rarenesse, and motion; The Element [Page 251] which is directly in the extreame thereunto, (that is to say) the earth, to have dulnesse, thicknesse, and rest: So, in respect of these Qua­lities, the earth and the fire, be cleane contrary to each other; whereas, they were not so, by those two qualities, whereof we had formerly spoken.

He holdeth likewise, that, by qualities taken from the two extreames, those Elements were made which are in the middle betweene these two: For (saith he) two qualities (to wit) rarenesse and moti­on, being taken from the fire; and one (that is to say) dulnesse, being assumed from the Earth, Aire is [Page 252] thereof composed, whose effecting Qualities, are rarenesse, motion, and dul­nesse. In like manner, two Qualities are taken from the earth, namely, dulnesse and thicknesse; and one from the fire, (to wit) mo­tion, whereof proceeds water, which getteth also his forme, by thicknesse, dulnesse, and motion.

Therefore, the same that sharpnesse is in respect of dulnesse, the same is fire in respect of aire: such as rarenesse is, in respect of thicknesse, such is aire in respect of water. That which motion is, in respect of rest, that water is, in re­spect of earth. Look what fire is, in respect of aire, [Page 253] the like is aire in respect of water. And as aire is in respect of water, so is water in respect of earth. For, it is the nature of things ha­ving a plaine thin ground, to bee held together by one medium; (that is to say) by a proportion be­tweene them; whereas, firme and sollid Bodies are not kept fast together, but, by two mediums.

There are, yet other qualities ascribed unto the Elements. Namely, to the earth and water, WEIGHTINESSE, whereby they doe natu­rally incline downeward; and to aire, and fire, LIGHTNESSE, whereby they are naturally given [Page 254] to mount upward.

III The Stoicks have more­over, another way of di­viding the Elements; for, some they affirme to be a­ctive, and some passive. By active they meane the more stirring Elements, such as are the fire and the aire: By passive they un­derstand the duller Ele­ments, that is to say, the earth and water.

But Aristotle, besides these Elements, bringeth in a Fifth BODIE, which he tearmes Aethereall; and this bee fancies to bee a BODIE having in it a cir­cular motion; because, it pleaseth him not to say that the heavens are com­posed of the foure Ele­ments: [Page 255] And he calls the Fifth, a Body moved circu­larly; because, it is (as he imagines) caried circular­ly round about the earth.

Plato is of another opi­nion; and affirmes direct­ly, that the heavens are made of fire, and of earth. His words are these: ‘E­very bodily shape which is made, must be visible and subject unto touching; but, nothing can bee visi­ble without some fire in it; not subject unto touching without some firmenesse; nor can any thing be firm, without earth: And ther­upon in the beginning, God caused the body of the whole world to bee composed of earth and [Page 256] fire. Now it is not possible that two things alone should bee made to unite and agree well together, without a third, which must be as it were a band betweene them, to bring them both together; and of all bands, that is the chief which can most perfectly bring into an unity, both it selfe, and such things as are united by the same. And this, the nature of proportion doth best per­forme.’

By the band here men­tioned, hee intends the two middle-Elements, ta­ken according to the pro­portion, whereof we spake before.

SECT. 3.

I. The opinion of the He­brewes, and of Apolli­narius touching the ma­king of the heavens and of the earth. II. Argu­ments out of Hippocra­tes against Thales, Ana­ximenes, and Heracli­tus, who say that there is but one onely Element. III. The body being an instrument for the soul, is made fit for the opera­tions thereof.

THe Hebrewes, in their opinions concerning the making of the heavens and the earth, differ so much from all others, that [Page 258] but few have conceived thereof as they doe: For they affirme that they were created of no fore existing matter; accor­ding to Moses, who said, In the beginning, God made the heaven and the earth.

But, Apollinarius thinks that God made the heaven and the earth, of the depth of waters. For, Moses in his description of the worlds creation, doth not so make mention of the depth of waters, as if it had beene created; but, in Iob these words are to bee found; He made the depth of waters. Therefore, hee affirmed, that all other things were made out of that, as out of a matter [Page 259] common to all.

Hee doth not say that this depth of waters, was never made; but, that it was laid downe by the Creator, as a foundation, before any other bodily-thing was made, that o­ther things might bee made thereof: For, the very name of depth, de­clares the infinitenesse of the matter.

And indeed, whether it bee this or that way ta­ken, it is not much mate­riall; For even by this opi­nion also, God is confes­sed the sole Creator of all things; and that hee made every thing of nothing.

Now, there bee some II who say, that there is but [Page 260] one onely Element; either Fire, or Aire, or Water, (For Thales affirmes that fire only; Anaximenes that aire onely; and Heraclitus, with Hipparchus Meta­pontinus, that water one­ly is an Element) against whom it shall be sufficient to alleage what Hippocra­tes hath said in that be­halfe.’

If (saith he) MAN were composed but of one onely thing hee could never feele any griefe; For, hee being but One thing, nothing could procure paine un­to him; or if hee should feele any griefe, there could be but one thing which might heale him: [Page 261] For, that which feeleth griefe, must needs bee in a mutation with some sense: And, if there bee but one Element, there can then bee no­thing whereinto the li­ving-creature should be changed: And if it were not altered, but continu­ed setled in the same state, it could not possi­bly feele paine, though it were never so sensible.

He saith further: It is necessary that the thing which any body suffe­reth should proceed from some other thing: but if there bee but one onely Element, there can be no quality, beside the quality of one Element, [Page 262] whereby the living-creature may be afflicted: And, if neither can bee changed nor suffer any thing, how can it bee grieved?

After hee had thus de­clared the impossibility thereof, he supposeth, ne­verthelesse, the same to be granted; and thereupon thus inferreth. Grant (saith hee) it could suffer griefe, and then it will fol­low, that there is but one thing onely which can cure the same; but expe­rience hath taught us that there is not one thing on­ly, but many things to cure every disease; and therefore Man cannot be one onely intire thing.

[Page 263] It may be further pro­ved, that there are foure Elements, by the reason wherewith every one of them endeavoureth to confirme his owne opini­on (who affirme that there is but one onely Element.)

For when Thales affir­med that water onely was to bee accounted an Ele­ment, hee endeavoured to shew that all the other three were made of it; saying that the faeces of it become earth, the thin parts become aire, and that the thinnest parts of that aire are turned into fire.

Anaximenes, holding o­pinion that aire onely is an Element; goes about to [Page 264] prove likewise, that all the rest of the Elements are made of aire.

Heraclitus and Hippar­chus Metapontinus affir­ming that there is no Ele­ment but fire, use likewise the very same demonstra­tion, to make their argu­ment seeme reasonable.

Now, it will become evident by the reasons which these men give to justifie their assertion; that every one of them is an Element: For by some it is demonstrated, that all other Elements are made of the fire; by another, that all the rest are made of water; and by a third that they are all of aire; which make it plaine that all the [Page 265] Elements are changed one into another (by their ge­nerall consent, who other­wise disagree.) And if they can all bee changed one into another, it will ne­cessarily follow that they must all be Elements; be­cause which of the foure soever shall bee taken, it will appeare that even that is made of some o­ther.

The Body (which is com­posed III of these Elements) be­ing an instrument for the SOUL, is divided toge­ther with the powers of the same: For, it was fra­med to be convenient and fit for them, in such ma­ner, that no power of the SOUL should be hindered [Page 266] through the Bodies defect. And therefore to every power of the SOUL, there are proper parts of the Body assigned, for his ope­ration; as I will more par­ticularly declare in the following Chapters.

The SOUL exercises the part of an Artificer; the BODIE is as it were his instrument: It is also the matter wherein the actions are conversant; and the effect which is wroght thereby, is the action it selfe. The matter is as the woman, the act is that which is conversant a­bout her; either whore­dome, incest, or lawfull copulation.

The powers of the Soul, [Page 267] are divided into these three; phantasie, judgement, and memory.

CAP. 6.

I. Of the phantasie, or ima­gination; what it is; by what Names expressed; and by what instruments it worketh. II. Of the seats and nature of the senses; and why being but foure Elements, there are five senses. III. The definitions of sense, ac­cording to Plato and o­thers; and distinctions betweene such faculties in the Soul, as are ap­pointed to beare rule▪ and to obey.

EXpresse we will in the next place, such things as concerne [Page 269] the phantasie or imagina­tion. The faculty of ima­gining, is a power of that part of the soule which is void of Reason, and wor­keth by those instruments wherein the senses are pla­ced.

The thing subject to imagination, is that where­about our imagination is conversant, and may bee called imaginable, as that which is felt is termed sensible.

Imagination it selfe (cal­led [...]) is a passion of that part of the soul which is irrationall, procured by something which is sub­ject to our imagination. A vaine imagination (called [...]) is a void passion [Page 270] in the parts of the soule which are destitute of rea­son, being procured of no certaine thing whereof an imagination should arise.

But, the Stoick Philo­sophers doe set downe those foure in this maner; The imagination it selfe, [...]; The thing wher­by the imagination is mo­ved, [...]; A voide drawing away of our ima­gination, [...]; And that which moveth our imagination to bee vainely drawne away, [...].

Imagination is a passion representing unto us both it selfe, and the thing mo­ving our Imagination; For, when we see some white thing, there is ingendred [Page 271] some passion in the Soule by the reception thereof. Even as there is some pas­sion begotten in the seats of the Sense when it fee­leth any thing; So, there is then something engen­dred in the Soule when it conceiveth any thing; & it receiveth an Image or impression of the thing understood.

The fancie or the thing wherby Imaginatiō is mo­ved, is, any sensible-thing, which hath caused the I­magination; as it may bee some white thing, or any o­ther object which may move the SOVL.

The Fantastick or void drawing away of our Ima­gination, is a needles (or [Page 272] causuall) seducing (or di­stracting) of the Imagina­tion, without any certaine thing which may move the same.

The Fantasme or thing it selfe, whereby wee are idely drawne away, is the very attraction whereby wee are attracted, accor­ding to our vain Imagina­tion; which falleth out in those that are Mad or Me­lancholy. Betweene these Opinions there is no dif­ference, but only, in the alteration of some Names.

The Instruments of the I­magination, are the former Panns of the braine; The Vitall spirits, which are in them; The sinewes procee­ding from the braine; The [Page 273] nerves moistned by the Vitall spirits, and the very frame of the places, wherein the Senses are seated.

There are five seats for II the senses; but all are pro­perly but one sense, which is the SOUL it self, who, by the seats of the senses, discernes all such things as fall out in them. It dis­cernes, or taketh know­ledge of an Earthy nature. by that sense, which is most Earthie and Bodily, namely the Touching: It perceiveth perspicuous (or bright shining things) by that sense which is most perspicuous, that is to say, the sight: It judgeth such things as are pertinent to aire by that [Page 274] seat which is ordained for the aire; for the very sub­stance of the voice is aire, or the smiting of the aire: and it receiveth every tast by a certaine quality of the instrument of the sense of tasting; which attracts, by its waterish and spon­gy nature.

For it is the nature of every sensible thing, to be discerned by some thing which hath a nature like unto it: and by this rea­son it should seeme that there being onely foure Elements there should bee no more but foure senses.

But, because there is a kinde of vapour, and cer­taine smells which have a middle-nature betweene [Page 275] aire and water; the parts whereof are somewhat thicker then aire, & thin­ner then water (which ap­peares by them who are sick of a heavinesse in the head, by rhumes, and stop­pings; for they drawing the aire by respiration, have no feeling of the va­pour, by reason the fat­nesse of the odour is hin­dered by obstructions, from approaching the sense) therefore, a fifth-seat of the sense, namely, smelling, was provided by nature, that no such thing as may bee brought unto our knowledge, should be hidden from the sense.

Yet the sense is not an alteration, but the discer­ning [Page 276] of alterations: In­deed the seats of the sense are altered, and the sense discernes this alteration.

III Now, many times the name of the sense, and of the seats of the sense are confounded. But, sense is an apprehending of those things which are subject to sense: Yet this seemeth not to bee the definition of sense it selfe, but of the workings of the sense; And therefore some de­fine it thus:

Sense is a certaine in­tellectual spirit extended from the principall part of the minde, unto the bodily instruments.’ It is thus also defined: Sense is a power of the soule, [Page 277] which taketh hold of sensi­ble things; and the seat of the sense, is the instru­ment whereby it layeth hold on such things as are sensible.

Plato sayes thus; Sense is that wherein the Soule and the body communicate together concerning out­ward things: For, the ve­ry power it selfe belongs unto the soule; but, the in­strument pertaines to the body; and both together take hold of such outward things as may bee offered to imagination.

Some things in the soul were ordained to serve and be commanded; o­thersome to rule and bear sway. The part which [Page 278] hath in it understanding, and knowledge, was ordai­ned to rule. Those which appertaine to sense, and to the motions by appetite, as also, our ability of speaking, are made to serve and bee at command: For, our voice, and our motion by ap­petite, are obedient to rea­on, most speedily, and al­most in a momēt of time.

For, wee Will and are moved together, and at once; so that we need no time to come betweene our Will and our motion, as we may see in the moving of our fingers. Some natu­rall things are placed un­der the command of Rea­son, as those which wee call perturbations.

CAP. 7.

SECT. 1.

I. Of the sense of sight, and the opinions of Hippar­chus, of the Geometri­cians, of Epicurus, and Aristotle concerning the same. II. The opinions of Plato, and of Galen, touching the same sense; and of the cause of see­ing. III. The opinion of Porphyrie also touching that sense.

WE finde that this word fight hath a divers signification; for▪ sometime it signifieth the seat of the sight; and some time the power of the [Page 280] sense (it selfe.)

Hipparchus affirmes that the beams being shot forth from the eyes, take hold (as it were) of outward things with the farthest ends of them (even as if a man should lay his hand on them) and presents (or yeelds) those things, whereof they have so ta­ken hold, to our sight.

But the Geometricians describe unto us Figures (which are called Cones) broad at the first and growing to a narrow top, made by the meeting of the eye-beames▪ in one point. And they hold opi­nion that the beames of the right-eye, being darted forth to the left-side, and [Page 281] the beames of the left-eye toward the right-side, the Figure CONOS is made by the uniting of them in one; and that thereby it comes to passe that the sight comprehends many visible things together, at one view; and then more exactly perceives them, when the beames are met closely one with another.

And this is the cause, that oftentimes, when we looke upon the pavement we see not a piece of mo­ney lying plainly visible thereupon, though wee settle our eyes upon the same with diligence: For, untill it so fall out, that the beames meet in that very place, where the mo­ney [Page 282] lyeth, wee still over­looke the same; but then, wee presently attaine the sight of it, as if that had beene the beginning of our looking for it in that place.

The Epicures think that the shapes of such things as appeare unto us, are brought to our eyes.

Aristotle is of opinion that it is not a bodily shape which appeares, but a cer­taine quality rather con­veyed from things visible, unto the sight, by an alte­ration of the aire which is round about.

II Plato sayes, that the sight is caused by the mee­ting of all the severall brightnesses together (that [Page 283] is to say) partly by the light of the eyes, which flowing out some part of the way into the aire, which is of like nature with it selfe; partly by that which is retorted back againe from the bo­dies which are seene; and partly by the force of that which is extended out to­gether with the fierynesse of the eye, affecting the aire which comes be­tweene them; and easily spreading every way, or turning to any side.

Galen agreeing with Plato, speaketh of the sight (here and there in some places of his seventh booke of the agreement of parts) much to this pur­pose [Page 284] If (saith hee) any part or power, or quality of bodies that are visible, should come unto the eye, wee could not know the quantity of the thing seen. For, if a very great moun­taine were the object, it were quite contrary to reason, to imagine that the shape of so huge a thing should enter wholly into our eyes: yea, and the spirit belonging to the sight, being darted forth could not bee able to col­lect together so much vi­gour, as would bee requi­site to comprehend the whole visible object.

It remaines therefore that the aire, wherewith we are encompassed, is af­ter [Page 285] a sort such an instru­ment unto us when we see, as the nerve which belon­geth unto the sight is to the body; and some such thing seemeth to happen to the aire, which enclo­seth us round: For, the bright shining Sun having touched the upper limits of the aire, distributes his power into the whole aire: And the splendor which is caried through the sinewes called the optick nerves which be­long unto the sight, hath his essence of the nature of the spirits: This falling into the aire which is di­lated round about us, makes an alteration even at the very first injection, [Page 286] and shootes forth very farre: yet so, that it con­taines it self undispersed, untill it happen upon a reflecting body.

For, the aire is such an instrument unto the eye, to discerne visible objects, as the sinew is unto the braine: and look in what case the braine is, in re­spect of his sinew; in like case is the eye in respect of the aire, after it is quick­ned by the bright shining of the Sun.

Now, that it is the na­ture of the aire, to become like unto those things which enter into it, ap­peares manifest by this, that whensoever any bright thing, (be it red or [Page 287] blew, or of the colour of silver) shall bee conveyed through the aire, when it is light, the colour of the aire will bee changed ac­cording to that thing which is caried through the same.

But, Porphyrie in his book III which hee wrote of the senses, affirms, that neither the making of the Figure Conos, neither any shape, nor any other thing, is cause of our seeing, but only this; that the soul her selfe mee­ting with such objects as are visible, doth perceive and know, that all those things which are seene, be contained in her selfe; be­cause it is she only which holds them together, to [Page 288] their preservation. For, (as he saith) whatsoever is in the world, is nothing else, but the soul holding together divers bodies.

And it were not untru­ly said, that the soul com­meth to the knowledge of it selfe, by the view of every thing which is in the world; if his opinion be allowed: for according to his tenet, there is but one soul for all things, e­ven the reasonable-soul.

SECT. 2.

I. Of the proper object of sight, and of such other meanes and circumstan­ces as are usefull in see­ing. II. Though colour and shape are onely the proper objects of sight; yet by cogitation and memory, it commeth to the knowledge of other qualities in the thing seene. III. Of such sen­ses as are conversant a­bout things at a distance; and in what cases the sight erres, or needs the aide of other senses.

THe sight seeth by straight lines; but it [Page 290] feeleth first & principally the colours of things; and together with thē, discer­neth also the body that is coloured, the magnitude, the shape, the place, wherein it is; the distance, the number, the motion, and the rest thereof; as like wise, whe­ther it be rough, or smooth, or unequall, or even, or sharpe, or dull, or what ele­ment is predominant ther­in; and whether it be wa­terish, or earthy; moist or dry.

Yet that which is the proper object of this sense, is colour onely; for wee no way attaine the know­ledge of colours but by our sight: and assoone as wee behold the colour, wee [Page 291] therewithall do immedi­ately perceive also the coloured body; the place wherein the visible object abideth; and the distance, which is between the se [...]r and the thing seene.

Looke in how many senses wee receive the knowledge of b [...]dily things; even in so many wee come to the know­ledge of a place, together with the body; as it is in touching, and tasting: but these two, feele them one­ly when they are joyned neare unto the body (ex­cept in those things which we shall speake of anon) whereas the sight, beholds things at a great distance.

Now in that the sight II [Page 292] laies hold of such things, as are visible, when they be far off, it must necessarily follow that it receives a sight only of the distance of things: and it is then on­ly capable of the magni­tude of things, when it is able at one view to com­prehend the thing which appeareth; but whensoe­ver the visible body is too large to bee apprehen­ded at one aspect, then the sight needeth memory and cogitation to assist it.

For, the sight behol­ding so great an object by peece-meale (and not at one whole view) must ne­cessarily passe from one part thereof to another; and in that passage, so [Page 293] much onely is apprehen­ded by the proper faculty of the sight, as is present in view; the rest which was viewed before, is kept by the memory, un­till our understanding hath brought together, both that which was before seen and that which is present likewise, in our sight.

Moreover, sight appre­hends the magnitude of bo­dies two maner of wayes; Sometime by it selfe a­lone; and sometime again by the aide of memory and cogitation: But by it selfe alone, it never taketh no­tice of the number of things visible if they ex­ceed three or foure; seeing the number of them can­not [Page 294] not be discerned at one at­tempt; neither can it lay hold on the motions of things; neither on Figures which have many corners, without it have the helpe of memory and cogitation to assist it.

For sight is not able to bring together, five or sixe or seaven, or more, with­out the helpe of memory; neither can it bring toge­ther figures that have six, eight, or many corners. The motion also that com­meth by passing from one great thing, to another, hath in the same, some what preceding, and some­what following after; and wheresoever things are found to bee some first, [Page 295] some second, and some third; there memory onely is the preserver of them together: But these qua­lities, high and low, equall and unequall, rough and smooth, sharpe and dull, bee communicable both to the touching, and to the sight; for that they onely can discerne of place; and yet they stand in some need also of our understan­ding.

For, that thing onely which moves the sense by one only attempt, is wrought by the sense alone (without the helpe of memory and cogitation:) but, such things as are felt at divers times are not wrought by the sense one­ly, [Page 296] but by the aide of me­mory and cogitation, as is aforesaid.

Such is the nature of sight, that it can pierce e­ven unto the bottome of transparant things; and first, and specially of the Aire: For it can passe quite through it. Second­ly, it can passe through water when it is cleare; in­somuch that wee may see fishes swimming in the same: And; (though som­what more hardly) it pas­ses through earth, being of a glassie or such like transparant nature. Yet, this is alwayes to be sup­posed, that these things must be enlightned, when they become the proper [Page 297] object of sight, without the aide of any other ass­istant.

But let no man bee so deceived, as to imagine that the sight may of it selfe discerne hot things; because when wee see fire, we know that it is hot; for if you refer that speech to the first function of sight, you shall finde that when the sight first beheld the fire, it perceived nothing but the shape and colour thereof. After that, wee comming to touch it, and thereby knowing the same to be hot, our memo­ry preserves in us the knowledge which wee first gained by the touch: and ever since; when wee [Page 298] behold fire (though wee see nothing in it but the shape and colour) our under­standing by the helpe of memory, conceives the hear of the fire to be in the same, as well as the things which are properly seene.

The like may be said of an apple; For seeing the whole forme thereof con­sisteth not onely in the co­lour and the shape, but in the smell also and in the tast; it followes not that it is the sight onely, whereby we know the same to bee an apple (because we saw the shape and colour of it) for, our memory had preserved in our understanding the experience which we had formerly collected from [Page 299] the smell and tast; and these being added unto that, whereof the eye tooke no­tice, perfited our know­ledge.

Therefore, when wee thinke an apple made of waxe to be a true apple, it is our understanding which erreth, and not our sight; for the sight failed not to informe rightly, so much as pertained unto her sense; when it perceived the true colour and shape of an apple.

Now, these three senses, III sight, hearing, and smelling, are conversant about things at a distance, and such as are not joyned close unto them by means of the aire comming be­tween [Page 300] them. But the tast cannot possibly feele any thing but that whereunto it is nearely joyned; and the touching taketh part of both: for sometime wee touch things bodily, with­out any intermedium be­tweene us and them; som­time againe, wee touch them with a staffe betwixt us, and the things tou­ched.

Moreover, the sight hath now and then, want of some other of the senses to witnesse unto it the certainty of that which it perceiveth, when things are artificially wrought to deceive the sight; as it falleth out in painting: For, it is the painters cun­ning [Page 301] to deceive the eye, with counterfeit shadow­ings, either of an Embost or hollow▪worke, as the na­ture of the things re­quires: To the discer­ning whereof, the sense of touching is especially usefull, and sometime of the tast and smell also; as appeared in the example of the apple made of wax. Yea, and otherwhile (at no great distance) the sight it selfe maketh some things appeare unto us to bee that which they are not: For, if a towne which is foure-square bee but a pretty distance from us, it will seeme unto the sight to be round.

The sight erres like­wise, [Page 302] when wee looke through a thick aire, or through smoake, or some such things as otherwise trouble the sight by the thicknesse thereof. In like maner, when we see things in the water, being stirred; for in the Sea an Oare seemeth broken when it is whole.

So is it also when wee looke in or through some transparant▪ bodie; as loo­king-glasses, or other glasses and the like things; or when the visible object is moved swiftly: For, a swift-motion so distempers the sight; that those things are thereby made appeare to be round which are nothing so, and those [Page 303] to bee fixed, which are moved.

The same happeneth, when the minde is busied about other matters; as when a man (purposing to meet his friend) passeth by without heeding him whom hee went to meet, (though hee met him in the way) by reason he had his minde busied with other thoughts: But, indeed this is not properly an er­ror of the sight, but of the minde: For, the sight be­held his friend, and gave warning; but the minde heeded not that which was brought unto it.

Finally, the sight nee­deth foure things for the cleare discerning of all [Page 304] visible objects, namely; A whole and sound seat for that sense; a proportionable mea­sure of motion; a fit distance; and the aire to bee pure and cleare.

CAP. 8.

I. Of the sense of touching; why the seat of it is in all parts of the body, and why every living-creature enjoyes that sense, where­as many are defective in other of the senses. II. Of the proper objects of this sense; and of such as it hath in common with o­ther senses. III. In which of the senses Man excelleth; and in what senses, other creatures excell him.

IT was by the Creator of the world, so orde­red, that hee made the seats of all the other senses [Page 306] two-fold, and confined them to a certaine circuit of place in some parts of the body; For example, hee hath made two eyes, two eares, two passages for the sense scituate in the nostrill; yea, and hee hath planted in every li­ving-creature, as it were, two tongues. In some they are evidently parted, (as in serpents) and in some other, they are joyned and united, as in men: And for this cause, hee made onely two former-pans of the braine, that the sinewes which serve for the senses, being sent downe from either of these braine-pans might make the seats of the senses to be twofold.

[Page 307] Now, hee made them twofold, in respect of that exceeding tender love which hee bare unto us; that when the one of them tooke harme, the o­ther which remained might preserve the sense. And yet, though most of the seats of the other sen­ses perish, the living-crea­ture may be alive: but as soone as the sense of tou­ching is extinct, the living-creature doth instantly pe­rish.

For onely the sense of touching, among all the rest of the senses is com­mon to all livingcreatures; and every living-creature is indued therewith; whereas all of them have [Page 308] not every one of the o­ther senses; but some have these, and some have others, (except those which wee call the more perfect crea­tures, and they indeed have all the senses.)

Now, seeing the living-creature loseth life by the losse of this sense; the Crea­tor hath allotted unto the sense of touching, not one part of the body onely; but almost the whole body of the living-creature: For, except the bones, and the hornes, and the nailes, and the binding-sinewes, and the haires, and certaine o­ther such like things, each part of the body is parta­ker of the sense of touching

Thereupon it hath so [Page 309] hapned that the seat of e­very sense hath two senses in it; one of such things as are properly the object of every particular sense, and another in respect of the sense of touching: For the sight discerneth colours, and yet is partaker both of hot and cold things; partici­pating of heat and cold as it is a body, and discerning of colours, as it is the sense of sight. The like may be thought also of the tast, of the smelling, and of the hearing.

It may hereupon bee questioned how the tou­ching can bee spred over the whole body, seeing that the senses proceed from the former braine­pans: [Page 310] for indeed the si­newes come downe from the braine, and being dis­persed into every part of the body, doe there occasi­on the sense of touching. And some were of opini­on (because the haire stands up as it were, with a sudden horror, when the foot is casually pric­ked with a thorne) that the griefe, or at least, the feeling of the griefe, ascen­ded up unto the brain, and was there felt. Which be­ing true, it might then be concluded, that there could bee no griefe in any part of the body, that were wounded, but in the brain only.

It were better there­fore [Page 311] to make this answer, that the sinewes (which bee dispersed as aforesaid) are the braine it selfe. For, they are a certaine porti­on of the braine, contai­ning in them the vitall spi­rits, and diffusing them throughout the whole bo­dy of the living-creature, in such manner as fire is contained in burning-iron: And wheresoever such a sensible-sinew is planted, it makes the part wherein it is ingraffed to be partaker of sense; and to be so qua­lified, that it may feele things. Neither were it improperly spoken, to say that not the passion, but ra­ther a certaine partaking of the griefe, and a denun­ciation [Page 312] of the same is con­veyed up to the braine, where all the sinewes have their beginning.

II Now the proper ob­jects of the sense of tou­ching are hot, cold, soft, hard, slimy, stiffe, heavy, and light: For, by touching on­ly, we attaine the know­ledge of these things; whereas these next fol­lowing are common both to the touching and the sight, (to wit) sharp, dull, rough, plaine, dry, moist, thick, thin, high, low, yea, and place it selfe. So like­wise is magnitude (when it can bee comprised within one attempt of the tou­ching) fogginesse, clearenesse, roundnesse, (if it be but in [Page 313] small things) as also the shape of other figures; yea, and it fooleth likewis the motion of bodies comming neare unto it, being assi­sted by memory, and un­derstanding.

Moreover, it is sensible of number, as farre as two or three, but no farther; and those things must also be of no larger magnitude, then may easily bee com­prehended by the touch. And these are better dis­cerned by sight then tou­ching; as are also such things as bee equall or une­quall (they being of the same kinde with smooth and rough things) for une­quality being mingled with hardnesse, causeth a [Page 314] roughnesse; and equalnesse added unto thicknesse, ma­keth a smoothnesse.

By that which we have here delivered, it is evi­dent that the senses com­municate each with other in many things: and that if one sense erre, the error if it may bee rectified by some other senses; As wee perceive in Pictures: For, the sight beholdeth things as if they stood out from the rest of the peece, as the Nose and such other parts of the Picture; but, by the sense of touching, the error of the sight is discovered.

As the sight useth at all times the aire for a meanes to behold all things; So [Page 315] the sense of touching fee­leth some things by a staffe (or other instrument) as by a meane; (to wit) hard, soft, and moist things. being aided by understan­ding, and the discourse of reason.

In the sense of touching III as also in tasting, Man ex­celleth all other living-creatures; and the beasts excell him, in the other three senses: for there be divers creatures that doe surpasse man in some one of the other three senses; but a Dog excelleth him in every one of these three, hearing, seeing, and smelling, as appeareth by hounds which hunt by foot.

[Page 316] The whole body (as wee said before) is the seat wherein the sense of tou­ching is placed; but in man the inside of the hands, and the tops of the fingers, are the principall seats there of, and were appointed by our Creator, not onely to lay hold on things; but to be exact instruments also, serviceable to the sense of touching. And the cause why the skin of them is somewhat thin; why cer­taine muscles are laid un­der them throughout the inside; and why there groweth no haire on them (whereof the muscles are cause) is by reason they should the better feele and take hold on small things.

[Page 317] Such hands as are har­dest, are the more strong to hold things; and such as are softest are most apt for exact touching. In like maner, the sinewes which are hard, be fittest for mo­tion, and those which are soft, more convenient for feeling; for the sinewes also are instruments of tou­ching; yea and the chiefe instruments of that sense.

CAP. 9.

I. Of the Tasting; by what wayes, on what matter, and with what instru­ment it worketh. II. The names of the simple qua­lities pertaining to the tast. III. Of the com­pound qualities belon­ging to the same sense, &c.

THat the sight be­holds things by di­rect lines; that the senses of hearing and smel­ling attain the knowledge of their objects, as well divers other wayes, as by direct lines; and that tou­ching and tasting doe nei­neither [Page 319] by direct lines, nor by any other meanes be­come sensible of their proper objects, but then onely, when they come neare to such things as are subject to their sense (ex­cept in such cases as are before expressed,) wee have already declared.

The matter whereupon the tast worketh is the hu­mors, or Iuices which are tasted. The instruments of tasting, are the tongue (chiefly the very tip of the tongue) and the roofe of the mouth: For in these are dispersed the sinewes descending from the braine, and they denounce to the principall part of the soule, what that tast is [Page 320] which they have recei­ved.

II The name of the quali­ties pertaining to the tast, and which are found in the Iuices, are these. Sweet­nesse, sharpnesse, tartnesse, a binding bitternesse, a bitter­nesse lesse binding, a quali­ty bringing a bitternesse by drought and heat; salt­nesse▪ fatnesse: For these are the qualities which tast discerneth; and it is in re­spect of these qualities that the water is said to be void of qualities; because if you tast water, it offers none of these qualities to your sense; whereas, if you have respect to other qualities, as cold and moisture, they are ingraffed therein. The [Page 321] two bitternesses differ from each other in their being more or lesse astringent.

These aforenamed are III in a maner all the simple-qualities which belong un­to the sense of tasting; but the compound-qualities, are infinite; in regard there is a proper tast belonging to every living-creature, and to every plant. There is one tast in swines flesh, ano­ther in Goats flesh, and when wee would know what flesh it is which commeth to be tasted, we distinguish the same by the quality of the tast, which could not be done except there were a di­vers quality in every thing that is tasted.

[Page 322] Now because those things are infinite, and utterly divers one from a­nother, wee cannot com­prise or distinguish them under particular tearmes: For even in those things, wherein some one of the simple qualities beareth rule, there is a plaine dif­ference of that which is the object of tast. For, though in dry figs, and in grapes, and in the fruit of the Palme, there is one predominant quality, to wit, sweetnesse, yet in eve­ry one of them the tast dis­cernes a difference.

CAP. 10.

I. Of the Hearing; of the object of that sense; of the instruments thereof; and of such living-crea­tures as move not their eares.

HItherto of the tast. The sense of Hearing is em­ployed about voices and sounds; and in them it dis­cernes the shrilnesse, the basenesse, the softnesse, the harshnesse, and the loud­nesse.

The instruments there­of are a soft kind of sinews which proceed from the braine; the forme of the [Page 324] eares; and chiefly that part of them which is gri­sly: for the grisles are fit­ted for sounds and noises.

Onely Man and the Ape, are thought to have eares unmoveable, and all other living-creatures to have moveable eares.

CAP. 11.

Of the Smelling; of the in­struments thereof; of the matter whereupon it layes hold; and of the dif­ference which is betweene the vapours, or fumes, from whence the Smell ariseth.

EVery one of those places which are seats of the senses (as wee have said before) takes hold of such things as are the proper objects of their senses, by meanes of a certaine likenesse and agreeablenesse which is betweene them and their sensible objects; and there­fore [Page 326] the Smelling (though it be first begunne by the nostrils) is perfected at the bounds of the former-braine-pans, which having a naturall affinity with va­pours, doe the more easily take hold of them.

And yet, whereas the braine in all other senses, sends downe sinewes into the seat of each sense to bee serviceable unto the sense therein placed; it so dealeth not with our sense of Smelling; for the bounds of the braine it selfe, are in stead of the sinewes, and the braine receives imme­diately such vapours, and fumes, as are yeelded up unto it. Of which vapours, the most generall diffe­rence [Page 327] is in this, that some of them have a good smell, some an evill sent, and some, that which is neither very good, nor ve­ry evill, but in a meane betwixt both.

The good smell ariseth from humours exactly con­cocted: The evill sent, is when they are ill conco­cted, or not at all; and the middle smell, is when they are concocted after a mid­ling maner.

CAP. 12.

Of the Cogitation; of the things thereunto pertai­ning; and of the instru­ment whereby it wor­keth, &c.

RIght briefly, and according to our ability, we have spoken of the imagining faculty of the soule; of the instruments thereof, and of those things wherein they agree or differ.

To the cogitation these particulars are generally pertinent; the judgement of things, a consent unto them, a refusall of them, and a desire unto them; [Page 329] But, those which are spe­cially pertinent, are consi­deration, vertues, know­ledges, the reason of arts, deliberation, and choice.

This is that part wher­by wee attaine the fore­sight of things to come, in visions or dreames; and therein onely, the Pytha­gorean Philosophers (fol­lowing the Iewish opini­ons) thinke true prophe­cying consisteth.

The instruments of cogi­tation, are the middle-pan of the braine, and the vi­tall spirits, which are in it.

CAP. 13.

I. Of the memorative part of the Soul, and the defi­nition of memory accor­ding to Origen and Pla­to. II. The difference be­twixt remembring of things contained in sense and of things contained in understanding; as also what recordation is. III. Of the instruments of the memory; and de­monstrations evidently shewing where the foun­taines of the senses, of the cogitation, and me­mory are to be found.

THe seat of memory, which the Greekes cal Mnemoneuticon, [Page 331] is the cause and storehouse both of memorie and recor­dation, or remembrance.

Memory (as Origen saith) is a certaine appearance left in the minde, by some sense which had wrought actually before. Plato ta­keth it to be a preservation of things both felt and con­sidered: For, the minde takes hold of things which are subject unto sense, by the seats of the sense, and therof is opinion begotten. But, it layeth hold on things intelligible by under­standing; and thence ari­seth consideration. And when the minde retaines the Prints both of things in opinion, and of those also which are in considera­tion, [Page 332] we then say, that it remembers them.

II It is likely that Plato doth herein meane, by the name of consideration, not the principall conside­ration; but a certaine cogi­tation: For things contai­ned in sense, are remem­bred by themselves; but, things contained in under­standing, are accidentally remembred. The remem­brance of things thought upon by us, doth remaine in us upon the heed of some appearance which was before in our imagi­nation: And we remember those things which are properly contained in our understanding, in respect that wee have learned [Page 333] them, and heard them; but as for their substance, wee have no memory thereof.

For indeed, the appre­hending of things contai­ned in understanding, pro­ceeds not from any pre­ceding imagination; but commeth to us by lear­ning, and by a naturall no­tion.

If we be said to remem­ber such things as we saw, or heard, or knew hereto­fore, by some occasion or meanes: This word here­tofore (having relation to the time past) makes it plaine, that such things as are made and destroyed a­gaine, and such as have their being in time, are [Page 334] comprehended in memory; and that our memory con­sisteth of things absent, but is not procured (or moved) by those absent things.

Recordation (or remem­brance) called by the Greekes Anamnesis; is when forgetfulnesse hath inter­rupted our memory; for it is a recovering of memory, which was lost, when it failed by forgetfulnesse.

Memory is lost, either altogether (and for ever) or else, for a space onely; and when it faileth but for a space, we call the re­covery thereof remem­brance.

But there is another kind of recordation, which [Page 335] is not occasioned by the forgetfulness of such things as proceed from sense or understanding; but from the forgetfulnesse of those things which wee have even by naturall notions. By naturall notions (or things naturally concei­ved) I meane such as eve­ry man hath in him with­out any teacher; as that there is a God. This Plato calleth a recordation of I­dea's; and what is meant by Idea's I will hereafter shew.

Such things as appeare unto the imagining part, are from thence conveyed unto the cogitation; and the cogitation, or discour­sing part (when it hath [Page 336] once apprehended such things & judged of them) sends them to bee stored up in that part of the soule, wherein memory is resi­dent.

III The instruments used by the memory, are the hinder braine-pan, called by the Greekes [...], and [...], and the vitall spirit there placed.

But seeing we have af­firmed, that the begin­nings and roots of the sen­ses, are the former pans of the braine; The seat of the cogitation, the middle pan; And of the memory, the hinder-pan; it will be ne­cessary for us to prove e­vidently that these things are so. Lest we seeme to [Page 337] give credit to that which hath been spoken, with­out any reason to be ren­dred for the same.

A plaine demonstration thereof may bee taken from the parts themselves; for, if by any meanes the former braine-pan be hurt, the senses are much hin­dred; but the cogitation remaineth sound. If only the middle-pan be harmed, the cogitation is maymed; but the seat of sense keepes the senses whole. If any hurt befall both to the former and middle-pan, both sense and cogitation decay. If the hinder-pan be onely disordered, the memory alone perisheth, and neither sense nor cogi­tation [Page 338] receive harme. But if the former, the middle, and the hinder braine-pans be all together out of or­der, the party so distur­bed is maimed, in sense, in cogitation, and memory, all at once; and the whole living-creature is in danger of destruction.

This is made evident also by many diseases, and accidents which are sym­ptomes of diseases, and especially in frantick men. For in some of them their cogitation onely is hurt, and their senses are preser­ved whole.

Such a frantick man, is mentioned by Galen, who being in a place wherein a wool-winder was at work [Page 339] by him, rose up, and ta­king certaine glasse vessels which hee found in the roome, ran to the win­dow, and asked such as passed by, whether they would have such or such glasses cast downe unto them, calling every vessell by the right name: And when they who stood be­low said they would have it so, hee threw them all downe, one after another.

Then hee asked them whether they would have the wool-winder throwne downe also; they (thin­king he had but jested) re­plyed yea: whereupon he tooke up the wool-winder and hurled him headlong from a high place.

[Page 340] This man had his senses whole enough; for hee knew which were the glasse-vessels, and which was the wool-winder; but his cogitation was diseased.

Others there be, who deluded by a vaine imagi­nation, suppose that they see such things as indeed are not seene; whereas in other things, they are not without the direction of reason. In such as these, the former braine-pans are on­ly diseased, and the mid­dle-pan uncrased; For, by those diseases which fol­low every part, the course of their operation is ac­cordingly hindred; and the living-creature is hurt in respect of that operati­on, [Page 341] to the working wher­of the part diseased is na­turally serviceable. As for example, if the feet bee hurt, our walking is hinde­red; for that is the work whereunto the foot ser­veth.

CAP. 14.

I. Of the Reason, from whence we have the deno­mination of reasonable-creatures. II. Of our speech, and of the seve­rall instruments thereof.

HEre is one divisi­on of the powers of the soul, (toge­ther with which, there are some parts of the body likewise divided) where­unto is added another di­vision, and after another maner▪ For the reasonable­part of the soule is divided into reason which is un­expressed in us, and that which is uttered by our speech.

[Page 343] The reason unexpressed (or setled in us) is a motion of the soule engendred in that part of the minde, wherein consisteth our discourse of reason, with­out any utterance by voice: Thereby often­times (although wee say nothing) wee throughly resolve, and set downe with our selves, the whole reason of a thing; and o­therwhile discourse in our dreames: And it is chiefly in respect thereof that we are called reasonable-crea­tures; yea much rather in this respect, then for that which is uttered by our speech.

For albeit some are deafe and dumbe from [Page 344] their births, or lose their voices by sicknesse and diseases, yet reasonable-creatures they are, never­thelesse.

II The utterance of reason is by the voice in the vari­ety of tongues; and the instruments used in the voice are many; namely, the muscles which are in the middle of the sides, the breast it selfe, the lungs, the winde-pipe, the throat, (and in all these, those parts especially which are grisly) the returning sinews, the cover of the wind-pipe; yea, and all the muscles which move these parts, are instruments of our speech.

[Page 345] The instruments of our various utterance are the mouth: (for therein the speech is moulded and fa­shioned) and the tongue and the wesil-pipe (which are there in stead of that wherewith wee smite the strings of a Lute or such like instrument) the roofe of the mouth also, which is as the belly of the Lute, that receives and gives back the sound. The teeth, and the various openings of the mouth, doe stand in stead of strings: yea, and the nose also doth some­what further the plaine­nesse, and the pleasingness of speech, as appeares in those that sing.

CAP. 15.

I. Another division of the soule, being threefold. II. An eightfold divi­sion thereof according to Zeno. III. A fivefold, and twofold division of the soul also according to Aristotle.

VNto those afore­going, there is added yet another division of the soule, into the powers, the kindes, and parts thereof; namely, in­to a vegitative power, which is the same wherby plants (and such like) doe grow; and this is called also a nourishing, or passive [Page 347] power, secondly into a sen­sible power; and thirdly in­to that whereby it exerci­seth reason.

Zeno the Stoick assignes II unto the soule eight parts; the reasonable part is the first and principall: the five senses make up sixe, the faculty of speech the seaventh, and the eighth hee affirmes to bee that power whereby things are ingendred one of another. But Panetine the philoso­pher (contradicting this opinion) affirmes that the uttering of our speech is a part of the motion which is in our appetite; and that the power of ingendring is a part of nature, not of the soule, wherein hee hath [Page 348] said very truly.

III Aristotle in his Physicks hath divided the Soule in­to to five parts; namely, that which is vegitative, sensi­tive, movable in place, that which belongs to appetite, and that which is intelle­ctive.

He calls that vegitative, which nourisheth, encrea­seth, breedeth, maketh, and formeth bodies; for under the name of vegitative he comprehends the intire faculty of growing; calling the whole after the name of that part thereof which is the chiefest therein, and from whence all the other parts of the growing power have their essence.

This is Aristotles opini­on [Page 349] in his Physicks; but in his Ethicks he makes but a twofold division of the Soule; that is to say, into parts rationall, and irratio­nall. Of the reasonable-part I have already treated; now therfore I will speak of that which is unreasona­ble.

CAP. 16.

I. Of that unreasonable part of the soule which con­taines the appetite: of concupiscence also; of anger, and of their seve­rall instruments. II. Of the divers acceptations of this word affection, and the definition of an affe­ction, and of an operati­on or act. III. The diffe­rence betweene an ope­ration, and an affection or passion, &c.

SOme hold opinion that irrationality, or to be voide of reason is an intire thing by it self, as though there were a [Page 351] soule void of reason, which were not a part of the ra­tionall soule: and for these causes they thinke so;

First, for that it is found alone by it selfe in unrea­sonable living creatures; For thereby it seemes un­to them to be perfect of it selfe, and no part of the reasonable soule. Secondly, they so imagine, because it appeares unto them one of the greatest absur­dities which may be, to affirme that a power void of reason should be part of a Soule indued with reason.

However, Aristotle af­firmes it to be both a part, and a faculty of the reaso­nable soule, dividing it in to two parts, (as I said be­fore) [Page 352] and calls those two by this one cōmon name, the appetitive-faculty: To which belongs also the motion of our appetite; for appetite is the beginning of motion, as appeares in every living creature ha­ving a desire to something; for their desire causes them to move forward, accor­ding to their appetite.

This unreasonable part of the soule doth either disobey, or obey reason: And that part which is o­bedient unto reason, is di­vided into two parts, con­cupiscence, and anger.

The instrument of the concupiscence by which it commeth into sense, is the Liver. But the instrument [Page 353] of anger is the heart, which being a hard part receives a strong motion, and is ordained for a hard ser­vice, and for great resi­stances; whereas the Li­ver being a tender entrail, is made the instrument of tender concupiscence.

These things are said to be obedient unto rea­son, because nature hath ordained them to obey reason, and to bee moved, as reason commandeth, in all such men as live answe­rable to that which nature (originally) requires. And these are certaine affecti­ons, which constitute our Essence, as it hath life in it; For life cannot bee main­tained without these.

[Page 354] II But whereas this word affection hath divers ac­ceptations, wee must first distinguish the variety of significations which it hath: for either it pertai­neth to the body, as when it is sick or ulcerated, in which cases we say it is so or so affected, or else it be­longs to the soul, of which we now speake, and wher­unto concupiscence and an­ger doe pertaine. But uni­versally and generally, in respect of the intire living creature consisting of both parts, it is called an affecti­on, and followeth either, in griefe or pleasure.

For griefe doth follow our affection, but the very passion or affection it selfe, [Page 355] is not griefe: for if that were true, then whereso­ever passion were found, there should be griefe also: but things void of life may be patients and suffer, yet feele no griefe. Therefore it is not necessarily conse­quent, that whensoever wee are affected unto a thing, we should also bee grieved, but then onely when wee feele the thing which hapneth unto us. Yea, and that which fal­leth unto us must bee a thing of such moment likewise, as may bee per­ceived by our sense.

But this is the definiti­on of such affections as are in the soul. An affection is the motion of our power of [Page 356] appetite, subject unto sense, provoked by the appearance of some good or evill. Or else it may bee defined thus: An affection is a motion of the soule, void of reason, supposing either some good or some evill thing.

Affection in generall is by some thus defined; Af­fection is a motion in one thing, by the commotion of another. The operation (or action) is a motion working that which is wrought. And therefore anger is an operation of that part of the soule wherein anger is; but it is an affection of both parts of the soule; and beside that, of all our body, when our body by reason of anger is violently drawn [Page 357] thereby to any furious act: for this motion chan­ced in one thing, by the commotion of another thing, which was the de­finition of an affection.

An operation (or action)III after another sort, is cal­led an affection; when it disagreeth from nature; for the operation is a motion according to nature, but the affection is repugnant unto nature: And there­fore, an operation when it is not moved according to nature, is called an affecti­on, whether it bee moved of it selfe, or of some o­ther: As for example, the motion which is from the heart in the pulses, is an operation; but that unsea­sonable [Page 356] appetite, subject unto sense, provoked by the appearance of some good or evill. Or else it may bee defined thus: An affection is a motion of the soule, void of reason, supposing either some good or some evill thing.

Affection in generall is by some thus defined; Af­fection is a motion in one thing, by the commotion of another. The operation (or action) is a motion working that which is wrought. And therefore anger is an operation of that part of the soule wherein anger is; but it is an affection of both parts of the soule; and beside that, of all our body, when our body by reason of anger is violently drawn [Page 357] thereby to any furious act: for this motion chan­ced in one thing, by the commotion of another thing, which was the de­finition of an affection.

An operation (or action)III after another sort, is cal­led an affection; when it disagreeth from nature; for the operation is a motion according to nature, but the affection is repugnant unto nature: And there­fore, an operation when it is not moved according to nature, is called an affecti­on, whether it bee moved of it selfe, or of some o­ther: As for example, the motion which is from the heart in the pulses, is an operation; but that unsea­sonable [Page 358] motion which commeth by feares or fea­vers, is an affection or pas­sion. For that great pan­ting proceedeth from the heart it selfe unnaturally; and from thence also com­meth naturally the mode­rate beating of the pulses. Therefore it is no mar­vaile if one and the same thing bee called both an affection and an operation. For in respect they bee certaine motions procee­ding from the passible part of the soule, they be a kinde of operations; but in this respect, that they passe measure, and are not a­greeable to nature, they are not operations, but af­fections.

[Page 359] Thus you see the moti­on of that part of the soule which is irrationall, to bee an affection in both signi­fications; and that never­thelesse, every motion of the passible part is not cal­led a passion (or affection) but those which are most vehement, or which (at least) proceed so far, that they may bee felt. For, those which are small, and which cannot be felt, are not to be called affections (or passions) while they are in that degree; because there must bee a conveni­ent quantity (or magni­tude) to make it a passion.

And for this reason, that clause; whose motion is perceived by sense, is an­nexed [Page 360] to the definition of an affection; even be­cause small motions, wher­unto the sense is not privy, doe not make an affection, as I said before.

CAP. 17.

I. Of the concupiscence, and of pleasure and griefe, which are the two parts, whereinto the same is divided; and of another fourfold division thereof. II. Of the meanes wher­by evill affections are in­gendred, and the meanes also how they might bee cured.

THat part of the soule, which (as we have said before) is irrationall, and yet obey­eth reason, is divided into these two; namely, the concupiscible, and irascible part. The coNcupiscence is [Page 362] againe divided into plea­sure and griefe: For if our concupiscence attaines to that which is desired, it breedeth a pleasure, and if it misseth of the same, it engendreth griefe.

This desire may ano­ther way be divided into four parts, the cōcupiscence it selfe being one of the foure. For of those things which are; some be good, some evill, some present, and some expected; and af­ter this maner, if two bee multiplied, the parts in the division of the concu­piscence will be foure: For you shall there find things good, things bad, things present, and things expe­cted.

[Page 363] Now good expected, is this desire: Good when it is present, is pleasure. Evill when it is looked for, be­getteth feare; when it is present, it bringeth griefe. If therefore you have re­spect to good things, there­in consisteth pleasure and desire; but if you respect evill things, of them pro­ceed feare and griefe. And for these considerations, some have divided affecti­on into these foure parts; desire, pleasure, feare, grief. We call those things good and bad, that are either so indeed, or else reputed to be such.

Evill affections are in­gendred II in our minde, by these three things; Evill [Page 364] education, unskilfulnesse (or ignorance,) and by an evill constitution of Body.

For, if wee be not well educated, even from our childhood, so that wee may learne to master our passions in the beginning, wee soone fall into an im­moderation almost incu­rable. By reason of igno­rance also, a certaine per­verse judgement is foste­red in the reasonable part of our soule, which makes us think evill things to be good; and good things to be evill. And by meanes of an ill complexion (or consti­tution) of body, somewhat is likewise occasioned to our harme; For they in whom choller abound are [Page 365] inclined to fretfulnesse; and they who exceed in heat and moisture, are prone to lasciviousnesse.

Wee must endeavour therefore, to cure an evill custome by enuring our selves to good customes; we must remove ignorance by learning knowledge; & we must labour to rectifie the evill constitution of our bo­dies, by such bodily things, as may so much as is pos­sible help to bring it into a meane temperature; which may be effected by a good dyet, by exercise, and by physick, if need be.

CAP. 18.

SECT. 1.

I. Of the pleasures both of minde and body; their variety, and different na­tures. II. Of such plea­sures as are to be pursued by good men, and which are properly accounted pleasures. III. What pleasures (according to the opinion of Plato) are true or false pleasures: how good pleasures are named; how defined by some Philosophers; and what defects are in their definition.

RIghtwell may plea­sure be divided in­to corpereall and mentall-pleasures: For, some belong onely to the minde, as to be delighted in knowledge; or in the contemplation of things. O­thers [Page 367] are called corporeall-pleasures, because they proceed from the con­junction of soul and body, and they are the pleasures which wee have in eating, drinking, carnall-copulation, and the like.

There is no pleasure proper to the body alone: For they that seem to be such, are passions rather then pleasures; as certaine cuttings, and flawings, qua­lities pertinent to the temperature of the body: For, all pleasure hath sense joyned with it, and (as we have shewed before) all sense belongeth to the soule.

There be divers kindes of pleasure: Some are [Page 368] good, some naught; some false, some true; some pertaine to the minde on­ly; some depend upon knowledge; some belong to the body, and are judged by the sense.

Among pleasures tryed by sense, some be naturall, and some not so. To that pleasure which is in drin­king, the griefe which commeth by thirst, is op­posed; but to the pleasure which ariseth from con­templation, there is no­thing opposite; And by these things it is manifest that the name of pleasure hath many significations.

Among those which we call bodily or corpore­all pleasures, some are both [Page 369] necessary and naturall; and without them it is impos­sible to live; such are the pleasures which we take in eating and drinking what is competent, and in ne­cessary clothing. Some are naturall, but not necessary pleasures, as naturall and legitimate copulation: For though this bee necessary for the preservation of the whole kinde; yet it is not so necessary to the life of any one man, but that he may live in his virgini­ty without it; but some pleasures are neither neces­sary nor naturall; as drun­kennesse, lasciviousnesse, and feeding in excesse.

For these neither assist in propagating the suc­cession [Page 370] of our kinde, as lawfull copulation, neither become profitable for the maintenance of our life; but are (on the contrary) harmefull unto us.

II Hee therefore that would live according to the law of God, must pur­sue those pleasures onely which are both necessary and naturall. But he that will content himself in the second order of ver­tues, may take in hand both the forementioned pleasures, and therewith such also as are naturall but not necessary; observing a conveniency in measure, manner, time, and place, the rest hee must by all meanes eschew.

[Page 371] Those pleasures are ge­nerally to be accounted good, which are neither in­tangled with griefe, nor occasion repentance, nor procure other harme, nor depart from the mean, nor draw us from good workes, nor bring us into bondage. But those are properly pleasures, wch are in some sort exercised in the con­sideration of God, and of knowledge and vertue: And these are to bee placed a­mōg those pleasures which ought earnestly to be pur­sued, above all the rest which are profitable unto us; not because they are pertinent unto our being (or for the continuation of our kinde) but for that [Page 372] they constitute our well­being, and make us to bee honest, to bee lovers, and beloved of God, and to have the utmost perfection of man; which perfection consisteth in the soule and Vnderstanding.

These pleasures are nei­ther the remedies to a­void diseases, as eating, drinking, and those other which doe supply our wants; neither have they any griefe at all, preceding them, following them, or contrary unto them; but are pure, immixt, and free from every material com­position, because they per­taine onely to the soule.

III For according to pla­to's opinion of pleasures, [Page 373] there bee some of them false, and some true. Those are false, unto the procu­ring whereof, sense and a false opinion is needfull; and such also as have grief annexed unto them. True pleasure is that which per­taines to the soule onely, even the soule by it selfe, together with science, un­derstanding, and prudence; and such pleasure as is pure without any mixture of griefe, or subsequent repen­tance at any time.

Some call such pleasures as ensue upon contemplati­on, and good actions, not passions, but sweetnesses; and others call them Ioy, as by a proper name.

They define pleasure to [Page 374] be a generation into a nature subject unto sense. But this definition seemeth to a­gree onely to corporeall pleasure: Seeing by that pleasure, the wants of our body are supplyed and cu­red, together with such griefes as we sustained by those wants. For when we be cold or thirsty, wee are delighted in the warmth, and in the drinke, whereby that griefe is cu­red, which proceeded from cold and thirst.

Therefore these plea­sures are not good natural­ly or of themselves, but accidentally: for, as to be in health, is good naturally and by it selfe, whereas to be healed, is but an acci­dentall [Page 375] good, so these plea­sures are onely accidentally good; because they are but remedies for the curing of other things. But the plea­sure taken in contemplation is good naturally, and of it selfe; because it is not u­sed in respect of any want.

Hereby it is plain, that all pleasure is not ordained to supply wants; and if this be true, that cannot bee a good definition, which de­fines pleasure to be A gene­ration into a nature subject unto sense; for it compre­hendeth not all pleasure; but leaveth out the best, even the pleasure that is in contemplation.

SECT. 2.

I. A definition of pleasure according to Epicurus, and another definition e­quivolent thereunto. II. A definition of pleasure ac­cording to Aristotle. III. Of the sundry sorts of pleasures; of their ope­rations; of such as are proper to man as hee is man; and of such as are common to him, with o­ther living-creatures.

EPicurus the Philoso­pher defines pleasure to be The taking a­way of every thing which may grieve a man: and in so defining it he sayes the same thing with him, who [Page 377] affirms it to be A generati­on into a nature subject unto sense. For hee sayes that our deliverance from that which grieveth us is plea­sure: But seeing no gene­ration consists of the same proprieties, with those things which proceed thereof, we must not thinke that the generation of pleasure, is pleasure; but, some other thing beside pleasure. For the generati­on it selfe is conversant a­bout ingendring; but of all things which are begot­ten, there is nothing which is at once in begetting, and perfectly begotten; seeing it is evident that the acting and the finishing of an act, are distinct things, perfe­cted [Page 378] by degrees. But that which taketh pleasure is delighted all at once; therefore pleasure cannot be a generation.

Furthermore, every generation is a making of things which are not for­merly in being; but plea­sure cōcerneth such things as have their being alrea­dy; therefore pleasure can­not be a generation. Again, generation may bee said to be speedy or slow; but so is not pleasure said to be.

Moreover, of good things, some be the habit, some the operation, and some the instruments. The habit, as vertues; the ope­ration, as the action agree­able to vertue. Again, the [Page 379] habit is as the faculty of seeing; the operation, as the seeing it selfe; and the in­struments whereby wee worke, as the eye, riches, and such like.

Now all the powers of the soule which are con­versant about good or e­vill things, are the facul­ties of some habits or o­ther. Therefore, if plea­sure bee a good thing, and not an evill thing; these are the onely things in which it can bee conver­sant. But it cannot bee a habit; neither is it as a ver­tue; for then it could not be so easily changed into griefe, which is contrary thereunto: neither as it is contrary to privation; [Page 380] seeing it is impossible that a habit, and a privation, should meet in the same subject; as pleasure and griefe may. For there bee some who take pleasure, and are grieved both at once; as they who are gently scratched when they itch; therefore plea­sure is not a habit.

Neither is pleasure an instrument; For instruments are ordained in respect of other things, not in re­spect of themselves, now pleasure is not for any o­ther thing, but for it selfe only, and therefore it can­not be an instrument.

II Pleasure must be there­fore an operatiō; & indeed Aristotle defines the same [Page 381] to be an operation of a habit that is agreeable unto nature: but by this definition, fe­licitie should bee pleasure, (seeing felicitie is such an operation as he defineth;) and so his definition is false.

Therefore Aristotle thus correcteth his definition; pleasure (saith hee) is the end of the operations of a li­ving-creature, which are void of incumbrance, and a­greeable to nature: So plea­sure may bee, as it were, wrapped up, and coexist, together with felicity; but felicity cannot be pleasure.

Now every operation is not a motion; for some ope­ration is practised without motion, such was the opera­tion [Page 382] which God used in the first creation; for the first mover of all things is unmoveable; such also is the operation of contemplation, which man useth; for it is exercised without motion; because the subject of con­templation is alwayes one and the same; and the minde of him that con­templates, alwayes firmly setled upon that object of contemplation.

If then, the pleasure that is in contemplation (and which is the greatest, the principall, and the onely true pleasure) be exercised without motion; it is plaine that such pleasures as have the fewest motions, are by so much the better, and [Page 383] the greater, as their moti­ons are the fewer.

Pleasures, together with III their operations are divers­ly distinguished; for there be so many pleasures, as of their operations: when the operations are good, the pleasures are good also; and if the operations bee naught, such are the plea­sures.

That there bee sundry sorts of pleasure in respect of every sense, it is very manifest; for there be ma­ny pleasures both in tou­ching and tasting; and great diversitie also in the pleasures of the sight, of the hearing, and of the smell: and the purer senses are they which keepe the [Page 384] farthest distance from their objects, which de­light them, as the slight, the hearing, and the smell.

There bee two sorts of the operations of the minde, the one in practise, the o­ther in contemplation; and therefore it is evident, that there are two sorts of pleasure which follow these operations; and that those which follow the contemplation are more pure, then those which follow the practise.

The pleasures of the minde (or understanding) are proper to man as hee is man; but they which per­taine to the sense, are common to him with o­ther living-creatures, in [Page 385] respect of his being a li­ving-creature.

Now seeing it is thus, and that some are deligh­ted with such pleasures, as pertaine to sense, and o­thers with some other pleasures; those pleasures onely are to be accounted good of their owne na­ture, which are judged good, not of evill men, but of good men: For in doubt­full matters, every com­mon fellow is not a com­petent judge; but he that is both skilfull, and regu­lateth himselfe according to the rule of (undepra­ved) nature.

CAP. 19.

I. Of Griefe, and the severall kindes thereof; and how farre a good man may be subject thereunto II. Excesse chanceth on­ly in bodily pleasures, not in those which are mentall.

ALL Griefe is of one of these kindes; namely, astonishing griefe, called by the greeks [...], care; tearmed [...], envy and pitty.

Astonishing griefe, is that which bereaveth us of the use of our voice; care is a griefe burthenous unto us. Envy is a griefe, springing from the wel-fare of other [Page 387] men; and pitty is a griefe arising from the adversity of others.

Every griefe is evill in respect of it owne nature▪ for albeit a good man bee sometime grieved, when hee seeth good men op­pressed, or his children or his country spoiled, hee grieveth not for the sor­rowes sake, as if it were good in it selfe to grieve; but for a respect unto other circumstances: Hee that is a delighted in con­templation is not moved II with such things, because he hath altogether estran­ged his minde from earth­ly affaires, and devoted himselfe wholly unto God. And hee that is otherwise [Page 388] a good man, is moved by the circumstance of grief in such a meane, as never brings him into subjection thereunto; but rather sub­dues them unto himselfe.

If you make the com­parison betweene an evill thing, and a good thing, griefe is then contrary un­to pleasure, which is used measurably; but if the comparison be betweene evill and evill, griefe is the contrary to an immode­rate pleasure.

II But these Excesses hap­pen onely in the pleasures of the body: For the plea­sure which is taken in con­templation, (even when it is in the highest degree, and hath attained unto [Page 389] perfection) admits no ex­cesse; neither is there any griefe set in a contrariety thereunto; nor doth it serve to cure any prece­ding griefe.

CAP. 20.

I. Of Feare, and the sixe parts thereof; with their definitions and diffe­rences. II. The cause of feare, and the instru­ment of that griefe.

NExt griefe (in ge­nerall) wee will describe Feare, which is divided into sixe parts; Sloth, Bashfulnesse, Shame, Amazednesse, Care­fulnesse, and Terror.

Sloth is when we feare [Page 390] lest we should be compel­led to worke. Amazednesse is a feare which ariseth in us when some huge and unusuall thing appeareth Terror is a trembling, or shuddering, occasioned by some dreadfull object. Care­fulnesse is when wee feare losing that which we have, or of missing that which we desire; for by the fear▪ of these things, wee are brought into a carefull a­gony. Bashfulnesse is the feare of some rebuke or disgrace; and is a very ho­nest passion. Shame is a feare begotten in us upon the remembrance of some evill which we have com­mitted: And where this is found there is remai­ning [Page 391] some hope of good­nesse and amendment.

And this is the diffe­rence betwixt bashfulnesse, and shame, he that is asha­med is troubled through feare of such things as hee hath done; but he that is abashed feares lest some reproach may befall him: But the old writers use the words indifferently, calling shame bashfulnesse; and bashfulnesse shame.

The cause of feare is a II cold that generally surpri­zeth us, by reason our whole heat (by the sud­den apprehension of some thing) is driven unto the heart, as to the principall part; even as the people flie to their Governours, [Page 392] when they are frighted.

The instrument which this griefe useth, is the belly (or mouth of the stomach) For there the biting is first felt: And Galen in his third book of Demon­strations, writeth to this purpose;

When men are grieved (saith hee) choller flowes plentifully into the stomach, which causeth a biting; and that griefe, and biting ne­ver ceaseth untill they have vomited out the choller. They feele this biting under­neath the gristle which is in the middle of the breast; which gristle is like a sword, and thereof is called [...], but the heart lyeth much higher. For the Stomach [Page 393] is placed under the midriffe, and the heart above it.

The old writers did use also to give the name of the heart to the mouth of the stomach; as namely, Hippocrates; & Thucidides, when hee talketh of the plague. His words be these, And when it came with some strength unto the heart, (meaning the stomach) it made it give up; and there came from it as many purga­tions of choller, as have been named of the Physitians. For, that which is turned up, and forced to vomit, is the mouth of the stomach, and not that bowel which we call the heart.

CAP. 21.

I. Of Anger, and of the names and nature of the three severall parts thereof Choller, Wrath, and Fury. II. The true office and use of anger.

SUch a heating of the blood, about the heart, as is caused by an exhalation of choller troubling the same, is ter­med Anger, and therefore it is named also choller, and wrath: And sometime it is a desire of revenge; for if we have beene injured, or but suppose our selves injured, we are then angry; and that passion is usually mixed, both of anger, and [Page 395] of a desire which wee have to be revenged.

Anger is of three sorts or species. The first is cal­led by the greekes [...] and [...]; for it is but the first heat, or beginning, (as it were) of anger, and may be named in English chol­ler, or an angry displeasure. The second is [...], so cal­led of the greek word [...], which implies a delaying. or tarrying, or a thing-laid up in memory, and meaneth a continuing, or inverterate anger. The last is [...], de­rived of a word signifi­ing to lye in waite; and is a revenging anger, waiting opportunities of revenge.

Anger, is appointed to II waite upon reason; and [Page 396] when any thing is done wherewithall reason may justly be displeased, anger immediately taketh hold thereof (as shee ought to doe) if reason, and anger keep their limits and na­turall course.

CAP. 22.

Of that irrationall part of the Soule, which is not o­bedient unto reason.

LEt us now speake of that part of the soul, which is not subject unto reason: For having declared that part which is obedient unto reason, wee shall in good order proceed to those faculties which are disobedient [Page 397] thereunto; namely the fa­culty of nourishing, of in­gendring, and of the pulses.

The faculties of nouri­shing, and ingendring are tearmed naturall; and the faculty of the pulses, is called vitall.

CAP. 23.

I. Of the nourishing power of the soul, and the foure faculties thereof. II. Of the severall evacuations. III. Of the severall in­struments, of nourish­ment, and of the particu­lar offices of those in­struments.

ALL the naturall faculties of the nourishing power, [Page 398] are these foure; an attra­ctive appetite, a retentive power, a distributing, and an expulsive (or avoiding fa­cultie: for every part of the living-creature, doth naturally draw unto it selfe such nourishment, as is convenient for the same: when it is attracted, it pre­serveth it: when the same is kept a due time, it changeth the same into it selfe; and then expelleth whatsoever proveth to be superfluous.

These are the faculties which order the nourish­ment of the parts of the body; and by these it groweth to an augmenta­tion both in breadth and height.

[Page 399] The wayes or passages,II by which all superfluities bee avoided, are, by the belly, by urine, by vomits, by sweats, by the mouth, by the nostrils, by the eares, by the eyes, by brea­things out, and by invisible pores, and unknowne pas­sages.

All the first evacuations are manifestly preceived, as that excrement called the eare-waxe, by the eares; the teares and the gumme (which wee call the spe­thyme) by the eyes; and that moisture also which maketh bleare-eyed: the out-breathings likewise, by which a sowltry heat is evaporated from the heart. But by those which [Page 400] we call unknowne passages, there breathes out (in­sensibly) a moisture over all the body, wherewith many humours are evacua­ted, from the very depth and drawing together of the arteries; and they are conveyed through the skin where it is rarified.

III The instruments of the nourishing faculty, are the mouth, the stomach, the belly, the liver, all the veines, the intrailes, both sorts of choller, and the reines.

The mouth prepares the food before-hand for the belly, dividing it into small parts, by the teeth and tongue: for in chewing the tongue is very helpfull [Page 401] in gathering the meat to­gether, and in applying it unto the teeth; and as the women which grinde corne, thrust the graines unto the milstone with their hands; so the tongue is as it were a hand to as­sist in the chewing of our meat.

The food being thus wrought before-hand, is conveyed into the belly by the stomach; which is a place not onely ordained to feele what wee want, but to bee a passage-way also, to convey the meat unto our bellies: for the stomach riseth up when wee eat or drinke, and (drawing unto it that which we swallow down) [Page 402] sendeth it into the belly.

When the belly hath received the same; it se­vers that which is profita­ble for nourishment, from that which is woody, sto­ny, or unfit for nutriment. That which is good, is there changed into hu­mours; which are thence caried up to the liver by veines ordained for that purpose, and which are as it were certaine rivulets to convey it thither.

These veines are in the liver, in the maner of rootes, drawing thither from the belly, the juyce of our food, even as the roots of plants draw nou­rishment from the earth: And the belly may bee re­sembled [Page 403] unto the earth, which ministreth nourish­ment unto the plants: The veines like rootes, ca­ry the humour from the belly, from the intrailes, and from the great double­skin, which fastneth our bowels, unto the back, unto the gates and to the bun­ches of the liver.

The liver it selfe may be compared unto the stemme or body of the plant. The veines which issue by divers wayes from the hollow veine, springing from the flatt parts of the liver; are like springs, and boughts. Af­ter the liver hath received the humour from the belly, it both concocts it, and [Page 404] makes it also like unto it selfe: for the liver consi­sting of such flesh as hath a neare allyance unto blood, easily converts that humour into blood.

This blood is cleansed by the spleen, by that blad­der which receives the gall; and by the reines: for the spleene attracts unto it all the dregs of the blood, and is nourished thereby. The bladder (called the gall) which receives the choller, drawes unto it selfe, the sharpnesse which remained in the juyce of our food. The reines, doe as it were straine out that thin humour which is like whey, and the sharp­nesse also which temai­neth [Page 405] in that humour: Af­ter all which, the blood be­comming pure and good, is distributed for a nou­rishment unto all other parts of the body, by such veines as are dispersed a­broad into every mēber.

By this meanes every part of the body drawing blood unto it, retaineth and converteth so much thereof as is proportiona­ble, into it own substance; the rest it sendeth to the next part, and so to the next, that it may yeeld nourishment unto them.

Thus, all the body is in every part nourished, and hath growth and continu­ance by the blood, which is distributed from the li­ver: [Page 406] And this part is ter­med irrationall, and said not to bee obedient unto reason; because that which it performeth, is not exe­cuted according to our choice (or as we our selves will) but naturally; and according to it owne na­ture.

CAP. 24.

I. Of the pulses, and of their offices. II. Of the ex­cellent and usefull disposi­tion of the sinowes, the veines, and arteries; and of the severall foun­taines of these. III. Of the mutuall benefit and assistance also, which these three are to each other.

[Page 407] THe motion of the Pulses is called a vitall power: For, having beginning from the heart (and especially from the left portion thereof, which is called the place of the spirits) it distributes unto every part of the body, an in­graffed and a vitall-heat, by meanes of the arteries; even as the liver distri­butes food by the veines.

If therefore the heart be inflamed above the due measure which na­ture doth require; the in­tire living-creature is forthwith brought into an unnaturall heat: and is in like maner cooled, if the [Page 408] heart be cooled beyond a just proportion; because the vitall-spirit is disper­sed from the heart by the arteries, into every part of the body.

II For it is ordered in such maner, that (for the most part) these three; the veine, the artery, and the sinew, bee so divided, that they goe all together, pro­ceeding from the three principall parts, which go­verne the intire living-creature.

From the braine, which is the fountaine both of motion and of sense, pro­ceeds the sinew. From the liver, which yeeldeth a beginning to the blood, and the nourishing-faculty, [Page 409] comes the veine, which is the vessell wherein the blood is caried. And from the heart, which is the root of our vitall-faculty, comes the artery, which is that vessell wherein the spirits are conveyed.

These three accompa­ny III one another, and re­ceive profit and assistance each from other. For the veine administers a cer­taine nourishment of blood to the sinew, and to the ar­tery. The artery imparts naturall heat, and vitall­spirits to the veine, and therefore it is not possible to finde either an artery altogether voide of a thin kinde of blood: or a veine without spirits, of a va­poury [Page 410] nature.

The artery is forcibly opened and contracted a­gaine, with a certain har­mony and proportion; ha­ving the beginning of that motion from the heart. And when it is o­pened, it sucks and draws a thin kinde of blood, from the veines that are neare unto it; which blood being resolved into exhalations, becommeth a nourish­ment to the vitall-spirits: when it is closed againe, it empties the sowltry heat which is in it, by certaine invisible pores, throughout the body; even as the heart sends from it selfe, the sowltry heat which op­presseth it, by evaporati­ons, [Page 411] both at the nostrills, and the mouth.

CAP. 25.

I. Of the propagating, or generating faculty, and how farre the same is in mans power. II. The in­struments of propaga­tion, and their offices. III. The opinions of Ari­stotle, Democritus, and Galen; concerning the seed of the Woman.

EVen the faculty of generatiō pertaineth also to that part of the soule, which is not o­bedient unto reason. For we yeeld seed in our dreame (or sleepe) whe­ther we will or no; and [Page 412] our desire of copulation is so naturall, that the desire is moved in us, even a­gainst our wills. But the act it selfe is indeed, and without question, in our owne power, and pertai­neth to the minde; for it is brought to passe by those instruments which are ser­viceable to the naturall-ap­petite; and to abstain from our appetite, or to master the same, was (by God) na­turally placed in our pow­er, (and may be so continued, if timely endeavour hath not beene omitted.)

II The instruments of a potentiall generation, are first the veines and arteries: For in these the first humor (that is not fully perfected [Page 413] into seed) is ingendred, and the blood there chan­ged, even as milke in the dugs. And forasmuch as they were first made of seed, this humour is a nou­rishment unto those ves­sels; and the veines and arteries, doe concoct the blood into a moisture, like unto seed, that they might be nourished thereby: And when they have due nourishment, that serveth for generation which re­maineth.

For it is first caried up into the head by a large circuit, and from thence brought downe againe, by two veines and two arte­ries. Therefore, if a man cut the veines which are [Page 414] about, or neare the eares, it makes the living-crea­ture unfit for generation.

Of these veines and ar­teries, is compacted that folded skin, which riseth like a swollen veine, in the Cod, and where this moi­sture (comming neare un­to the nature of seed) fal­leth into either of the Testicles.

There is one veine, and one artery full of seed: In these it is perfected, and is driven forth by the fol­ded seminall veine, which is behinde the Testicles, by a winde.

That winde proves that an artery sends it forth; and that it is caried by a veine, may appeare by [Page 415] those who are overmuch addicted unto Venerie: For they that use carnall-copulation overmuch, ther­by wasting their seed, and that seminall humour, which commeth near un­to the nature of seed, (if they further provoke themselves) pure blood is then strained from them.

Women have the same III parts which men have: this only is the difference, men have them outwardly, and they inwardly. But Aristotle and Democritus were of opinion that the seed of the woman, is no way usefull in the gene­ration of children. For they conceive that which proceeds from the woman [Page 416] to bee a sweating of the place, rather then any seed of generation.

But Galen condemning Aristotles opinion, affirmes that women have their seed also, and that the ming­ling of both seeds together is the cause of concepti­on; and thereupon (saith hee) their accompanying together in that act is ter­med [...], a copulation.

Yet he judgeth not the seed of the woman to be so perfect as the mans; but to be moister, and some­what lesse concocted, and as it were a nourishment unto the seed of the man. Of that seed, those parts are composed which are about the utmost places [Page 417] of the wombe, and which is called [...] (skin wrapped about the skin wher­in the infant lieth) and or­dained for a vessell to re­ceive the superfluities of the childe.

In all sorts of living-creatures, the Female takes the male when shee may conceive; and such as are able to conceive at all times (as hens, doves, and women) are at all times desirous to accompany the male: But women on­ly accept of the males company when they have conceived; for all other creatures usually reject the male after conception. As for hens, they are daily trodden, because they do [Page 418] lay almost every day.

Women, as they bee at their own liberty in other things; so they are at li­berty also to accompany with men after concepti­on; whereas living-crea­tures void of reason, are governed not of them­selves, but by nature; ad­mitting such a measure, and such times, as are di­ctated unto them, by a naturall instinct.

CAP. 26.

This Chapter mentioneth other divisions of the fa­culties belonging to a li­ving-creature.

DIvision is made of those faculties which pertain un­to [Page 419] a living-creature in ano­ther maner: For it is af­firmed that some faculties are mentall, some naturall, and some vitall.

They which are mentall are in our owne choice and election; they which are not in our election, are naturall, and vitall. The faculties belonging unto the minde are two, the motion of appetite, and of sense.

To the motion of our appetite, these faculties are appertaining; Progression from place to place, the motion of the whole body, speech and respiration: For it is in our power to doe, or to omit these things. But the naturall, and vitall [Page 420] faculties are not in our power; for they goe for­ward, nill we will we; as the faculty of nourishing, of growing, and of propaga­tion: all which are naturall faculties, and so doth like­wise the facultie of the pulses, which is vitall.

As for the instruments (of these faculties) menti­oned by others, wee have already treated of them, wee will therefore speake of the instruments of those things which belong unto our appetite (or choice)

CAP. 27.

I. Of the motion procee­ding voluntarily from us: of the place where it assumeth beginning; and the instruments which it useth. II. The wise pro­vidence of the Creator, in uniting together things naturall & mentall, &c.

[Page 421] THe motion which belongeth to our assent (or choice) and proceedeth volunta­rily from us, taketh be­ginning from the braine, and from the marrow of the chine, which is it selfe a part of the braine.

The instruments there­of are the sinewes that spring from these, the ligaments, and muscles. The composure of these muscles, is flesh, and the strings in the blood; which are like sinewes and grisles [Page 422] wrapped up together, with sinewie-strings. And some are of opinion, that they are sensible; because that sense proceedeth from the sinewes, where withall they are folded up.

The grisly-end of the muscle is compounded both of a ligament, and of certaine small sinewes; yet this grisly-end differs from a sinew in this, that every sinew hath sense in it, and is round, and somewhat tender, and assumeth also his beginning from the braine: whereas this grisly end, is more hard, some­time also flat, having like­wise his originall from the bone, and is in it selfe void of sense.

[Page 423] The hands are an instru­ment, ordained to lay hold of things, and so con­venient for the exercise of arts, above other mem­bers, that if the hands, or but the fingers only should be taken away, wee are made unapt for almost e­very art. And therefore man onely received hands from his Creator, because he onely is indued with reason, which makes him capable of arts.

The feet are instruments ordained for going; for by them wee remove and passe from place to place. And man can sit firmely without a prop, because he only makes two right­angles by the bowing of [Page 424] his legs; the one inward, the other outward.

Whatsoever things therefore (in man) are moved by sinewes, and muscles, belong to the minde; and hee hath a free liberty in the use of them; Among these (as we have already shewed) the senses and the voice are to be ac­counted; and therefore this hath beene hitherto a discourse, probably setting forth, as well those things which are mentall, as those which are naturall.

II For the Creator accor­ding to his exceeding wise for-sight, hath fol­ded up things mentall with such as are naturall; and things naturall, with [Page 425] such as appertaine unto the minde. And whereas the avoiding of superflui­ties belongs to the expul­sive faculty (which is coun­ted one of those that is naturall) that wee might not behave our selves fil­thily in avoiding our ex­crements, without regar­ding the time, the place, and such other circumstan­ces as are comely; he hath appointed the muscles to bee as it were Porters, to order our evacuations; and of things which were of themselves meerely natu­rall, hee hath made them to be mentall, and such as depend upon the rule of the minde. And thereup­on, when wee are provo­ked [Page 426] unto any evacuations, we are able (if cause bee) to containe them very of­ten, and very long.

Certaine sinewes which bee soft and sensible, are sent downe both from the middle-pan, and also from the two former pans of the braine: Other sinewes which are harder, and serve us for motion, pro­ceed from that brain-pan, which is in the hinder part of the head, and from the marrow of the back.

Among these, those are the harder which come from the spinall-marrow: and of them, those are the hardest of all, which pro­ceed from the lowest parts of the marrow of the [Page 427] back: For by how much farther the marrow of the chine descendeth from the braine; so much the more hard is the chine-marrow of it selfe, and the sinews also which doe spring from the same.

And as we have recei­ved the senses double; so the sinewes have a two­fold springing also from us. For every joynt of the chine sends forth a couple of sinewes; one issuing to­ward the rightside, and a­nother toward the left; yea, and almost our whole body is divided also into two parts, the one on the right, and the other on the left side. Thus like­wise are our feet, our [Page 428] hands, the seats of our sen­ses, and other parts divi­ded.

CAP. 28.

I. Of respiration; of the in­strument, of the use, and of the causes of that fa­culty. II. Of the com­posure and use of the Lungs, and of such o­ther parts as are assisting to respiration. III. Of those parts of a living­creature, which are made for themselves alone; for others, and for them­selves; or altogether for others.

HERE wee will treat of respiration, which is also a [Page 429] worke belonging to the minde: For by the mus­cles the breast is opened, which is the principall in­strument of respiration. Our sighing also, and our thick drawing of breath, when any great sorow happeneth unto us, is an evidence, that the opera­tion hereof belongeth unto the minde.

Moreover, the variati­ons, and alterings of our breathing, whensoever need requires, are in our power: For if we be grie­ved in any part servicea­ble to respiration, or in such parts as are moved by the motion of any of these; as the midriffe, the liver, the spleene, the stomach, the [Page 430] small-guts, or the lowest-gut, we then breath short and thick. Wee breath short, that we may not o­ver-vehemently smite the grieved part; we breath also thick, that the often breathing may supply what is wanting in the length of our blast.

When our leg is woun­ded, wee set it forth very leisurely in our going; which is done to the same end, for which we breath short; and therefore as to goe from place to place belongs unto the minde, so doth also this operation of respiration. But al­though we should rest and not goe at all it were pos­sible for us to live a long [Page 431] time, whereas it were im­possible for us to hold our breath the tenth part of an houre, without death; because the naturall heat which is in us, would bee choaked up and quite ex­tinct by a sowltry fume. For it is as if a man should co­ver a fire within a small vessell, having no vent; which would be immedi­ately stifled and quenched by it owne fume.

For this cause it is very necessary that when wee are asleepe, our soul should worke neverthelesse in this part; because if it should be idle therein (though for a very small time) the living-creature would perish: And in [Page 432] this it is againe manife­sted, how the endeavour of the minde and of nature are knit together.

For the minde exerci­seth respiration, by an arte­ry which is a naturall in­strument; and it is alwaies in motion, that neither it owne work, nor the work of the other arteries may be intermitted. This not being perceived by some, (to wit, how the minde and nature joyne together in this worke) they supposed respi­ration to bee onely a natu­rall faculty.

Three things cause re­spiration, the use, the pow­er, and the instruments. The use is twofold: one for the preservation of [Page 435] our naturall heat, and the other for the nourishment of the vitall-spirits.

The preservation of our naturall heat consi­steth both of drawing in, and breathing out of aire, For the drawing of the breath doth not onely coole, but (in a mediocrity) stirreth up heat also. The breathing out of the aire, drives away the foggy heat which is about the heart (whereas nourishment of the vitall-spirits, is respira­tion onely) for the heart is dilated abroad, and a cer­taine portion of aire is at­tracted thereunto.

The power (which is a cause also of respiration) is that which it hath from [Page 436] the soule: for it is the minde which moves the instru­ments of respiration, by meanes of the muscles (and especially by the breast) wherewith our lungs, and the sharp arteries (which are also a part of the lungs) are moved.

For that part of the sharp artery, which is grist­ly, is the instrument of the voice; the ligaments thereof which are like skinnes, are instruments of respiration: and that which is composed of both together (which is the forementioned artery) is the instrument both of respiration, and of the voice.

II The lungs therefore [Page 437] are a composition fol­ded up together, and con­sisting of these foure, a sharp artery, a smooth arte­ry, a veine, and of a spumie flesh; which flesh doth fill up all the void places of the folded skin, as it were a moist bed, (or the herbe Sleve) both of the two ar­teries and of the veine; so that it becommeth both a seat for them, and a band keeping them together.

The flesh of the lungs, doth naturally cōcoct the spirits; as the liver con­cocts the humour which commeth from the belly: And as the liver, with his utmost edges or skirts, spreads it selfe about the belly, because it needeth [Page 438] heat, so the lungs inclose even the very middle of the heart; because it nee­deth some cooling by re­spiration.

To the sharp artery the gristle of the winde-pipe is immediately joyned, be­ing compounded of three great gristles, whereunto the throat is annexed, and which are continued unto the mouth and nostrils, by both which, we draw the aire that is without us. From the mouth it ascen­deth by a bone like unto a sieve, or like a sponge, which is full of holes, that the braine may not be har­med, if there bee any ex­cesse in the qualities of the aire, or if too much [Page 439] winde should enter into it at once.

Here hath also the Cre­ator placed the nose both for smelling and respiration, according as hee hath or­dained the tongue, for the voice, for the tasting, and for chewing.

Thus the most princi­pall parts, serving both for the very being of the living-creature, and for the necessary uses of this life, are divided together with the powers of the minde: and if any thing hath beene formerly omitted, it may bee understood by that which is now expres­sed.

Now as it falls out in all III other created things, that [Page 440] some are made onely for their own sakes; some for themselves and others also; some onely for the sakes of others; and that some things fall out accidental­ly, together with such things as are made; Even thus you shall find it to be also in the parts of a li­ving-creature.

For all the forenamed instruments, of those three principall things which governe the living-crea­ture, are made for their owne sakes: For those things are especially and principally made which are named according to their proper nature; and are ingendred in the wōb even of the seed it selfe, as the bones are.

[Page 441] But the yellow choller is made both in respect of it selfe, & some other thing; For it helpeth concoction, stirreth up to the avoiding of excrements, and (in that respect) is in some sort, one of the parts that ser­veth for nourishment. Moreover, it ministreth unto the body a certaine heat, as doth our vitall-faculty; and in respect of all these things, it seemeth to bee made for it owne sake: But in that it pur­geth our blood, it seemeth after a sort, to be made in respect of the blood.

The spleen also helpeth concoction; and that not a little: For being tart, and of a sharp astringent na­ture; [Page 442] it bindeth the belly by powring out into the same, the avoidance of a black moisture; Yea, it strengtheneth it also; as­sisteth concoction, and pur­geth the liver: For which causes, that part also see­meth to have beene or­dained in respect of the blood.

The reines likewise are a purgation for the blood, and a cause of the desire which we have to carnall copulation: For the veines, which (as we have decla­red before) doe fall down into the cods, passe along by the reines; and from thence carry with them a certaine sharpnesse, which provoketh lust, even as a [Page 443] certaine sharp moisture which is under the skin, procureth an itch. And looke how much the flesh of the stones, is tenderer then the other skin of the body; by so much the more, (being tickled by that sharpnesse) are they stirred up to the ejacula­tion of seed.

These things therefore and such like, are made both for their owne sakes, and also in respect of o­ther things. But the ker­nels, and the flesh are only ordained in respect of o­ther things. For the ker­nells doe serve to cary up and underprop the vessels, that they may not be bro­ken when they are lifted [Page 444] up, or stretched forth with any violent motions. And the flesh was made to be a covering to the other parts; that it might coole the living-creature in the summer, by being as it were, a morning dew thereunto, and that it might in the winter bee as it were a quilt of wooll to the parts of the body.

The skin was ordained as a covering, both for the tender flesh, and all those parts that are in­ward. The flesh is of a na­ture hardened like a scar, by reason of the aire which compasseth it a­bout, and by meanes of those other bodies where­withall it is conversant.

[Page 445] The bones are an un­dersetting to the whole body, and especially the chine of the back, which is termed the foundation of a living creature.

The nailes are most commonly used to scratch withall, by every living-creature (which hath nails) and they are also for sun­dry particular uses, to di­vers living-creatures. For they are given to many for a defence; as to those which have crooked ta­lons; and they be as it were an instrument to execute anger.

Many have them both for a weapon of defence, and also for a strengthe­ning to their feet, as [Page 446] horses; and all such as di­vide not the hoofe. But nailes are bestowed on men, not onely to scratch themselves withall, and that they might by so do­ing, disperse the sharp moisture which is under the skin: but that they might also take the firmer hold of small things. For by help of them a very small thing may be taken up; because their meeting one against another at the very ends of the fin­gers, enables to the ta­king of firme hold.

The haires grow out accidentally with other things, by the meeting together of such fumy va­pours as ascend out of the [Page 447] body; and yet the Creator made not their acciden­tall generation, without some profitable use; for they serve both to cover and beautifie living-crea­tures: They are a covering for goats and sheep; they are an ornament unto men; and they are both a cove­ring, and an ornament to Lions.

CAP. 29.

I. Of things done volunta­rily, and against our will. II. Of the definition of an action; and of the circumstances which ac­company, and follow an action. III. Of the marks both of a voluntary, and involuntary action.

[Page 448] I Have often made men­tion of things done vo­luntarily, and by con­straint, of which somwhat must be now expressed, lest errors may be occasi­oned through want of an exact knowledge of these.

But hee that underta­keth to discourse of things done voluntarily and a­gainst our will, must in the first place set downe some assured rules, and certaine tokens, wherby it may be well discerned whether the thing done, be (unque­stionably) voluntary, or a­gainst our will.

Seeing therefore that every voluntarie thing consisteth in some action; seeing moreover, that all those things which are [Page 449] said to be done against our will, consist in action also (as shall bee anon decla­red) and seeing likewise, some think that the thing which is done against our will, consisteth both in a­ction & passion; we wil (be­fore we proceed further) define what an action is.

An action is the actuall II doing of any thing with the use of reason.

After all actions, there followeth either praise or dispraise. Some actions are exercised with plea­sure, and some with griefe. Some are to bee chosen by the doer, and some are to be avoided. Of thē which are to bee chosen, some are at all times to be made [Page 450] choice of; some at one time rather then at ano­ther. The same circum­stances are considerable in such actions as are to bee eschewed also; and this moreover is observable, that some actions are pitti­ed, some pardoned, some hated, and some punished.

III Now then, let these be the markes to discern the things which are willingly done; namely, that praise or dispraise alwaies fol­low them; that they are done with pleasure; and that the actions are to bee chosen by the doers of them, either at all times, or at those times in which they are done. The notes of involuntary actions are these; They are vouch­safed [Page 451] pardon; or they are pittied, or they are done with griefe, and they are not done by our owne choice. These things be­ing thus defined and orde­red; wee will first speake of such things as are done against our will.

CAP. 30.

I. The definition of an in­voluntary act. II. The solution of certaine que­stions concerning mixt actions, and an advise what is to bee done, when we know not what action to choose. III. Things done by inconstancy, by intemperancy, or anger, are not to be reputed things done against our will.

[Page 452] SUch things as are done against our wil, are either done by constraint, or of ignorance. The beginning of those a­ctions which are done a­gainst our will, by force, is without our selves; that is, some other thing, and not we our selves is the cause thereof: and therefore this is the definition of that thing which is done against our will, by force. It is an action not having the beginning thereof in him which doth it; and he which is forced thereunto doth no­thing to further the same of his owne will. Wee meane, in this place, by the begin­ning, the cause-effecting the thing done.

II Hereupon it may bee [Page 453] questioned, when Ship­men cast their lading into the sea, when they are en­dangered by a tēpest; (or when a man is contented to suffer or doe some dis­honest thing to save his friend or his country) whe­ther these actions may be said to bee done against their will, or no. And ac­cording to this clause ad­ded to the definition (Hee that is forced, doth nothing to further the matter of his owne will) these actions do seeme to be voluntary; be­cause to the executing of such things, the actors doe of themselves move their instrumentall parts, even of their owne accord.

Such is their case who [Page 454] cast their lading into the Sea; and theirs who offer themselves to abide any shame or danger to bring to passe a greater good, as did Zeno, who bitt off his owne tongue, and spit it out into the face of Diony­sius the tyrant, because he would not utter unto him what was to bee kept se­cret; or as did Anaxarchus the Philosopher, who chose to be tormented unto death, by being row­led up together like a wheele, rather then hee would disclose the secret of his friend unto Nica­reon the Tyrant.

Therefore, generally, when a man either choo­seth a lesse evill, through feare of some greater evil; [Page 455] or, when a man accepts the lesse Good, in hope of a greater Good, (which he cannot otherwise attaine according as hee would) that thing which in such cases he doth or suffereth, is not utterly against his will: for he doth or suffers by his owne advise, and choice; and such things are to bee made choice of at that time, though they be not to bee chosen of their owne nature.

These are mixt actions, partly voluntary, and part­ly against our will: For, they are voluntary in re­spect of the circumstances; but they are involuntary, in regard of the actions themselves; and were it [Page 456] not for the circūstances, no man would make choice of doing such things.

Moreover the praise or dispraise which followes such actions, declare them to be voluntary: for nei­ther praise nor dispraise fol­low such things as are done absolutely by con­straint.

It is not easie to dis­cerne what things are to be chosen before others, in some difficult cases: But for the most part, wee must choose rather to a­bide griefe, then commit any shamefull act; as did both Ioseph, and Susanna; and yet this holds not al­wayes. For doubtlesse O­rigen fell grossely when he [Page 457] chose to sacrifice unto I­dols, rather then to under­go that dishonestie which the Aethiopians would have put upon him.

We see therefore, that the discerning of such things is not easie; and we finde also, that it is ve­ry hard for them that have chosen, to continue in that which they have resolved upon; because perills to come doe not so amaze or discourage us, as those tor­ments which are presently inflicted.

It so happeneth often­times, that they who have chosen well, doe depart from their owne choice by persecution; as it hath happened unto some, who [Page 458] when they should have suffered martyrdome, fell back from their stout and resolute beginnings, by being through tenderness unable to endure the tri­als, and the torments of adversity, when they were inflicted upon them.

III Let no man imagine therefore, that either an inconstant falling away from a well chosen reso­lution, or an intemperate lust, or an angry rage, are to bee accounted among such offences as are to bee judged things done against our will; by reason there is an efficient cause of those actions without our selves: For though the beauty of an harlot made them that [Page 459] saw her to rush into the execution of an intempe­rate lust; and though such as are furiously angry, were so provoked there­unto by another man, that the first beginnings therof may bee truly affirmed to have beene without them­selves; yet the actors of such things doe worke by themselves, and by their instrumentall parts: for which cause their actions come not within the defi­nition of things done by constraint; even in regard they offered unto them­selves the occasions, and be­ginnings of those actions; and suffered themselves to bee easily incaptivated by passions, through an [Page 460] evill conversation.

Therefore all they who doe such things, are wor­thily reprehended, as men voluntarily given to evill: and the evill is manifested to be voluntary, when they delight also in the deed; because every thing done by constraint, hath griefe annexed thereunto.

Thus much of things done against our will, by force; we will now treate of such involuntary actions, as are done through igno­rance.

CAP. 31.

I. Of things done against our will, through igno­rance; and of those acti­ons which are, or are not altogether involuntary. II. The definition and [Page 461] markes of things done quite against our will; and the difference be­tween things done tho­row ignorance, and those which we doe being igno­rant. III. A catalogue of such particulars, the igno­rance wherof makes an a­ction to be involuntary.

BY ignorance many things are done by us, whereof we re­joyce after the deed: As when a man killeth his e­nemy at unawares (or a­gainst his will) and yet is glad that he is slaine. These, & such like things, are neither accounted vo­luntary, nor altogether in­voluntary.

Some things also are [Page 462] done through ignorance, for which we grieve after they are done: And those are usually called things done against our will, after the doing wherof we be­come grieved for the act. And by this it appeares that there be two sorts of things done by ignorance; the one not volūtary, & the other quite against our will.

It is our purpose there­fore, to treat at this time of such things as are alto­gether against our will: be­cause that which wee call not voluntary (as aforesaid) may rather be reduced to those things which are voluntary in regard it is mixt of both.

For though it hath a be­ginning [Page 463] by constraint, yet the end is voluntary; be­cause by the event, that becomes voluntary, which was first against our will.

Therefore a thing done II against our will, is defined in this manner; That is an involuntary act, which is not only against our wil, but hath also griefe & repentance an­nexed thereunto. Moreover, it is one thing to doe an act through ignorance, and another thing to doe it, being ignorant: For if that thing which caused the ignorance be in our power, we doe it being ignorant; but not by ignorance.

For example, he that is accustomed unto drun­kennesse, or to anger, and [Page 464] in his wrath or drunken­nesse, committeth an evill; he hath (indeed) drunken­nesse, or anger, as a cause of those things which are done by him: But never­thelesse those things were voluntary (for it was in his power not to have beene drunke (or so inraged) and therefore in not suppres­sing those inordinate ap­petites, hee himselfe was cause of his own ignorance; and may in that regard be said to have done that evil being ignorant; but cannot be truly said to have done it through ignorance: Nei­ther is his act to bee ac­counted as done, by con­straint, but voluntarily; for that cause he who [Page 465] doth commit such things is justly reprehended by good men: Even because his drunkennesse (which occasioned that act) being voluntary, makes the act which was therby occasi­oned, to be voluntary also.

But we are said to doe things through ignorance, when wee our selves gave no cause of that igno­rance; and when the deed was by chance. As if a man should shoot in an usuall shooting place, & happen to hit and slay his father walking thereabout.

It is plaine by that which is aforesaid, that the actions of such a man are not to bee accounted as done against his will, who [Page 466] is ignorant of such things as it behooveth him to know; or which reputes evill things to bee goo: For this ignorance pro­ceeds from his owne wic­kednesse; and as his actions are vitious, so his igno­rance also is to be accoun­ted as a vice, for which he is worthy of reprehensiō. And reprehension is due on­ly to those things which are voluntarily done.

For the ignorance of ge­nerall (or universall) things; or of such as are in choice, is not accounted to bee a thing involuntary; but the ignorance of particular things onely, is esteemed such: For we may be ig­norant of particular things [Page 467] against our will. But of universall things, our igno­rance is accounted volun­tary; because such an igno­rance cannot bee in us without our owne fault; except we are madmen, or Idiots.

This being thus deter­mined,III it now resteth to be declared, what those particulars are of which we speake; and they are the same which the Rheto­ricians call the parts or cir­cumstāces of things done. (To wit) WHO, WHOM, WHAT, WITH WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, in WHAT MANER, for WHAT CAUSE, (To which may bee added accor­ding to our English game u­sed [Page 468] for an exercise of wit, WHAT FOLLOVVED, or the event of that which was done.)

The persons are either he who did it, or he to whom the thing was done; as if the Sonne should smite his Fa­ther at unawares. The thing done, is the action it selfe; as if I intended to to give one a little blow on the eare, and thereby struck out his eye. The in­strument; as whē one flings a very stone, and thinkes it but a pommy stone. The place; as when at the tur­ning of a lane two meet, and one unexpected­ly overthrowes the o­ther. The time; as if in the night a man should kill his [Page 469] friend, supposing him his enemy. The manner; as if he should give one a small blow, without any great violence, and yet thereby slay him (for he knew not that one could have dyed by so small a stroke.) The cause; as if one should mi­nister a medicine for a cure, which might prove deadly and kill his patient.

Of all these particulars together, no man can bee ignorant, except hee that is mad (or a very Idiot.) But whosoever is igno­rant of the most of these, or in the principall of them, is accounted to doe things through ignorance. And the principall among such circumstances, are; [Page 470] Wherefore it was done; and What was done. That is to say; the cause, and the mat­ter it selfe.

CAP. 32.

I. Of things done volunta­rily; and the definition of such actions. II. Whe­ther things which have a naturall course, as con­coction, and the like, may be termed volunta­ry, &c. III. They who acknowledge not those a­ctions to be voluntary, which proceed from the passions, doe thereby take away the morall-vertues, &c.

OF those things which are done by constraint, [Page 471] there being two sorts; the one done through igno­rance, and the other by compulsiō; the thing which is voluntary, doth on the contrary answer unto these two, and is neither done by compulsion, nor through ignorance.

That action is done without compulsion, wher­of the beginning was in the doers; and an action is voide of ignorance, when none of those particular circumstances, are un­known, in which, and by which, the deed consisteth: And therefore wee joyne both together, and thus define it;

That is voluntary, where­of the beginning is in the [Page 472] doer, who knoweth all those particular circumstances, wherein the deed consisteth.

II It may now be questi­oned whether naturall things (as our concoction, and our growth) bee to be accounted voluntvry: but, wee answer (as is before shewed) that such things are neither voluntary, nor of constraint▪ because both voluntary things, and such as are by constraint, are esteemed among such things as are in our pow­er; but our concoction, and our growth are not in our power: therefore though wee are ignorant of the particular circumstances; yet for that they are not in our power, they are [Page 473] neither to bee accounted things voluntary, nor of constraint.

But it hath been decla­red before, that things done of wrath or concupi­scence, are voluntary; For when these passions are moderated, they are com­mended who so governe them; and such as offend in them, are for the same reproved, or hated. More­over, pleasure or griefe en­sue upon the doing of them; and the beginnings of these actions also, was in the doers themselves, be­cause they were made a­ble so to have governed their appetites, that they might not have beene lightly transported by [Page 474] them, if they had endea­voured according to their power.

By practise and custom such passions may be cor­rected; for if it were true, that they were absolutely by constraint, then doubt­lesse neither unreasonable-creatures, nor infants, doe any thing voluntarily, (but by constraint; because they are moved by their appe­tite.)

But that is not so, for we see them goe to their food of their owne accord without any compulsion thereunto. It is they them­selves which make speed unto it of themselves; yea, and not of ignorance, aswell as not of compulsion: For, [Page 475] they know their food; they are glad of it, when they see it; they presently hast toward it upon sight thereof, as unto a thing knowne; and are grieved if they misse of the same.

By this, a voluntary thing is assuredly knowne from that which is invo­lantary; even by the de­light which followes the obtaining that which is desired; and by the griefe which followes, if the de­sire be made frustrate: for even beasts doe voluntari­ly covet; yea, and are vo­luntarily angry also, in re­gard anger hath some plea­sure annexed thereunto.

He that will not ac­knowledg III those things to [Page 476] be voluntary, whereunto we are moved by anger, and a vehement appetite; even he taketh away the morall-vertues; seeing they consist in a mediocritie in respect of passions. If our passions bee of constraint; then they also are forced actions which are done according to vertue; be­cause the doing of them belongeth to our passions. But no man will account that to bee of constraint, which is done by reason, by choice, by our owne mo­tion, by our owne desire, with a knowledge also of the particular circumstances and by having the very be­ginning of the action in our selves, which are evi­dent [Page 477] proofes that the thing done is voluntary, as hath been formerly decla­red.

And now seeing wee have in many places made mention of our choice, and of such things as are in our power, wee will next discourse of such things as are in our choice.

CAP. 33.

I. Of such things as are in our choice, and what dif­ference there is beewixt them, and things volun­tary. II. Choice is nei­ther the concupiscible, nor the irascible appe­tite, nor will, nor opini­on, nor consultation. III. The definition of choice, and about what it is conversant.

[Page 478] OF our Choice, the question may per­haps bee asked whether it be not all one with that which wee call voluntary; because every thing done by choice is voluntary. To which we an­swer, It is not so; for they are not termini convertibi­les, which they should be, if a thing done by our choice, and a thing volun­tary were all one.

The thing that is vo­luntary, is larger then that which is by choice; for all choice is voluntary; but e­very thing that is volun­tary, is not done by choice; [Page 479] as appeares in children, and in unreasonable-crea­tures, who doe many things voluntarily, but not by choice.

Though our friend com­meth upon us unexpe­ctedly, and so well con­tenteth us with his com­ming, that we are glad of it, yet we cannot say that it came to passe by our choice: and though hee that casually findes trea­sure, did willingly enough hit upon it, because it was a profitable booty; yet he did not deliberately think upon such a thing before, therefore it may be from these things concluded, that a thing voluntary, and our choice is not all one.

[Page 480] II Neither is our appetite and our choice all one. For our appetite is divided in­to these three, desire, anger, and will. Now, that our choice is neither anger, nor the desire of a thing, it is made evident by this, that man doth therein not a­gree with irrationall-crea­tures; whereas he doth a­gree with beasts in cove­ting, and in anger: And if in these last mentioned he agree with beasts, and differs from them in ha­ving a choice of things; then it is manifest, that our choice is one thing, and that our desire and our an­ger are other distinct things.

The same is proved by [Page 481] incontinent men, who are overcome by their lust, and prosecute the same contrary to their owne choice and judgements; For even the incontinent mans judgement disliketh his lust (& maketh choice of better things) whereas if his choice and appetite were all one, neither of them would bee contrary unto the other.

That choice and will are not all one, may bee pro­ved by this; that our Will doth not agree unto all things, whereunto our choice (or judgement) doth assent. For we have a will to be in health, or to be rich; but to be in health, or to bee rich is not in our choice.

[Page 482] Our will hath place even in things impossible; but our choice cōsisteth in those only wch are in our power. We may say that we would be immortall, but we cannot say, that to bee im­mortall is at our choice. For our will extendeth unto the end it selfe; but our choice can reach no further then to the means which are in possibility to attaine that end: and there is betweene them the same proportion which there is betweene the thing subject unto our will, and that thing wher­about we enter into con­sultation; for the subject of our will is the end of that which wee would have, [Page 483] and our consultation, is a­bout the meanes, whereby wee may accomplish that end.

Wee chuse those things onely which may be effe­cted by us; but our will ex­tendeth unto such things as are not in our power to accomplish; as when would that such or such a Commander should obtain the victory.

It is then well enough proved that our choice is neither the concupiscible, nor the irascible appetite, nor our will; and aswell by the same arguments, as by other also, it may bee made manifest; that it is not opinion. For opinion extendeth not onely to [Page 484] things which are in our power, but to things eter­nall.

Moreover, we say that an opinion is either true or false; but to say our choice is either true or false, is an absurd saying.

Opinion concerneth likewise universall things; but our choice is conver­sant in particulars: For, our choice is of things to be undergone, (enjoyed or done) which are parti­cular things.

Neither is our choice all one with our consultation: For consultation is an advi­sing about such things as are to be done (suffered or enjoyed) and that thing is to bee chosen which in [Page 485] consultation is preferred: yea, our consultation de­bates of things yet in que­stion, whereas our choice reacheth to that which is already concluded most worthy.

Wee have hitherto de­clared III what this choice is not; and we will now shew you what it is.

Doubtlesse choice is a thing mixt of consultation, judgement, and appetite; be­ing neither the one nor the other, but a certaine compound of these. For as wee say that a living-creature, is a compound of soul and body; and neither a body by it selfe, nor a soule alone; but a thing made up of both toge­ther; [Page 486] even so say wee also of this our choice.

It is plaine by the very Etymologie therof, that it is a certaine counselling, or consultation, with an appro­bation of some one thing before the rest; and that it is not altogether the same with consultation: For we are then onely ac­counted to have made choice, when one thing is taken before another. And no man preferreth a­ny thing in choice, before he hath consulted, neither accepteth before hee hath judged.

And seeing we are not willing to execute or ad­mit of all these things, which wee well approve [Page 487] of; then that which is pre­ferred after consultation, is in choice; and contained under our choice, when it taketh an appetite thereun­to. Hereupon it necessa­rily followes also, that our choice is conversant in the same thing about which our consultation is imploy­ed.

Out of all which it may be concluded, that our Choice is an appetite, consul­ting of such things as are in our power; or a Consultati­on with an appetite unto those things which are in our power. For, when wee chuse, we desire that which was preferred, after our consultation.

But seeing wee have [Page 488] said that choice and consul­tation, are conversant a­bout the self-same things; we will declare next, what it is, about which this con­sultation is occupied; and about what things wee consult.

CAP. 34.

I. Of consultation, and wherein it differs from a question. II. The defi­nition of consultation, and as illustration there­of, by shewing what things are not proper sub­jects of consultation. III. Of the proper objects of consultation; and of such other things as are pertinent thereunto.

[Page 489] KEeping close unto our chiefe purpose, wee thinke it best (be­fore we declare about what things wee consult) to determine wherein a consultation differs from a question. For a consultation and a question is not all one; though he that con­sults calls things into que­stion by his consultation; but they differ very much. For wee seeke and aske, whether or no the Sunne be greater than the earth: but no man saith I consult whether the Sun bee grea­ter than the Earth.

A question is more ge­nerall, and as it were genus to consultation; and the na­ture of it extends further; [Page 490] For, every consultation is a kinde of questioning; but every question is not a con­sultation, as hath been for­merly declared.

Our consideration is con­versant sometime in con­sultation; as when I consi­der whether I should goe to Sea, or not: and some­time it is conversant in de­bating things in the mind: as when I consider the li­berall sciences; for it is not proper to say wee consult of the Sciences. But the use of these words with­out distinction, hath made many to [...]re, and to con­ceive tho [...] things to bee the same, which are very different. Which diffe­rence being now discove­red, [Page 491] wee will proceed to declare what the things are whereof we consult.

We consult then of those things which are in our power; even of such as may bee brought to passe by us; and whose event is not mani­fest: That is, such as may fall out divers wayes.

We define it to bee of those things which are in our power, because our consultation is onely of those things which are to be undertakē by us; which things are in our power: For we doe not consult of that kinde of Philosophy, which is called contempla­tive; neither of GOD; nor of things which fall out of necessity (by necessi­ty [Page 492] I meane those things which fall out alwayes af­ter one maner, as the Cir­cuit of the yeare.)

Neither doe we consult of those things which are not alwayes permanent, and yet fall out to bee alwayes alike, as of the rising and setting of the Sunne. Nei­ther of those things which fall out naturally; yet not alwayes alike, but so for the most part onely; as; that a man of sixty should have gray haires; or that a man of twenty should begin to have a beard.

Neither consult wee of those things which chance naturally, but sometimes thus, and sometimes o­therwaies, and not after [Page 493] any certaine time or mea­sure; as of showers, and droughts, and haile: Nei­ther is consultation of those things which doe fall out by chance, and seldome, one while more, and ano­ther while lesse: For in respect of these things, this clause was added, that the thing (consulted of) should be in our power.

The definition saith fur­ther, that it must bee of things which may be done by VS. Because we doe not consult of all men; neither of every thing, but of those which are in our power to consult of: For we con­sult not how the common wealth of our enemies may be governed; nor of [Page 494] them who dwell very far from us, (albeit this bee a thing which may be con­sulted of among them­selves.)

Neither doe we consult of all things that may bee done by us; nor of all things that are in our power. And therfore these words, which have an uncertain end were added to the defini­tion: for if the thing bee manifest, and confessed, we deliberate no more thereof.

Neither is there any consultation of such works or actions as are according to Science, and Art: For, all their principles are de­terminately knowne, ex­cept a few Arts which are [Page 495] termed conjecturall, as Phy­sick, and the art of Exorci­sing, and of governing.

For, we doe not onely consult of these things; but of such also as are under our hand, and may be exe­cuted by us; they having such an uncertaine end, that the successe may be as well that, as this.

But it hath been decla­red that our consultation is not of the end; but of things which tend unto the end: For our consulta­tion is not of being rich, but of the meanes how to be rich.

To speake all in briefe; III wee doe consult of those things onely which are doubtfull, and may be ei­ther [Page 496] so, or not so: and of those things we must also treate, that in our discourse nothing be wāting which may make things evident.

Those qualities are cal­led faculties, whereby we are enabled to the perfor­mance of any thing. For, whatsoever we doe, wee have the faculty of it; and those things wee cannot performe, whereof the fa­culty is not in us. There­fore our action dependeth upon our faculty, and our faculty upon our essence: yea the action proceedeth from our faculty, and our faculty from our substance, and is in our substance And as I said before, these are three things depending [Page 497] one upon another. The thing able; the faculty by which it hath ability; and the thing which is to be done.

The thing able to doe it is a substance. The faculty is that whereby wee have ability to doe it. The thing to be done, is that, whose nature may be pra­ctised upon, by our fa­culty.

Of things that may bee done, some are necessary, & some contingent. Those are termed necessary which cannot possibly be hinde­red; or those, the contra­ry whereof is unpossible: And that is contingent, which may bee hindered, or whose contrary may possibly fall out.

[Page 498] For example; It is ne­cessary that a man should breath as long as hee li­veth; for it is impossible a man should live and not breath. It is contingent that there should be raine to day; for it is possible that this day it should not raine, which is contrary to the other.

Againe, things contin­gent are said to fall out sometimes often, some­time seldome, and some­times indifferently, in this maner or in that. They are frequent, as to have gray haires at three score; they are seldome, as not to have gray haires at that age: And they are indiffe­rent; as it is equally in our [Page 499] choice to walke, or not to walke; or simply to doe any act, or not to doe it.

Now our consultation is of those things onely which may indifferently come to passe, or not come to passe; and a thing is said to fall out equally or indifferently, when wee may in like sort, doe as well the contrary thereof as the thing it selfe: For, if we could not doe both equally, wee should not consult thereof. Because no man consults either of things confessed, or impossi­ble. For if wee were able to doe but one of those things which are contrary; that should be received without ambiguity; and [Page 500] the contrary should not, because impossible.

CAP. 35.

I. of destiny, and of the ab­surdities, impieties, and blasphemies which follow their opinion, who as­cribe the cause of all things to the motion of the Starres, or fatall ne­cessity. II. Of them who affirme that some things are both necessitated by destiny, and yet in mans power. III. An exami­nation of the opinion afore mentioned.

OUr opinion is that they who ascribe all things which are done, to the motions [Page 501] and constellations of the Starres, doe not onely op­pose the vulgar notions of humane reason; but teach also (in effect) that all go­vernance in common­weales, are to no purpose. For indeed, lawes are in vaine, and judgements su­perfluous, because they punish innocent men, without cause.

If their opinion bee true, it is also a thing un­reasonable to reprehend or praise any man: yea, if e­very thing come to passe by destiny (or by an ina­voidable decree) our pray­ers are foolish, and ineffe­ctuall bablings; and there is neither place nor use for providence or piety.

[Page 502] Moreover (if this were true) what account is to be made of man? or what is he more then an instru­ment serviceable to the motions of the superiour bodies? Seeing, as they af­firme, he is moved by the celestiall influences not on­ly to the performance of all bodily actions; but to every thought also which is in his minde.

They that are of this opinion doe generally take away (together with such things, as should bee left in our power) the na­ture likewise, of all con­tingent things; and in a manner subvert and de­stroy the whole world; making the Stars injuri­ous [Page 503] homicides, and cuc­kold-makers, or at least the causers of all adulte­ries and murthers.

Nay God who is the Creator of the starres, is (by this blasphemous opinion) made to beare the blame of all which is ill done, ra­ther then the starres; be­cause hee made them such as should necessarily, and inavoidably, bring, and lay evills upon us.

Thus, their absurditie extends not onely to the subversion of common­weales; but maketh God al­so to bee the author of all sinne; and the cause of all mischiefes: Which absur­dity & blasphemy is both impossible for them to [Page 504] and intollerable for us to heare.

II Some there be who af­firme, that things may bee in our power, and that there may be destiny also. For, some things (say these) is given by destiny to every thing that is made, as to the water to coole; to eve­ry plant to beare such fruit as is according to its kinde; to a stone to sinke downeward; to fire to mount upwards; and to living-creatures to accept or to be desirous of things agreeable unto them. And when nothing (without us, or belonging to destiny) opposeth it selfe against that which we endeavour; then it becomes perfectly [Page 505] in our power to proceed; yea and then (say these) we shall assuredly effect it.

They who affirme this are Chrysippus, Philopater, and many other men of great sufficiency and e­steem among the Stoicks, and all which they have said (what shew soever it makes of somewhat else) proves nothing but this; that all things are done by destiny.

For though they have III said that our attempts are given unto us by destiny; and that they are some­times hindered by destiny, and sometime left at li­berty; yet (the matter be­ing well observed) it is plain that all things are done by [Page 506] destiny; even those things (for ought they have yet said) which they would pretend to be in our owne power. And wee will use against them no other ar­guments, to declare the ab­surdity of their opinion, then such as they them­selves have made use of.

As long as the same causes continue, it is ne­cessary (as they them­selves have said) that the selfe-same events should alwayes fall out; and it is impossible that a thing should chance sometimes in one maner, and some­times in another fashion, when that thing is decree­ed from eternity how it shall come to passe.

[Page 507] If this bee so, as they have said, it is inavoidably ne­cessary, but that the en­deavour of a living-crea­ture, should in all respects and altogether fall out in that one maner, which is agreeable to the unchāge­able course of destiny; be­cause the selfe-same cau­ses (doe continue and) beare rule in it. And if our appetite and our endea­vour, doth follow fatall necessity; where then is that thing which (they say) is in our power; seeing the thing that should bee in our power, must be free?

It is free; if (notwith­standing the continuance of the same causes) it bee still in our power, to en­deavour, [Page 508] or not to endea­vour. But if our very en­deavouring of a thing, bee subject unto a fatall necessi­ty; it is plaine, that even those things which belong to our desire and appetite doe fall out by destiny, al­though they bee done by us, according to our na­ture, our desire, and our judgement.

For if it were possible that the same thing should not come to passe which did come to passe (by the course of destiny) then that proposition of theirs would be false, which af­firmes that, as long as the same causes doe continue a­bout any thing, it is necessa­ry that the selfe same effects [Page 509] should ensue.

The like shall happen also to unreasonable-crea­tures, and to things with­out life: For, if they say our appetite is in our power; because wee have it of nature, (and for not o­ther respect) why should they not say aswell that fire hath burning in its own power (seeing fire burneth naturally) according as Philopater hath in some sort affirmed in his booke of destiny.

These arguments con­sidered, wee may affirme, that those things which we doe (being compelled thereunto) by destiny, are not things in our owne power. For wee may as [Page 508] [...] [Page 509] [...] [Page 510] truely say, that the harp, the flute, and all other creatures that are unrea­sonable, or void of life, have in themselves a power to doe some things that wee doe by the use of them; which were absurdly af­firmed.

CAP. 36.

I. Of their opinion, who say that all was fore-appoin­ted by destiny; and yet that the effects of desti­ny are prevented by prai­ers. II. A quaere, how prayer only, should bee in our power, when all other things are foredecreed. III. Of the inequality, and injustice, of this fai­ned destiny.

[Page 511] FRom these, wee will proceed to examine the opinion of the Aegyptian wise men, who say that the destiny procee­ding from the constellati­ons hath true effects; and yet may be prevented by prayers made for the aver­ting thereof.

For they teach that there be certaine meanes ordained whereby men may pacifie the Starres, and mitigate their force: and that there are other powers, superiours to them, which are able to change or governe them: and that prayers, and supplica­tions unto the gods for pa­cification, were devised [Page 512] to that purpose.

We will shew you, that in saying thus, they place destiny among contingent things: Now contingent things are indefinite; and indefinite things are un­knowne: therefore by these mens opinion, all divina­tion is overthrowne: and that especially which is by casting nativities, whereof they make most account of all other, as of a thing forceably and infallibly true.

If they tells us that the events of the figures (which they set) are very manifest, and well known to those who are skilfull; and that God hath hinde­red the same, when the [Page 513] figure hath not effect ac­cording to his proper ver­tue; we will reply, that it is absurd to account praier, and the service of the gods only, to be in our power; and no other thing.

For we will make this II quare, and aske them how it come to passe, that all o­ther things (which are to bee done or accepted by men) should depend upon such or such a constellation, or affection of the starres; and that prayer onely should bee in our power? For it is not onely doubt­full whether this thing it selfe be so; but as doubt­full also, for what cause, and upon what necessity it should be.

[Page 514] If there bee an art, and an orderly way whereby men may attaine to those pacifications, which may hinder such things as are effected by destiny: It may be questioned, whether all men may attaine this method, or some few only. If all may aspire unto it, then there is a possibility, by that meanes to give their destiny an utter over­throw, as soone as all have learned that art, which prevents and hinders the effects thereof.

If some onely may at­taine this meanes, and not others; we would willing­ly know what maner of man, and who he is, that shall determine of this [Page 515] thing. For if destiny it self bee the cause, that some serve GOD, and some do not so; even that will bee another proofe, that all things are done by destiny, whereas it appeared by their opinion before men­tioned, that our praying, and honouring of the Gods, is in our power, not only no lesse then destiny; but much more also.

Now if it be not destiny but some other thing which is cause thereof, then that thing shall ra­ther be destiny: For all the force of destiny consisteth in this, that we either may or may not obtaine that which we petition for in our prayers. If we may, then [Page 516] is destiny of no force; and if wee may not prevaile by prayer, then all is subject unto destiny: and it will so fall out, that in some, all things are done by destiny, and that in some other, de­stiny effecteth nothing at all (because prayer is preva­lent for some and not for o­thers.) And this is evi­dent, that whosoever de­termines hereof, he is the chiefe destiny: and so it will be another way decla­red, that all things are done by destiny (mediately or immediately)

III Moreover, (if truth were in this opinion) hee which doth distribute things shall be unjust, whe­ther it bee destiny or some [Page 517] other divine power: See­ing the way of serving the gods is not equally and worthily distributed. For why should one be judged worthier then another? Seeing all are the instru­ments of destiny; and see­ing no man doth any thing by a foreintended purpose of his owne: or, rather, seeing there is no man which hath any thing left unto his owne choice (according to their do­ctrine.)

For in things which are so done, none is either just or unjust; and there­fore neither worthy, nor unworthy of favour: and whosoever maketh his di­vision unequally (in things [Page 518] of such nature as these) to them, whose case is alone, he (even whosoever he bee) is unjust.

CAP. 37.

I. Of those who affirme wee have power to chuse what is to be done; and that the event of our choice de­pends on destiny. II. Providence and not de­stiny orders the event of things. III. The strife betweene reason, and lust is made void, if all things be done by destiny

NOw they who af­firme, that the choice of those things which are to bee done, is in our power, and [Page 519] that the event of the things chosen depends on destiny (which is the opi­nion even of the wisest of the Grecians) their judge­ment, is partly right, and in some part erroneous: For, whereas they place in our power the choice of things to be done, and yet allow not the events of the same things, to be al­together at our dispose, they doe very rightly: but in that they attribute them unto destiny, they doe not well▪ and their er­ror shall easily be discove­red.

For first they impute imperfection unto destiny, in saying it hath some part, but not all power: [Page 520] And secondly, they erre in making it a sequell to our Iudgement, in saying, that the worke of destiny followes our choice. For, if that be so, then destiny see­meth not to move us; but rather to be moved by us: And then, Man is to bee preferred, as having a greater power then desti­ny; because he maketh it, by his choice.

II It is better therefore to say, that Providence is causer of the event of things; because it is wrought rather by provi­dence then destiny; and see­ing it is the property of Providence, to distribute unto every one, that which for every one is most expe­dient. [Page 521] By this meanes al­so, the event of the things which are chosen, doe fall out sometime in one ma­ner, and sometime in ano­ther, according to that which is most expedient.

If destiny be (as the Sto­icks define it) A certaine concatenatiō of causes which may not be avoided; or a fast knitting together of cau­ses which may not bee al­tered, and brings to every thing (& conveyes to and fro) such effects onely, as are according to the moti­ons, and necessity of destiny it selfe; and not such ef­fects rather, as are most expedient: What will they say then, of such as are blockish, and so foo­lish [Page 522] that they cannot di­rect their owne choice? whether commeth it of destiny or no, that they are such?

If it proceed not of de­stiny; then fooles, and block­heads, are without the compasse of destiny; and if they have their blockish­nesse by destiny, then doth it necessarily follow that our choice also is not in our power: for if the lack of choice be contained under destiny; then it must needs be, that the faculty of chu­sing, and the thing to be cho­sen, must be contained un­der destiny. And so they run backe againe to them who affirm, that all things are done by destiny.

[Page 523] The strife likewise,III which is betweene reason, and lust in the continent, and incontinent man, is to no purpose, if all things be subject unto destiny: For, if it bee determined by a fatall necessity, that such a thing must be done and that such a thing must not bee done, what use is there of that strife in us (which is aforementioned?)

But if it bee not onely fatally determined, that we shall doe such a thing; but so ordered also, that wee shall doe it thus, or thus; what else doe they affirme, who are of this o­pinion, from this, that even our choice is in the number of those things [Page 524] which are subject unto destiny? For, it is our will and our choice which op­poseth our lust, getting the victory in the conti­nent, and which is over­come in the incontinent. And so, that which they first proposed, as their opi­nion, is overthrowne; and by that meanes our choice shall in no case bee in our owne power.

CAP. 38.

I. Of Plato's opinion con­cerning destiny; and how he agrees or dissents from the truth. II. Of the force of prayer, and of the power which the Godhead hath over de­stiny. III. The opinion of the Stoicks touching the destruction, and re­stauration of the world, when the planets returne to the point, in which they stood at the Creati­on.

[Page 525] EXamine we will in this Chapter, the opinion of Plato concerning destiny; for he speakes of a twofold destiny; one in substance, and another in operation.

He calleth destiny in substance, a certaine life, or soule, belonging to the whole world together; and destiny in operation, a cer­taine divine law, by an in­evitable decree, which hee calleth [...], a [Page 526] holy decree, that cannot be escaped; & he saith it was given by the first & high­est God, unto the soul of the world, for the universall garnishing of all things; and for the governing of all things which are made.

That which he calleth destiny in operation, he ter­meth also Providence. For whatsoever is done by de­stiny, is done also by Pro­vidence; though (on the contrary) all things which are done by Providence, are not effected also by destiny.

For, this divine law (which hee saith is both Providence and destiny) comprehends all things in it selfe; some of purpose, [Page 527] and othersome not of set purpose. It comprehends the chiefe, or antecedent causes (which are as it were principles) even of purpose; as our condescen­ding unto any thing; our judgement, and our appetite, of desire. But whatsoever followeth like things of necessity, is beside purpose; and that choice of things, to be done, which is in our power, is of purpose.

Now after those things be determined, which are in our power; upon the self-same things (as it were be­side purpose) follow, saith he, the workes of destiny. As for example; It is in our power to set saile; and wee have purposed so to [Page 528] doe; but saith he, when it is determined that wee will put to sea, other things may follow thereupon, namely, the suffering of shipwrack; which was not purposed at all.

Therefore, hee calleth those things beside purpose, which follow, and are consequēt to those things (that is to say) to those be­ginnings, and actions which are purposed by us. So then the principall things, and such as are in our pow­er, bee done of purpose: whereas the things that follow upon them, are be­side our purpose; and not in our power; but such as ne­cessarily follow.

For the affirmes not that [Page 529] things effected by destiny, are determined from eter­nity; but they happen af­terward, when things which are in our power have gone before. And hereunto agree those cō ­mon sayings; That the fault is in the chuser, and God is blamelesse: that, there is none to over-master vertue; and, that there bee divinations. For all this in­tends nothing else, but to shew, that our choice, and some actions according to our choice, are in our pow­er; and that their events, with such things as hap­pen afterward upon thē, should necessarily pertain to destiny.

That this is not truely [Page 530] affirmed, appeares by what is formerly expres­sed. And yet when hee calleth destiny the Ordi­nance and will of GOD, making all things to bee subject unto Providence, he differs not much from the divine Scriptures, which teach that Provi­dence alone, is the gover­nesse of all things.

But he dissenteth farre from them, when he sayes that the events doe necessa­rily ensue upon those things which are in our power. For wee say that things wrought by Provi­dence are effected, not as necessary, but as contingent: because, if they followed of necessity, then the grea­test [Page 531] part of our prayers would be in vaine; and ac­cording to his opinion our prayers would bee a­vaileable for nothing, but to procure prosperous beginnings to our actions, or to petition that wee may chuse what is best. For after we have prefer­red one thing before ano­ther, all our praying should be fruitlesse, because all things by his opinion en­sue of necessity, which doe afterwards follow.

But wee affirme, that II prayer is forcible even in respect of those events. And wee say, that it is in the choice of Providence, whether wee shall suffer shipwrack or no (when wee [Page 532] have purposed to set saile) and that nothing falleth out so necessarily, but that it may either be so, or not so, as GOD pleaseth. For, he is not concluded under any necessity; neither is it lawfull to say, that his Will is confined by fatall neces­sity; seeing he is the Crea­tor of necessity it selfe.

It is hee who laid that necessity upon the starres, by which they are con­strained to keep the same course. It is hee that set bounds unto the Sea, and who hath appointed a ne­cessary limitation to univer­sall▪ and generall things; which if they will call de­stiny, because in all re­spects, and altogether it so [Page 533] falleth out of necessity; as that in successiō all things which are made should also be destroyed (and the like) wee will not much contend about the same; because we will not con­test for the bare names.

But GOD himselfe is not onely without the compasse of all necessity; but he is also the Lord and maker thereof: For, in that he himselfe is the ab­solute power of all things; and a nature wherein all power is comprehended; hee doth nothing as one subjected either to the ne­cessity of nature, or decree of Law. But all things are in his hand, to doe, or not to doe; even [Page 534] those things which were otherwise necessary.

And that this might plainely be declared, hee stayed once the courses of the Sun, and of the Moone, which are moved of neces­sity, and keep alwayes one constant motion: thereby shewing, that nothing done by necessity doth con­fine him; but that accor­ding to his power all things are contingent.

Yet he made such a day but once (as wee finde it in holy Scripture) that he might onely set forth his power, and not dissolve that strong law which was made by him at the first, that the motion of the Starres should bee ne­cessary.

[Page 535] So likewise, he did pre­serve some from death, as Enoch, and Elias, who were naturally mortall, and liable to corruption; that by all these things we might perceive his power and his will to be ir­resistible.

But the Stoicks have III taught, that when the Planets have wheeled a­bout unto the same point, both in longitude, and lati­tude, wherein every one of them stood at the Crea­tion, they shall within a certain limitation of time cause all to be set on fire, and destroyed. And then (as they also affirme) the world beginning anew, shall be restored unto the [Page 536] state wherein it was be­fore.

Yea, they say further, that forasmuch as the stars shall have againe the same course; every thing that was in the former circuit shall come to passe againe without any alteration. Socrates shall be as hee was againe, and Plato, and eve­ry particular man; having the same friends, and the same Citizens; and that the like things shall befall every one; yea, that every man shall take in hand the same worke which he for­merly wrought; and that every City, Village, and field shall bee brought to the like state againe: And that the whole Vniverse [Page 537] shall be restored unto the former condition againe; not one time onely, but as often as the revolutions of the Planets do come about to the same point, which revolutions they thinke shall be infinite and with­out number.

They say also, that the gods are not subject to this corruption; and that when they have observed one whole revolution, they know by that circuit, all things that shall come to passe in every succeeding round. For, there shall be (as they dreame) no new thing; but every thing which was before, shall bee reacted after one and the same sort, without any [Page 538] alteration in the least thing.

And some have said, that from this restauration, the Christians tooke occa­sion to conceive the resur­rection: but the were much mistaken; for the Christian verity doth assure us, that the Resurrection shall bee perfected but once, and not according to the revolutions of the Starres.

CAP. 39.

I. Of freewill. II. Of those who deny freewill; To what causes they must of necessity ascribe al things; and what may be inferred thereupon. III. The ma­ny absurdities which will follow, if it be denied that man hath freewill.

[Page 539] MAny are of opini­on, that there is nothing at all in our power; and therefore the discourse of freewill; namely of that which is in our power, doth first occasi­on this question; Whether any thing be in our power or no: Then a second que­stion, to wit, What those things bee which are in our power; or wherein freewill consisteth: and thirdly, it gives occasion to in­quire, Why God our maker, made us with freewill.

That we may discourse orderly of these things, we will speake first to the [Page 540] first question; and prove that there is something in our power, even by the confessions of those who have denied the same.

II They affirme, that of things which are made or done, either GOD, or ne­cessity, or destiny, or nature, or fortune, or chance is the cause.

But the proper worke of GOD, is either substance or Providence. The work of necessity is in the motion of those things which are alwayes of one sort. The worke of destiny, is in those things which are to be perfected by it of neces­sity; for in it, things are effected of necessity. The workes of nature are gene­ration, [Page 541] augmentation, cor­ruption, plants, and living-creatures. The worke of fortune is in things that are very rare, and unexpe­cted.

For they define fortune to be the concurrence, and meeting of two causes, which had their begin­ning from our will and choice, and yet produce in the end somewhat else then was intended by the thing done. As when hee that is digging of a ditch, findes treasure: For nei­ther hee who there laid the treasure, had any pur­pose it should be so found; neither had the finder any intent to dig for treasure; but the purpose of the [Page 542] one was to take it thence when he himself thought fit; and the intention of the other was to make a ditch; and there fell out another thing beside those which were purposed by them.

The workes of chance are such as befall unreaso­nable, and inanimate crea­tures, without nature, or art.

Now if a man bee nei­ther the cause, nor begin­ning of his owne actions, under which of these may we containe the things which are done by him?

It is not lawfull, nor comely to ascribe unto GOD those actions of men which are uncleane, [Page 543] or unjust. Neither may we ascribe them to necessi­ty; because they cannot be truly accounted among those things which conti­nue alwayes after one maner. Nor may wee im­pute them to nature; for the workes of nature, are living-creatures and plants. Nor to fortune, for the a­ctions of men are not rare or unlooked for. Nor be­long they to chance; be­cause things casuall belong to inanimate and irrationall creatures.

Therefore it remaineth undeniable, that the man himself which worketh, & accōplisheth such, or such things, is the beginner of his owne actions, and [Page 544] hath freewill.

III Moreover, if man bee the beginner of no action of his owne, all consultati­on is superfluous in him; for to what end is delibe­ration, if hee have no acti­on in his owne power? But it must needs be a ve­ry absurd thing to affirme that to bee superflous in man, which is best, and most honourable in him.

If then he doe consult, he consults about the doing of some thing; for all deliberation doth concerne the execution of some a­ction.

Moreover, of whatso­ever things the faculty of doing the same, is in our power; the acting also of [Page 545] those things, and the ex­ercising of that faculty is in our power. But, a fa­culty to worke according to the vertues, is in our pow­er; therefore the vertues also, are in our power.

Now that the faculties to worke according to vertue are in our power, it is very elegantly declared by Aristotle where he trea­teth of the morall vertues. That saith he; which wee learne by practise, we pra­ctise when wee have lear­ned it: For while we learn to master our pleasures, we become temperate; and when we are temperate, we become the masters of our pleasures.

Wee may argue also in [Page 546] this maner: It is confes­sed of all, that practise and the exercise of things are in our power: But pra­ctise beareth sway in ha­bits; for custome is as it were a purchased nature. If then practise rule the habit, and if practise bee in our power, then the habit also must be in our power: yea, and the actions also, whose habits are in our power, (and which are effected according to those habits) must bee in our power also; because the actions are conforma­ble to the habits.

Hee then which hath the habit of justice, will do just things; and hee that hath a habit of injurie, will [Page 547] doe injurious things. Therefore God hath gi­ven us a power to bee just or unjust.

Our counselling also, and our exhorting of one ano­ther, doe declare that there bee some things in our power; for no man doth exhort us not to bee hungry, or not to thirst, or to flye in the ayre; because these things are not in our power. Therefore it is manifest, that those things whereunto our exhortati­ons doe serve, are in our power.

Moreover, if nothing be in our power, then our lawes are superfluous; but every nation useth some lawes naturally, as know­ing, [Page 548] that they have power to doe such things as their lawes injoyne: And ma­ny nations have ascribed the making of their lawes to the gods (as the inhabi­tants of Crete, to Iupiter; and the Lacedemonians to Apollo) therefore the knowledge that such things are in our power is naturally dispersed amōg all men.

The like may be infer­red upon the praises, or dispraises which follow those things of which wee make choice of; and of all those other circumstances (a­forementioned) which disprove that all things are done by destiny.

CAP. 40.

I. Of such things as are in our power; and wherein our freewill consisteth. II. A reproofe aswell of them who conceive that mans freewill extendeth to every thing; as of those who deny him to have any freewill at all. III. The beginnings, or choice both of good and evill things, are in our power, but not their events: that so, neither divine Providence, nor humane faculties, might bee su­perfluous.

EVidently enough appeares it, that some things are in [Page 550] our power, and that wee have some actions at our dispose. It now remains that we declare, What things they are which bee in our power.

We say in generall, that all things which wee doe voluntarily be in our pow­er; because it could not else be truly verified that the things were done vo­luntarily, which were not in our power: and be­cause generally all those things whereupon ensu­eth praise or dispraise; and those also wherein we use exhortation, or law, are in our power; as is afore de­clared.

But things which are properly in our power; are all [Page 551] such things as belong un­to the minde; and those whereof we may consult. For our consulting of them doth imply, that it is in our power to execute that which is proposed and consulted of. And wee have declared in the for­mer part of this treatise, that consultation, and deli­beration, fall out in such things onely as are contin­gent: and that such things only are contingent, which may fall out either this way, or that way, or in a contrary manner.

It is our minde which maketh choice thereof; & it is the beginning of our action; & those are contin­gent things, which are in [Page 552] our power: To be moved, or not to be moved; To at­tempt, or not to attempt; To desire things unnecessary, or not desire them; To lie, or speake truth; To give, or not to give; To rejoyce in such things as we ought, or not to rejoyce; and all such other things like unto these, wherein consist the works of vice and vertue: For herein consisteth our free­will.

The Arts also are ac­counted among such things as may alike fall out, or not fall out: For, every Art brings forth such things as may both be done, and left undone; and such things also, as have the beginning in the [Page 553] doer, and not in the things themselves, which are done: But neither those things which are eternall (and in that respect, things of ne­cessity) neither any other things which are done of necessity, can be said to be done by Art.

Nor is any of those things said to be done by Art, which are contingent, and may bee done other­wise, if they have their efficient cause in them­selves; as in living-crea­tures, and in plants, which are made by nature, not by Art. If therefore the efficient cause of things made by Art, is without themselves; then who is cause of the things made [Page 554] by Art, but the Artificer which made them? And if the making of them be­long unto him, then is he the beginning, and cause of his owne actions. And therefore also, the wor­king according, to Art, and vertue, and all actions of mans minde, and of rea­son, are in mans power: and what actions they are, I have declared already.

II Now the most part of men, supposing that wee are said to have this free­will in every thing which wee doe or possesse, are therefore offended at this opinion; and not without cause. But, some there be, having more acute­nesse, who bringing this [Page 555] text of Scripture to refute us (namely, The wayes of man are not in his own hand) say thus unto us.

Good friends, how is the will of man free, seeing his way is not in his owne hands? and seeing the thoughts of men are so vaine, that they cannot bring to effect those things which they have devised?

Many such like things they object, not knowing in what sense, wee speake of freewill. For we affirm not that it is in our power to be rich, or poore, or al­wayes in health, or of a strong constitution of na­ture; or to rule; or gene­rally to have those good [Page 556] things, which wee count as instruments to worke things by; or such as are called the gifts of fortune; neither doe wee account those to be at our dispose which have their event from Providence: But wee affirme those actions onely to be in our power, which are according to vice, or vertue; as also, our motions or choice of things; or else such things where­of wee may doe the con­trary, aswell as the things themselves.

For a certaine will or choice goeth before every action▪ and not onely the deed, but the affection also is condemned; as may plainly appeare in that [Page 557] place of the Gospell, which saith, He who lookes upon a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery already wth her in his heart. And we read that Iob sacrificed un­to God, for such offēces as his children might com­mit in thought. For in­deed the beginning, either of sin, or of doing uprightly is in our will; whereas the doing of the thing it selfe, is otherwhile permitted by Providence, and other­while hindered.

For, seeing there are III some things in our power, and a Providence beside; it is necessary that such things as are done should bee done by them both: Because, if they were [Page 558] done by either of them a­lone, the other should be to no purpose. Therefore in regard all actions are mixt, it will sometime happen that they shall be in our power; another while, that they shall bee as providence alone dire­cteth; and sometimes a­gaine, both according to Providence, and as wee would also.

And whereas likewise there is sometimes a gene­rall, and sometimes a parti­cular Providence; it is ne­cessary that the same should fall out in particu­lar things, as it doth in things generall. For if the aire about us bee dry, our bodies are dryed also, [Page 559] though not all alike. And if a mother be given to ri­otous fare, or a distempe­red dyet; even thereby shall her children become distempered in body, and perverse in such things as they attempt.

It is plaine therefore, by what hath beene said, that men may fall into a distempered estate of bo­dy, either by the generall distēperature of the aire; or by the dyet of parents; or when they spoil them­selves by their owne vo­luptuousnesse; and that they may be distempered sometime by such occasi­ons as take their begin­nings from themselves; in such maner, that Provi­dence [Page 560] shall not altogether bee the cause of such things.

If then, the Soul shall yeeld her selfe to be over­swayed by the temperature of the body, and give place to wrath, or lust; or bee pressed downe by outward things, as poverty; or lifted up, by riches, or the like: if any evill commeth to the same thereby; it so hapned thereunto by the selfe-will of that Soul. See­ing, if shee had not volun­tarily yeelded her selfe to those distemperatures, she might have overcome them, and beene in good case. For through well ordering the affections of the minde, by a conveni­ent [Page 561] dyet, and a good con­versation, she might have altered that temperature, rather then have beene perverted thereby.

This is manifest by the example of such as are in a good condition, and that all such as are not in a good e­state, doe sin voluntarily (and not by constraint:) And that it is in our pow­er, either to consent, and yeeld our selves unto our bodily distemperatures, or to resist, and overcome them.

Neverthelesse, there be many who pretend these distemperatures to bee the cause why we doe such or such things; and so im­pute their wickednesse, [Page 562] not unto their owne will, but to necessity. And there­fore they cōclude (though very absurdly) that the vertues also, are not in our power.

CAP. 41.

I. Of the cause why man was made with free will; and that if it had been other­wise, he had neither beene capable of the contem­plative, nor practike fa­culty, nor been a reason­able creature. II. Of the mutability of men and Angels: and of the causes thereof; and of some inferences thereupon proving freewill. III. It is not through any natu­rall defect that men are vicious, but by their owne will: And it is here shewne also, that man without freewill, could neither have any vice nor vertue.

[Page 563] SOmewhat remaines to be declared, wher­by it may bee mani­fest why man had freewill bestowed upon him.

We affirme, that im­mediately, together with reason this freewill entered into us; and that together with nature, there is in­graffed into created things a mutability, and al­teration; especially in those things which are a subject made of matter. For there is a mutation even in the [Page 564] very beginning of every thing which is made; and all making proceedeth from an alteration of the materiall subject.

This is evident to any man who considerately beholds the plants, and li­ving-creatures, which have their abiding either in the earth, in the water, or in the aire: For there is in all those a continuall mu­tability.

Moreover, that our freewill enters into us, to­gether with reason, hath beene made plain enough by those things which we have said, to prove that some thing is in our power; as will appeare to them who have heeded what [Page 565] was delivered to that pur­pose. But because the se­quell of this treatise, doth for some respects require the same; perhaps it will not be impertinent to re­peat some part of that which was formerly de­clared.

Our reason is divided into contemplation, and practise▪ Contemplative rea­son, is that which concer­neth (universally) the na­ture of things, as they bee really; and active reason, is that whereby wee delibe­rate of things, and sets downe the right way of putting them into execu­tion.

The contemplative part is called the minde (or the [Page 566] principall part of the soule) and the active part is ter­med reason. The one is likewise called wisdome, and the other prudence.

Now every one that de­liberates, doth for this cause deliberate, even for that the choice of such things as are to be done, is in his power; and to the intent that hee might by deliberation, make choice of that which is most wor­thy; and that after he hath so chosen, he might exe­cute the same.

It is therefore necessa­ry, that he which delibe­rates should have power over his owne deeds: for if he have not power over his owne actions; his con­sultation [Page 567] will be fruitlesse also unto him. And if these things be so; it will follow, by a necessary con­sequence, that wheresoe­ver reason is planted, there is likewise freewill. For either he is no reasonable-creature; or else, if he be a reasonable-creature, he hath power over the beginnings of his owne actions; and in having that power, hath also freewill.

It hath beene declared II also, that things compo­sed of a materiall subject, have a mutability in them; out of which (together with what hath been said before) it may bee infer­red, that there must, of necessity, be in man both [Page 568] freewill, and mutability. Mutability, because hee is made of matter; and free­will, because he is indued with reason.

Whosoever therefore findes fault with God, for that hee did not so make man at the first, that hee might not fall unto vice, but gave him his owne choice: Surely, those men are not aware, that they reprove GOD for making man reasonable, and not rather an unreasonable-crea­ture.

For one of these two is unavoidably necessary. Either man should have beene made void of reason; or else being indued with reason, and exercised in [Page 569] action, hee must have in him freewill. Yea, and thereupon it followes also of necessity, that every nature endued with reason, hath freewill, and is muta­ble of his owne nature.

But those natures have especially a mutability in them which are made of a materiall subject; aswell in respect that they were made, as in regard they were made of matter: whereas those natures which were not made of matter (as the subject) have mutability in them, but in one respect onely; namely, in that they were made.

Moreover, so many of those immateriall natures [Page 570] as were conversant in earthly matters, and in­termedled with such infe­riour things, as are to bee done, by reason of com­municating with men; by so much they became more mutable then others (of that immateriall nature) And so many of them as directed the excellency of their nature, to approach neare unto God, with an inclination to love him; and to enjoy a blessed e­state in the minding and fruition of him; so ben­ding themselves inward, and unto GOD only, that they wholly estranged themselves from outward, and materiall things. Those (by that meanes) became [Page 471] so familiar with contempla­tion, and with GOD, that they still remaine without mutation. Having a free­will, in that they are indu­ed with reason; and yet are not now subject unto alteration, for the fore­mentioned causes.

And this need not bee wondred at. For even those men also, which give themselves to con­templation, and seque­ster themselves from the inordinate love, and med­ling in worldly affaires, doe and may attaine unto an immutable condition, (and unto an estate of grace, from which there is no fal­ling away.)

Now I doe suppose, [Page 572] that this (with what was formerly said) hath suffi­ciently proved, that in the beginning, all the reasonable creatures were created in so excellent a condition, that if they had remained such as they were made, they should have beene void of all vice, and that their vitiousnesse (who have been corrupted) came unto them by their owne will. For it so falleth out, that they who remaine in the condition wherein they were placed by their crea­tion, are setled in a most blessed estate.

Of incorporeall natures, Angels alone have beene altered: yet not all of them: but some part; [Page 573] even so many onely, as creeping doneward de­parted from that inclina­tion which they had to supreame things, and the contemplation of GOD.

It is made plaine by the things afore proved, that the powers of our will are mutable; because we are of a mutable nature: And yet no man can blame GOD, as if hee were the cause that we are evill, in regard the faculties are mutable, which he gave un­to us.

For vices consist not in our faculties▪ but in habits; and our habits depend up­on our will▪ and it is there­fore the fault of our will, that we are evill, and not [Page 574] (originally) of our nature. But our meaning shall be more plainly understood by this that followes.

Wee have said hereto fore, that a faculty is a power whereby we are a­ble to put in execution whatsoever we doe. And in all the faculties belon­ging to our choice, the self-same concerneth both the contraries (as for ex­ample) there is the same faculty of lying, and of speaking truth; one and the same faculty of tempe­rance, and wantonnesse.

But it cannot bee, that in contrary things there should be the same habit; as in wantonnesse and tem­perance; or in lying, and [Page 575] speaking truth; because of contrary things, the habits are contrary. For the ha­bit which concernes tem­perance, belongeth to ver­tue: but all intemperance is of vice; and therefore the vices doe not depend upon the faculties, which are in us; but upon our habits, and our will: And it is not a faculty, which maketh us wantons, or ly­ars, but our will. For if we would, we might speak the truth, and not lye.

Seeing then, vice is not a faculty, but a habit; God is not cause of our naugh­tinesse, which giveth us the faculty; but a habit (is cause thereof) which be­ing in us, proceedeth from [Page 576] our selves, and by our selves, & for our selves. For if wee would endea­vour thereafter, we might instead of an evill-habit, at­taine unto the contrary thereof.

Now a faculty doth herein differ from a habit; all faculties are naturall, but habits are procured by use. Yea; and here also they differ; our faculties are in us without teaching, and our habits are gotten by learning, and custome. If therefore the faculties that are in us, be naturall, and without teaching; and the habits gotten by use and learning; then it can­not be that our (originall) nature should be the cause [Page 577] our wickednesse; but ra­ther our evill education, whereby wee have gotten an evill habit.

For that our habits come unto us by custome, it hath beene already de­clared; and that our facul­ties are in us by nature, it is evident by this; that all men have the same facul­ties (except those which are someway maimed or lame.) And that the habits are not naturall, is as evi­dent by this, that all have not the same habits; but some of them habits of one sort, and some of ano­ther: whereas things that are naturall, are found in all.

CAP. 42.

SECT. 1.

I. Of Providence; and first, that there is a provi­dence, and for what good causes, both Jew and Christian ought to be­leeve it. II. The same is illustrated to heathen men, by arguments and demonstrations agreea­ble to their knowledges. III. Proofes thereof, by things also generally con­fessed.

IT is already sufficient­ly proved, that man hath freewill; as also wherein his freewill consi­steth, and for what cause he was created with free­will.

[Page 579] Now forasmuch as eve­ry one who purposeth to murther a man, doth not alwayes put the same in execution; but sometime fulfilleth his murtherous intent, and sometime not, because his purpose being hindered, hath not effect according thereunto: And wheras we have said that providence is cause therof, & not destiny; It followeth consequently, after the Tract of things which are in our power, that we speak next of Providence.

We will divide our dis­course into three parts; the first, proving that there is a Providence; the second, shewing what Providence is; and the third, What [Page 580] things belong unto Provi­dence.

As for the Iewes, unlesse they be mad, they cannot be ignorant that there is a Providence, knowing the wonders which GOD wrought in Aegypt; and hearing of those things which hapned unto their Fathers in the wildernesse; wherein most manifest visions of Providence ap­peared more clearly unto them, thē by those things which wee now see with our eyes. And they had also many evidēt proofes that things were done by Providence, both in their Prophets, and in their Ba­bylonish captivity, which leave not any just occasi­on [Page 581] for them, to be doubt­full of the same. As for the Christians; they have not onely all those things which hapned unto the Iews, to preach unto them that there is a Providence; but also that admirable work of Providence, above all other most divine, which containeth in it that exceeding great fa­vour towards man, which passeth common beliefe; I meane, that GOD should take unto him a Body for our sakes.

But seeing wee must II reason the matter, not with such onely, but also with heathen men. Wee will therefore endeavour to prove there is a Provi­dence [Page 582] by such other things as are also in credit with them. And that there is a Providence, may be proved by those argumēts wher­by we prove that there is a God.

For concerning the continuance of things▪ and especially such as are subject to generation, and corruption; and the scitua­tion, and order of all things that are, being al­wayes preserved after one maner; and the course of the Starres nothing alte­ring at any time; and the circuit of the yeare, and the returne of the season of the yeare; and the equality both of the night and of the dayes of the [Page 583] yeare, so that either of them is both increased and diminished in the same proportion of time: how might all this conti­nue under so conforma­ble a government, if it had none to rule it by his Pro­vidence?

Moreover, the punish­ments which follow sin; or (which is of more im­port) the detecting of murthers, and offences themselves, which are of­ten bewrayed (when there is no witnesse of the deed) by some circumstances; doe shew that there is a Provi­dence.

Both the Scriptures of the Hebrewes, and the wri­tings of the Heathen, are [Page 584] full of stories to this pur­pose. Of this nature is that which is written of Susanna: and in prophane bookes, there is a story to the same purpose of Ibicus the Poet.

For, when this Poet was murther [...]d by certaine ruffians, where none were in presence, either to as­sist him, or beare witnesse of the assault which they made upon him; he seeing Cranes not far from him, cryed out and said, oh yee Cranes, be you revengers of this murther.

And so it fell out, that when the Magistrates of the City where he lived, endeavoured to seeke out the committers of that [Page 585] murther, and could not finde them: The people being assembled together into a common place for that intent; the Cranes flew over them; whereup­on the murtherers espying them, laughed outright, and said, loe, where they flie that should revenge the death of Ibicus: which being overheard by one that sate next unto them, and declared to the Ma­gistrates, the said murthe­rers were thereupon exa­mined, and confessed the fact.

There be very many of such like things, recorded by ancient writers, which if a man should collect to­gether, would enlarge this [Page 586] Treatise to an infinite length.

And though all offen­ders be not descried; but, that some do quite escape the publike stroke of Iu­stice; yet let no man for that cause deny that there is a Providence. For the Providence of GOD, taketh care of men, (and brings thē to repētance) not one way alone; but after divers and sundry maners.

Furthermore, the com­posure, and proportiona­ble knitting together of those bodies, which are sub­ject unto generation, and corruption, and there be­ing kept alwaies alike (ac­cording to their severall [Page 587] kinds) is not the least argu­ment proving that there is a Providence, seeing the great care (and wisedome) of divine Providence is ve­ry manifest in every part of the body; as they who will take paines to peruse them, may learne out of those many Treatises, which are made upon that subject. Yea, the varieties which are in the colours of living-creatures, and their keeping alwayes the same comely mixture and pro­portion, are proofes of a Providence.

And among such things III as are generally confessed by all men, one evident proofe declaring there is a Providence, is that uni­versall [Page 588] consent of men in all times, and of all nati­ons, that wee ought to serve GOD, both by Pray­ers, and Oblations. For if there were not a Provi­dence to governe the af­faires of this world, who would pray? or to whom should we make our peti­tions?

Moreover, that earnest desire which is in us, to do good unto others (and which they naturally, and very diligently endea­vour, whose mindes are not perverted) is a plaine demonstration that there is a Providence. For ha­ving received a benefit which we are not able to recompence, wee are the [Page 589] more desirous to be som­way helpfull to them, who are not able to requite us for the same.

If Providence were ta­ken away, then every man should be permitted to be injurious, according to the power hee hath to doe wrong. There would also be no giving of almes, nor any feare of GOD a­mong men; and there­withall vertue and piety would be quite rooted out. For if GOD had not a provident care of every thing; neither did punish evill-doers; nor encourage those that were well-dispo­sed nor defended innocents from oppression; Who would worship GOD? or [Page 590] who would serve him, that could be no way pro­fitable unto them?

If there bee no Provi­dence, all prophecies, and the fore-knowledge of things, are likewise over­throwne. But even those things which happen out before our eyes, almost e­very day, are manifesta­tions of the same: For, GOD often appeareth un­to us in our necessities (by supplying our wants in an un­expected maner) many have beene cured of their infir­mities, by that which hath beene revealed unto them in dreames; many predictions of things to come have beene truely uttered in all ages. And [Page 591] many who have embrued their hands in innocent blood, or committed such like heynous offences, have been horribly terrifi­ed night and day.

From the goodnesse of God, his Providence may al­so be inferred; for hee is the most excellent Good; and as he is good, he is in­clined to bee good and be­neficiall to others; and if he be inclined to be bene­ficiall to others, he is in­clinable also, to have a Providence over others.

What need I speake here of those workes which belong unto the Creation? of their propor­tion? of their harmony? of their scituation? of their [Page 592] order? or of the use where­unto every thing serveth in the whole world? see­ing all things may evi­dently appeare to have beene perfected in such maner, that nothing should have been in good plight, if it had beene o­therwise then it is now: and that nothing can well be added, nor any thing be conveniently wanting in any of those things which were made tho­rowout the world: For, both by wisdome, and pro­vidence, all things therein were created in a comely and perfect maner.

SECT. 2.

I. Of the difference betweene Providence, and Crea­tion; and of their distinct workes. II. Of the won­derfull Providence of GOD, in the manifold, and unlike visages of men. III. The same Pro­vidence is illustrated by the great diversity of co­lours whereby the seve­rall species of every kind of living-creatures are distinguished.

BUt wee will defer the full explanation here­of, untill we shall have oc­casion to speake of the Creation, lest wee should fall into that oversight [Page 594] whereinto those writers have slipped; who extoll GOD's creation instead of his Providence; when his Providence was their Theme. For though in­deed Creation gives us an occasion to treat of Pro­vidence; yet so great is the difference betwixt them, that they are farre from being one.

It is the worke of Crea­tion to make well those things which are made; but it is the part of Provi­dence to conserve and take care for such things. And these two are not alwayes altogether in one; as wee may perceive by those men who are coversant in arts and mysteries. For, [Page 595] some when they have made a thing well, give over there, and take no more care for the thing which they have made; as Carpenters, and Painters, and the makers of other handy-craft workes: and some other, doe no more but provide, and take care for the preservation of those things which are un­der their charge; as heard­men, and shepheards.

These things conside­red, it will become us, when we treat of Creation, to shew that all the things which were made, were exceeding well-made: and to declare when we come to speake of Providence, that God was diligent in [Page 596] the preservation of those things which he had well created.

By this providence it comes to passe, that men beget men, that beasts are engendred of beasts; and that every thing springs from his owne, and not from any strange seed. And whosoever shall a­verre, that every thing (af­ter it is once made) pro­ceeds forward as in a cer­taine race; he cannot chuse but confesse also, that af­ter a thing is created, there must be alwayes a provi­dence to governe the same. For in that the thing crea­ted proceedeth on in a course, it is even thereby manifested, that together [Page 597] with creation, there was laid a foundation of provi­dence, to whom belongs the governing of al things after they are created: and he saith (in effect) that he which first made all things, and he which governes them by his providence, when they are made, is but one, and the same GOD.

Whosoever beholds the II visages of men, to bee so many thousands, and yet to differ so much from each other, as that no one is like any of the other in all respects; hee cannot chuse but admire the work; and if he well consider the cause of it, shall easily find that it is divine providence [Page 598] by whom so many diffe­rent, and distinct features and countenances, were brought forth.

For if our visages should be all of the same forme and moulding without a­ny alteration, how great a confusion would there follow? In how much darknesse and ignorance should man be kept? None should know his familiar acquaintance, from a stran­ger, nor be able to discern a wicked enemy from an ho­nest friend; but all things would be confounded to­gether in one masse, ac­cording to the opinion of Anaxagoras.

Moreover, if this had beene so, there had not [Page 599] beene any cause why men should have been forbid­den to company with si­sters or mothers: neither would many have refrai­ned from theft, rapine, or from offering any open violence or injurie to o­thers, if they could but contrive their present e­scape: For though after­ward they were seene, none should be able to di­stinguish them from o­ther men.

Neither could any law be executed; nor any common wealth well ordered; nei­ther could fathers or chil­dren know each other; nei­ther could any thing per­taining to humane affairs be well, or orderly affe­cted; [Page 600] because men should be as it were blinde, not discerning between man and man; and bee no way helped by their eyes, ex­cept it were in discerning the age or quantity.

This benefit we gaine by providence, that it pre­vents these inconveniences and confusions, by making a variety in the visages of men, alwayes, in all places, and at all times. And it is a strong argument also to prove that this providence extendeth unto every par­ticular; in that every par­ticular man is known one from another, by his por­traiture, by his proportion, by his visage, and by his voice.

[Page 601] For mans visage is not III the onely marke whereby we may discerne him; but (as if that were not e­nough) providence hath added another distinction for our more advantage; even the diversity of co­lours also, to the intent that the weaknesse of our nature might bee assisted divers wayes: And I sup­pose likewise, that many of those living-creatures, which in their generall kinde, have in appearance but one shape (and colour) as Dawes and Crowes; yet there may be certaine vi­sible differences, whereby they might bee distinguished by good heed; and whereby they discerne each other [Page 602] when they should couple together. For though ma­ny Dawes and Crowes bee gathered together in one place; yet in their coup­ling, they discerne each o­ther; and every male and female know their owne mate.

But how could they know each other, if every one of them had not some proper distinction in the shape; which (though not easily perceived by us) might be well enough dis­cerned by thē, through a naturall instinct; they being creatures of one kinde?

Lastly, the signes, and oracles, and sooth-sayings, and wonders, which are from above (for now I [Page 603] direct their discourse to heathen philosophers) and which (as they affirme) doe by their owne force make good the events of such things as are decla­red by them, have (no doubt) their significations, by the vertue of provi­dence; and have thereby also, a true effect, accor­ding to the same significa­tions.

CAP. 43.

This Chapter declares, what Providence is; and that it is necessary & conveni­ent the Creator, and ru­ler of all things should be One.

VEry plainly may it be manifested that there is a provi­dence; [Page 604] both by arguments already produced, and by others which wee shall have occasion to mention hereafter: wee will now therefore, declare what providence is.

Providence is a heedfull provision for all things, pro­ceeding from GOD. Some thus define it. Providence is the will of GOD, whereby all created things receive a government fit for them.

Now if Providence be the will of GOD, it is ne­cessary that all things should be ordered as rea­sonably, as excellently, and as decently as the na­ture of the God-head re­quires; which is after so good and perfect a maner [Page 605] as that nothing may pos­sibly receive a better or­der: For neither is it a thing of good cōsequence nor agreeable to decency, that one should make things, and another take the care of their preserva­tion and government; see­ing it were but an argu­ment of weakness to have it so.

Many types and ex­pressions of that which we have said, are ingraf­fed in living-creatures: For every thing which breedeth ought, provides food also for the thing bred thereby; and man provides for all other things also, belonging to the life of him whom hee [Page 606] hath begotten, so far forth as his ability doth extend. And all creatures which make not provision for their young, doe therefore not make it, because their weaknesse is a hinderance thereunto.

Therefore it is truely declared, that GOD is he whose Providence concer­neth all: and that Provi­dence is the will of GOD.

CAP. 44.

SECT. 1.

I. It is here shewed wherein providence consisteth; Plato's opinion concer­ning the same, and how far his tenet is allowable. II. The opinions of the Stoicks, of Democritus, Heraclitus, and Epicurus, [Page 607] touching Provi­dence, and the absurdi­ties insuing. III. The o­pinions also of Aristotle, Euripides, and Menan­der; and the refutation of them.

SInce we have shew­ed that there is a Providence, and also what it is; we will now de­clare, in what things, that providence beareth sway; whether in things univer­sall, or things particular, or in both.

Plato affirmes that it hath government both of universall, and particular things; and he divideth his discourse of providence in­to three parts. The first [Page 608] he calls the providence of the first and supreamest GOD, and that this provi­dence is especially over the IDEAE (that is, the most beautifull formes of things:) and in the next place, over the whole world in general, as, over the heavens, the stars, and all generall things; even over the predica­ments of substance, quanti­ty, and quality, with such like: yea, and over all things which are especial­ly contained under those predicaments.

His opinion likewise is, that the providence of a se­cond degree of gods, which (as he conceiveth) turne about the Sphaeres; hath rule over the ingen­dring [Page 609] of all the baser li­ving-creatures, & of plants, and of all things which are subject unto generation, and corruption. Yea, and Aristotle himselfe ascribes the ingendring of such things, to the Sun, and un­to the Zodiack circle.

That which according to Plato's opinion, is the third providence, hath pre­dominācie over the events and ends of those things which are begun or per­fected by us; as also over the course and condition of mans life; and over all those naturall and materiall things; and over such as are called instrument all things, whether they bee good or evill. And the prin­cipall [Page 610] agents in this provi­dence, he supposed to bee certaine Angells (or spi­rits) ordained to bee al­wayes conversant upon the earth, and to have the charge over those things which men doe.

But hee affirmes that the second and the third providence also, have their whole essence from the first; so that all things are in effect, governed by the power of the chiefest God, who ordained the first, the second, and the third, to be employed in the well-or­dering, and governing of things.

Now this is praise wor­thy in Plato, that he refer­reth all unto GOD, and [Page 611] affirmes all providence to depend upon his will. But whereas he sayes there is a second providence, com­mitted unto those which turne the heavens about (as he hath said) we com­mend him not in so affir­ming. For (if any such were) that which they per­formed, is not a worke of providence; but rather, a worke of necessity, where­unto they were destina­ted. For, let them be figu­red how they will, it must necessarily follow, that things must both be done as they were done; and that they might not be in any other maner then they are. And I have al­ready shewed, that no­thing [Page 612] done by providence, is subject unto necessity.

II Now the Stoick Philo­sophers (who defend as an undeniable truth, that there is a destiny, necessita­ting all things, and that some things are also in our power) doe leave no place at all for providence; and indeed they overthrow (as is before declared) by affirming there is destiny, so much of their owne opi­nion, as averrs that things are in our power.

Democritus, Heraclitus, and Epicurus, are of opini­on that there is no provi­dence either of universall, or of particular things. And Epicurus hath expressed his meaning to this pur­pose.

[Page 613] ‘The nature (saith hee) which is blessed and in­corruptible; neither is of it selfe troubled with any businesse; neither occasioneth any other to be troublesomely im­ployed: and therefore, neither is angry for any thing; nor favoureth any thing; because all such like things, doe betoken weaknesse. Yea the gods cannot bee angry, in re­gard anger never chan­ceth unto any, but when something succeedeth contrary unto their will, which thing cannot at any time happen unto the gods.

The opinion of these men is conformable to the [Page 614] principles which are devi­sed by themselves. For, it is no wonder if they hold opinion that there is no providence to governe any thing, who affirme that the world was made by hap-hazzard. For how should those things which had no Creator, have any providence to preserve or governe them? Seeing it is plaine that such things must be confusedly caried to & fro, by hap-hazzard, which were made by chance, and at adventure, in the beginning.

Wee must therefore withstand them in their first opinion, as wee have done already (and so dis­prove the same) that it may [Page 615] be well manifested there is a providence. And for that cause wee will refer the confutation of these men, unto a fitter oppor­tunity; and proceed to ex­amine the opinion of A­ristotle; and others, who say that particular things are not governed by any providence.

For Aristotle in the III sixth booke of his Ethicks to Nichomachus, hath covertly delivered that par­ticular things are gover­ned by nature onely. For, nature being (saith he) di­vine, and ingraffed in all things which are ingendred, doth naturally ad­minister a way unto each, to chuse which is most ex­pedient [Page 616] for it, and to a­void such things as are hurtfull thereunto. And (indeed) every living-creature (as we have shew­ed heretofore) maketh choice of such nourish­ment, as is agreeable unto it; earnestly pursuing what is convenient for it; and naturally knowing what cures are pertinent unto the diseases thereof.

Euripides, and Menan­der, have in some places affirmed, that the princi­pall parts of the minde, which is in every man, doth by providence go­verne each man, and no GOD at all. But the minde is conversant in those things onely which are in [Page 617] our power; and they are ei­ther in actions which may be done, or in the arts, or in contemplation: Whereas providence is busied in things which are not in our power; as to be rich, or to be poore; to be in health, or to be sick; wherewith nei­ther the minde, nor nature, (as Aristotle himselfe hol­deth opinion) have any thing to doe, in that sense.

For the workes of na­ture are evident: and if a murtherer bee sometime punished, and sometime let goe without punish­ment, here is that perti­nent either to the minde, or unto nature (as it is unto providence?) except some will affirme that things [Page 618] belonging to nature, and unto the minde, are perti­nent unto providence; and that things which follow upon the choice of the minde, and operations of nature, doe afterward be­long unto destiny; which being granted, all that should bee in our power, would be quite over­throwne.

But the matter is not at that point. For (as hath beene already declared) every thing belonging unto the minde (whether it be for practise or contem­plation) is all in our power. Neither doe all things which are contained un­der providence, belong to nature; though every thing [Page 619] belonging to nature, is go­verned by providence. For many things wrought by providence, are not the workes of nature; as I have declared in discovering the murtherer; neither is nature in all points, the same with providence, though it be (as indeed it is) a part of providence. And therefore these men doe ascribe the providence over particular things both to nature, and unto the minde.

SECT. 2.

I. Of their absurd opinion, who affirme that GOD hath care of universall, but not of particular things. II. The error of [Page 620] the vulgar, concerning blessednesse; and of their causelesse, and impious reprehension of GODS Providence. III. Of the blasphemies which must consequently follow the deniall of GODS Provi­dence, over particular things.

THere be some who af­firme, that God so pro­vides for the continuance of all things which hee hath created, that nothing shall faile which hee hath made; and that his provi­dence extends to this thing alone, without regarding particulars, which are left by him to succeed as meer casualty shall bring them about.

[Page 621] Hereupon (as they conceive) it commeth to passe, that so many inju­ries, so many murthers, and (in briefe) that so much wickednesse, and oppression is increased a­mong men: yea, there­upon it commeth (say they) to passe, that some of them are punished, some unpunished, and that little or nothing is performed, either accor­ding to right reason, or the Canons of Law.

For, how (as they think) can it be possible that God hath care of any thing, when as neither law, nor true judgement beareth sway? but where the con­trary hath rather the chief [Page 622] rule? and where the best men are for the most part wronged, oppressed, and plunged into innumera­ble afflictions; while Ty­rants and wicked men are advanced to offices, to powerfull dignities, to ri­ches, and to all such things as are well esteemed of in this life?

But they who speake in this maner, are not onely ignorant of many other things, that are expressed in our discourse of providence; but estranged also to the immortality of the soule: For, supposing the soule to bee mortall they shut up all things belon­ging unto man within the compasse of this life; and [Page 623] (judging perversly of those things which are good) they imagine that such as abound in riches, and beare great sway by the places of authority, and vaunt of other such like temporall (or materiall) commodities, are the on­ly blessed and happy men.

But of the vertues of the minde (which exceed by many degrees all bodi­ly and externall things) they make no account at all. Howsoever those com­modities are the best, which belong unto the best things. And in that respect, vertue as far sur­passeth riches and health, and such like, as the soule is more excellent then the [Page 624] body: And therefore al­so, vertue aswell alone, as together with other things, makes a man to be blessed.

Vertue with other things is considered according to a finite amplitude, as a thing of two ells, or the like; but alone, and by it selfe, it is considerable accor­ding to an indefinite cir­cumscription, as a heape. For if from a heape (which is a thing having an indefinite circumscription) you may take away two bushels (which is a finite quantity) two bushels is indeed ta­ken from the heape: yet that which is left continu­eth still to be an an heape.

In like maner, if from [Page 625] vertue (considered in its own indefinite amplitude) you take away all the good things that are bo­dily or externall (which are but finite things) and leave the vertue onely, (which is an indefinite good) the blessednesse remaineth still intire; because vertue, even of it selfe, is perfect­ly sufficient to blessednesse. And therefore every good man is blessed (though no externall good be left him) and every wicked man is miserable, though he hath all those things hapned together, which are cal­led the goods of Fortune.

The multitude not know­ing II thus much, doe think that they onely are blessed, [Page 626] who have all things at will, for their bodily de­light, and abound in ri­ches; and they can oft finde fault with providence which governeth our af­faires, not with respect unto those things onely which are apparent unto us, but with regard unto those also, which are ac­cording to the fore-know­ledge of GOD.

For GOD foreseeing, that it would be expedi­ent for him to bee poore, who is now honest and good, (and that riches com­ming fast upō him, would corrupt his minde) doth keep him in that poverty, which is most convenient for the chiefe good of that [Page 627] man. And in regard God foresaw also, that the rich, man would be grievous to others in the want of ri­ches (by committing rob­beries, murthers, and o­ther great outrages) hee suffered him to enjoy ri­ches.

Poverty hath been ma­ny times profitable also, in making us to beare the losse of our children with more contentednesse; and in preventing the vexati­ons which might happen by wicked servants; and perhaps their lives would have beene more bitter to us then their deaths, if our children had lived to bee wicked; or if wee should have had false and thee-vish [Page 628] servants. We foresee­ing nothing that is to come; but beholding only the things present, cannot judge rightly of that which may fall out; but unto GOD all future things are as evident as those which are present.

Thus much wee have spoken against those who have presumed to blame GODS providence; and a­gainst whom this part of Scripture may well be ap­plyed, Shall the clay say to the potter, why hast thou made me thus? For it is an arrogance to be abhorred, that he who dares not finde fault with an earth­ly Law-giver, should pre­scribe lawes to GOD, and [Page 629] object against the workes of his providence.

But we will forbeare to meddle further with such extravagancies, (or to speake more properly, with such impieties) and proceed in disproving them, who say, that parti­cular things are not gover­ned by any providence, and yet allow that universall, and generall things, are go­verned by a providence. For no man can alleadge more then these three causes, to prove that there is no providence of God over particular things.

Either it must bee be­cause GOD knoweth not that it is good to take care for such things; or because he [Page 630] will not; or because he can­not. But nothing is more estranged from that bles­sed Essence, then ignorance, and unskilfulnesse: For It is knowledge, and science, and wisdome it selfe. Nay, there is none among men, so ignorant (if he be in his wits) but knowes, that if all particular things should be destroyed, the generall things could not possibly consist; seeing universall things, are made up of par­ticulars. Yea, all the par­ticular things, and the gene­rall things are equall, and converted, & destroyed, and preserved together. If ther­fore particular things pe­rish, the universall will al­so perish. And there is no [Page 631] reason why wee should imagine that all singular things could escape de­struction, if no care were taken of them from above.

Now whereas to avoid this objection, they grant that GODS providence ex­tendeth to this onely; that individualls shall bee pro­vidently preserved, so far forth as may conduce to the preservation of gene­rall things; they have said enough (though they bee not aware thereof) to prove that there is, also, some providence over indi­vidualls. For (as they themselves have said in effect) GOD by preser­ving the species, preserveth also the kindes.

SECT. 3.

I. Of the unreasonablenesse of their opinion, who thinke that God despiseth to take care of particular things. II. Of Gods un­deniable ablenesse to go­verne individualls; and of the capablenesse which particulars have of the divine providence. III. Mans readinesse to call upon God in suddain ex­tremities (as it were by naturall instinct) is an ar­gument of providence.

SOme there be who (al­though they confesse that GOD is not ignorant how to provide for parti­cular things) doe affirme, [Page 633] that he will not assume the care of them. Now every one that will not doe a thing; either will not doe it, because of sloth, or else for that it is not comely for him so to doe.

No man will be so mad as to impute sloth to GOD; For sloth is bred of these two; pleasure, and feare; and every one that is slothfull, is thereby drawn away by the love of some ease (or pleasure) or else discouraged by feare: and to cōceive either of these to be in GOD, were an impious absurdity.

If they that will not be so prophane to lay sloth­fulnesse to GODS charge, shall say it is undecent for [Page 634] GOD, and unworthy the majesty of so high a blessed­nesse, to descend so low and unto such vile & smal things (or to be as it were prophaned by the absur­dities, and obscenities of those materiall things which depend upon the will of man; and that there­fore he will not take upon himselfe the government of such matters) they (not heeding it) impute unto GOD, in so saying, two very faulty things, pride, and impurity.

For either the Creator despiseth to take on him­selfe the government and administration of indivi­dualls through haughtiness: (which is most absurd to [Page 635] affirme) or else through feare of being defiled, as they speake. And that is no lesse absurd then the other. For if they know the nature of the Sunne-beams to be such, that they can exhale naturally all moisture, even from dung-hills when they shine up­on them, and that neither the Sunne, nor his beames are any whit contamina­ted, or defiled thereby, but keepe neverthelesse their owne purity: how can they conceive that GOD should be polluted, by those things which are below? Surely these can­not be the conjectures of men, that have any know­ledge of what is pertinent [Page 636] unto the nature of GOD.

For the God-head is un­touchable, uncorruptible, not possibly to be contamina­ted, and above all altera­tion: But pollution and such like things are the workes of change, and be­token alteration.

II And how can it bee counted other then most absurd, that an artificer (of what art soever) and espe­cially a Physitian, taking care of generall things, should heedlesly passe o­ver things particular? with­out caring to shew his art in them (though things of the least consequence) see­ing hee cannot chuse but know that every part stan­deth in some stead unto [Page 637] the whole? much more ab­surd were it for any man to be of opinion; that God who is the Creator of all, should be more unskilfull then an artificer; and what else can be alleaged, if he be willing, but that hee cannot take the care of particulars? And what can be affirmed more ma­nifestly repugnant to the nature of GOD, then to say he is weak, and lacketh ability to doe well?

For two other causes, GODS providence is by some judged not to be ex­ercised in particular things. The one is, because the nature of God (as they thinke) serveth not there­unto; the other is, for that [Page 638] they conceive particular things to be incapable of his providence.

But that it is agreeable to the nature of GOD to governe by his providence, they themselves (who have denied it) doe im­plicitly confesse, when they affirme that his pro­vidence ruleth universall things; especially seeing the inferiour things are not able to mount up, unto such as are much above them; whereas the power of those which are superi­our, descendeth even unto the lowest, (even to things insensible) for their pre­servation: yea, all things depend upon the will of GOD, and draw from [Page 639] thence, their continuance, and well-being.

And that the nature of individualls (though infi­nitely multiplyed) is ca­pable of being governed by Providence; it is plaine by those living creatures which are ordered by Rule and Authority. For, some of them, as Bees and Ants, and divers others, which being assembled together, are continued under certaine Captaines (or guides) whom they obediently follow: But this is best perceived if we looke into the govern­ment of common-wealths▪ and the conversation that is amongst men: For it is plaine, that it admits the [Page 640] administration and care, both of Lawgivers, and al­so of subordinate magi­strates; and how can that which is capable of such things, be unfit, to receive an orderly government from the providence of the Creator?

III This also is no small ar­gument, that there is pro­vidence over particular things, even that the knowledge thereof is na­turally ingraffed in men: which is evident, when wee are brought to any great extremity; for wee then slie immediately un­to GOD by prayer, as if without teaching, it were naturally written in our hearts, that help were to [Page 641] be sought of GOD.

Nature except it have beene taught, cannot of it selfe lead us unto that, the doing whereof is not ac­cording to nature: nei­ther doth it move us to fly thither for assistance, where none is to be had: yet when any great affli­ction, or feare suddenly op­presseth us; we cry out un­to GOD before we be a­ware; and before we have had time to bethinke our selves what wee have to doe. Now, every naturall consequence, is a forcible evidence admitting no contradiction.

SECT. 4.

I. Of the occasion and grounds of their error, who thought there was no Providence ruling indi­vidualls. II. How men ought to behave them­selves in the search of Gods providence, which is beyond their compre­hension. III. Of Divine permission, and the ma­nifold species thereof.

THe occasions & ground of their error who say there is no providence over particular things, are these. First, they conceived the soule to bee mortall, and that it perished with the body. And secondly, be­cause [Page 643] these men could not comprehend by their understanding and rea­son, how there should bee any providence ruling indi­vidualls.

But that the soule is not mortall, and that all things pertaining unto man, are not shut up within the compasse of this life, it ap­peareth (even to heathen men) both by the opini­ons of the wisest among the Grecians, who taught the transmigration of soules from body to body; as also by the places which they affirmed to bee allotted out, unto the Soules de­parted, according to their good or evill course in this life; and by those pu­nishments [Page 644] wherwith soules are (as they hold) puni­shed by themselves, for the offences they have committed.

For these things, al­though they be erroneous in other circumstances and respects; yet in this they are true, and their authors do all agree there­in, that the soule remai­neth after this life, and shall come to Iudgement.

II But if wee cannot at­taine unto the reason of that governance which pro­vidence hath over particu­lar things; which indeed we cannot, as is implyed by this text: How unsearch­able are thy judgements, and thy wayes past finding out! [Page 645] Let us not therupon con­clude, there is no such pro­vidence: For no man ought to affirme there is neither sea, not sand, be­cause he is ignorant of the limits of the Sea, and of the number of the sands: seeing by the same rule, they might aswell say that there is neither man, nor any other living-creature, because they know not the number either of the men, or of the living-creatures.

Particular things are to us infinite: Things which are unto us infinite, and al­so unknowne unto us; and therefore, though univer­salls may be (oftentimes) comprehended by our un­derstanding, [Page 646] yet indivi­dualls are not possibly comprehensible thereby.

There is in every man a double difference; one in respect of other men; and another in respect of him­selfe: yea, there is in eve­ry man great differences, and alterations even in re­spect of himselfe. Every day; as, in the maner of his life; in his actions, (or af­faires) in his necessities, in his desires; and in all things which doe happen, or per­taine unto him.

It is not much other­wise with an irrationall-creature; for according to the manifold necessities, and occasions thereof, it is very speedily caried hi­ther [Page 647] and thither; and soon altered againe as other opportunities require.

These things conside­red, that Providence which is able to keep a continu­all course with every one of those infinite and in­comprehensible particu­lars (which are so differing also, so changeable, and of so many fashions) must needs be such a Providence as is agreeable to all, and every one of those indivi­dualls: and extended more infinitely then those things are, whereunto it should reach.

And if this Providence must be so fit, and so infi­nite in regard of the infi­nite difference of indivi­dualls: [Page 648] no doubt but the reason and method of this Providence is as infinite; and if it be infinite, it can­not possibly bee compre­hended by us. And it be­comes not us to deny that gracious providence which governes all things, be­cause our ignorance is una­ble to comprehend it. For those things which wee suppose to be amisse, are knowne well enough un­to the wisdome of the Cre­ator, to be well ordered.

Because wee are igno­rant of their occasions, we causelesly judge many things to be imprudently done; and that which chanceth unto us in other things, by reason of our [Page 649] ignorance, falleth out al­so in the workes of provi­dence; for we doe after the same sort cōceive of those things which belong to providence; receiving by obscure likelihoods, and by conjectures, certaine formes or shadowes of the workes thereof, by such things as we have seene.

Wee say therefore, that III some things are done by Gods permission; and this permission is of many sorts: For he sometime permits that even the just man shall fall into misery, to declare unto others, that vertue which is concealed as in Iob.

Hee doth also permit some absurd things; that [Page 650] by the act which appea­reth to bee absurd, some great and wonderfull mat­ter may bee brought to passe, as the salvation of men by the Crosse.

Hee permits likewise the blessed Saints to be af­flicted for another end; as that they might not fall from a sincere conscience, and that the loftinesse of the minde might be aba­ted; as when St. Paul was buffetted by Satan.

Sometimes also, one man is rejected, and left as desolate for a time; that others considering his case, might be instructed, and amended thereby. As in the example of Laza­rus and the rich man; for, [Page 651] when we see any man af­flicted, our hearts are na­turally touched there­with, according as Menan­der hath very well ex­pressed:

By seeing others feele the Rod,
We tremble with a fear of GOD.

Otherwhile, again, one man is afflicted for the glory of another; and nei­ther for his owne sin, nor the sinne of his Parents: as, he that was blind from his birth, for the glorify­ing of the Son of man.

It is permitted also that some should be persecu­ted, to be a pattern of con­stancy unto others; and that when their glory is [Page 652] exalted, others might be incouraged to suffer in the like case, in hope of the glory to come; and for the blessednesse which is expected after this life; as in the Martyrs, and in those who have yeelded up their lives for their Country, for their kinred, or for their masters.

SECT. 5.

I. One may otherwhile be af­flicted for the good of a­nother, without infrin­ging the Justice of divine Providence. Why holy men suffer bitter deaths and persecutions. II. Death, or sufferings are no disadvātages to good men; neither are the un­lawfull actions of the wic­ked, justifiable, though Providence convert thē to good ends.

[Page 653] NOw, if any one thinke it against reason, that one man should be affli­cted for the amendment of another; let him know that this life, is (not the per­fection of mans happinesse) but a place of wrestlings, and of striving for maste­ry, in respect of Vertue: And the greater the la­bours and sufferings are, the more glorious Crown of Glory shall be obtai­ned: because the recom­pence of Rewards, is accor­ding to the measure of Patience.

[Page 654] Saint Paul was conten­ted to undergoe the mani­fold afflictions and tribu­lations which he suffered, that he might obtain the greater, and more perfect Crown of a Conquerour: (which he himself confesseth to be more then all our suffe­rings can merit) and there­fore the works of Provi­dence are justly and very decently performed.

A man may the better allow this to be so, (and conceive that GOD go­verns all things, so well and so fitly, that the na­ture of each thing cannot more desire) if he doe but propose unto himself the beleeving of these two things which are general­ly [Page 655] confessed among men: namely, that GOD, onely, is good and wise: For, in that he is Good, it is agree­able unto his goodnesse to employ his providence over all things; and in that he is wise, he hath a regard to performe them wisely and exactly: because, if he used not his Providence, he could not be good: and if he did not use it well, hee could not be wise.

He therefore, that gives his minde to consider dis­creetly of these matters, will not misesteem of any thing which is wrought by divine providence; nei­ther speak evill thereof without due examinati­on: but rather accept of [Page 656] all things, as exceeding well performed: and mar­vaile at their admirable decency and perfection, though the ignorant mul­titude judge according to a false appearance: For in conceiving otherwise, wee bring upon our heads (besides the guilt of blasphemy) great blame for our sottish presump­tion.

II Now, in that wee say, all things are done well, wee justifie not the naughti­nesse of men, or of such evill works as are in our power to doe, or leave undone; but, we speak it of the works of Providence which are not in our po­wer. For, if any man ob­ject [Page 657] and say, How falls it out that holy men are put cruelly to death without desert? why, if they were unjustly condemned, did not Gods just providence hinder those murthers? and if they deserved to be so put to death, why are not they without blame who caused them to bee slaine?

To this we answer, that the murtherers of such men were injurious in slaying them; and that they which were so slain, were slain either for their desert, or their profit Somtime deservingly, for evills committed by them in secret: and sometimes for their profit: Gods [Page 658] providence, thereby pre­venting either future sins, or worse mischiefes to come; and in those re­spects it was good for them that their life should be shortned. Thus was it with Socrates, and the Saints.

But, they who slew these men, did not slay them for any such cause; nei­ther was it lawfully done; but out of the corruption of their owne minds, and for gain and robbery: For, the Act is in mans power; but what shall follow up­on the Act, (as whether we shall be slain or no) is not as he will: neither is any death evill, except for sinne onely, as is ma­nifest [Page 659] by the death of the Saints.

But, wicked men, al­though they die in their beds on a sudden, and without pain, doe never­thelesse die an evill death, which brings them unto an evill buriall: I meane, to bee buried in their sinne; yet whosoever killeth any man murthe­rously, doth wickedly in so doing.

If hee killeth any one for that which deserveth death; he is then to be ac­counted among hangmen and executioners. If it be for the gaining of some profit by them that are slaine, he is to be reputed among cruell and wic­ked [Page 660] murtherers.

The like may be said of them who murther their enemies, or oppresse them by extreame servitude, or use any manner of in­humane cruelty, against them whom they have overcome.

They also are as little to be justified, who seeke the inriching of them­selves, by extorting other mens goods: for, though it may be expedient for those, from whom they were extorted, that they should be deprived of them; yet, they which wrested away more then their owne, were unjust, in so so doing. For, they take them out of a cove­tous [Page 661] desire of those good, and not for that it was expedient for them, whō they dispos­sessed of such things.

Glory be to God.


This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal. The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.